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THE WESTERN PUBLIC
1952 and Beyond

By Alfred de Grazia

What are the roots of political behavior in the eleven Western states? Why did Eisenhower sweep the West in 1952? Is the West local-minded or nationalistic, internationally minded or isolationist? What factors will affect the Western vote in 1954 and 1956?

In *The Western Public, 1952 and Beyond*, Alfred de Grazia, pioneering authority in the science of political behavior, provides answers to these and many other questions on the Western vote, which with each major election gains strength and significance in the national voting picture. The origin of much of this book lies in a major survey of the election campaign of 1952, made by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. From the great mass of information obtained—probably the most elaborate collection of facts and figures ever assembled on the subject—Dr. de Grazia has written this first scientific treatment of political behavior in the American West.

The book first gives an account of the results of the 1952 election. The political campaign is described: what the Westerners regarded as the main issues of the campaign; how the campaign reached the voters via the press, radio, television, and political agitation; and how the Eisenhower nomination served the local Republican candidates in the West.

Dr. de Grazia also describes some of the underlying social divisions of the Western public. He delves into the political differences between the poor and the well to do, between the country and city voters, be-

(Continued on back flap)

Oct. 8, 1954

To Mom & Dad

with love

Al



REPUBLICAN VICTORY IN THE WEST, 1952
(Breakdown by counties)

THE WESTERN PUBLIC
1952 and Beyond

By

ALFRED DE GRAZIA

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To
JILL

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

IN EXTENDING THANKS to those who have made a book on political behavior possible, one may rightly begin with the Founding Fathers, who initiated the Census, and end with his wife. More immediately, there are those who have helped prepare the book itself. William Wolman assisted valiantly and efficiently in all phases of the work. Harold Ellis granted to it the fullest measure of his thorough scholarship and editorial skills. Jacqueline Vandersyde shepherded well the mass of papers, tables, and manuscripts that tended constantly to scatter into the farthest recesses of Serra House, and finally brought them together with skill into orderly press copy for the printers. Without their kindness and diligence, I could not now have published this work.

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To Floyd E. McCaffree, Director of the Research Division of the Republican National Committee, and his hard-working staff, I am indebted for a number of valuable factual tables that are reproduced from their excellent compendium, *The 1952 Elections: A Statistical Analysis.* The Committee for Research in Social Sciences of Stanford University granted financial aid that considerably abetted the researches. My colleagues of the Committee on Political Behavior Research of the Social Science Research Council have, indirectly and directly, lent a friendly and helpful hand. In their noncorporate capacities, they are: Conrad M. Arensberg, Angus Campbell, Oliver Garceau, V. O. Key, Avery Leiserson, M. Brewster Smith, David B. Truman, and Pendleton Herring. Finally, I would express my appreciation to Thomas S. Barclay, whose peerless acquaintanceship with Western politics is a most effective radar against high-flying statistical canards.

ALFRED DE GRAZIA

SERRA HOUSE
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
September 14, 1954

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INTRODUCTION

POLITICALLY SPEAKING, the Western states of America compose the least known region of the nation. The Atlantic States, New England, the Midwest, and the South have fuller histories. There are eleven Western states in all: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. All of them joined the Union after 1850, during which period only seven others were admitted, including West Virginia, which was carved from Virginia during the Civil War. Most of the population, even of the older Western states, is of recent origin. About half of today's California voters have come into the state since 1932. The Western population has been expanding at a great rate, especially along the Pacific Coast. Industrial and commercial pursuits have involved an ever increasing proportion of the people. Every new census proves the heightened importance of the West to the American economy and domestic political structure. Every new incident of political turmoil in the Orient and the Pacific Basin accents the critical role of the American West in the international picture.

Until lately, the voice of the West has been heard most strikingly in the United States Senate, where states of small population contend on equal terms with the most populous. Today and in the future the West can speak strongly in the House of Representatives, in the White House, and in many of the departments of government besides those with inherent interests in the West, such as the Department of the Interior. The eleven states stand in national politics today, not only with 22 of the 96 Senators in Washington, but with 9,151,160 votes of the total of 61,551,919 cast in the nation in 1952. They send to the Capitol 57 of the 435 members of the House of Representatives. Ten years before, the number had been only 49. In 1960 there will be more. A Westerner, Richard Nixon of California, occupies the Vice-Presidency. Governor Warren of California has become Chief Justice of the United States. From now on, at every presidential nominating convention, the candidates from California will enter the lists with chances of success almost equal to those of candidates from New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois.

It is evident that the political fortunes of the West have been changing

rapidly, and if one is to keep abreast of them he must repeatedly examine his political facts. Yet the politics of the West have been the subject of little systematic writing. Every day one hears new statements about the West, but too often they are unsupported by serious evidence. The West has a reputation for unpredictability, but who has proved this to be true? Some political scientists and politicians believe that the West is intensely local-minded, but others believe it is the most nationalistic section of the country. Even the basic political geography of the West is not reported in necessary form and detail.

Consequently, the opportunity was welcome, during and after the elections of 1952, to study and report on the most elaborate collection of facts and figures concerning the political behavior of the West that has ever been assembled. The origin of much of this book goes back to a 1949 conference of specialists on political behavior, from all over the country, held at Ann Arbor, Michigan, and directed by Pendleton Herring of the Social Science Research Council. There, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan proposed a major study of the election campaign of 1952, to answer a large number of questions about the political behavior of Americans that previous surveys had failed to treat. Discussions of this proposal of the Survey Research Center, whose international prestige in the making of field surveys had been achieved through many distinguished studies in economics, psychology, and politics, took place in a series of meetings at the Social Science Research Council in New York. Finally, the Carnegie Corporation granted the Survey Research Center the financial aid necessary for a nation-wide study of the election of 1952.

Months of preliminary work at the University of Michigan produced an exact, pretested, and exhaustive questionnaire. A sample of 2,021 Americans was chosen, according to principles of statistical probability, to stand for the 150,000,000 people of the nation. The West's portion of this sample amounted to 210 cases. However, the sample was weighted so that there would be enough additional cases from the Western states to represent more accurately the West as a distinct region of the country. With the new weight added, the Western sample was 452 cases. In September and October, interviewers from the Survey Research Center went into the field and interrogated carefully and at length the persons of the sample. Immediately following the election the members of the national sample were reinterviewed, with the exception of the 242 persons from

the West who had constituted the extra weighting in the first interview. The weighting had been dropped for lack of funds. Therefore, the Western sample numbered 452 cases for the lengthy interview during the campaign and 210 for the shorter interview just after the election. With very few exceptions the persons of the second interview had already been interviewed before the election.

The amount of information gathered from the people who composed the sample is amazing. Eight IBM tabulating cards were required to contain the hundreds of coded punches representing all the information from each person's interview report. The index to all punches possible on the eight cards is in itself a book of over two hundred pages. It can readily be understood that when the information provided by a single person was punched into his eight cards, thousands of combinations and comparisons might be made relating his background and opinions to the background and opinions of all the other people of the sample. Because of the special interest here in the political behavior of the Western states, the Western part of the sample was separated from that of the balance of the nation. The record of those interviews formed the largest body of materials for the present work. When comparisons with the rest of the country were needed, the entire national sample was used. Supplemented by a collection of official election statistics and newspaper materials, these voluminous interview records comprised the factual basis of this book.

Naturally one is not often completely satisfied with the character of his sample. Very few investigators are ever satisfied with their samples. Just as Archimedes longed for a lever long enough to move the world, so, too, the men who make surveys pine for a sample that would have a negligible error for every purpose which they might have. Even beyond the defects of most samples, the Western sample had some regrettable features. It should have been somewhat larger—perhaps 650, both before and after the elections—even for the grosser kind of analysis. It was unfortunate that the materials taken after the election were from a sample one-half the size of that taken before the election. Furthermore, the population of the Western states is most unevenly distributed, so that a sample of even several hundred more would not have thrown light upon certain question of politics peculiar to the less populous states of the region. That is, this sample, or even one considerably larger, could not be used to report

accurately what people in small states like Nevada or Idaho were thinking about local problems.

Such problems have been avoided in this book. An effort has been made at all times to shield the reader from statements made on the basis of too few cases or insufficient information. One is not even tempted to make such statements; there are too many significant things to say which are well founded in fact to indulge in pure conjecture, surmise, or prejudice. If it is necessary to guess about a matter the facts of which come from too few people, it will be so noted.

At all events, if one thinks of how he usually gets information about the public, he may be happy to accept these materials as the best yet gathered on the public of the West. You will find here no off-the-cuff guesses of a harried newspaper reporter, no gossip from a cocktail bar that is frequented by a limited class of people, no wishful thinking of a politician, no gleanings of eternal "truth" from a small crowd of enthusiastic supporters of a cause, and no editorial "we" of a publisher presuming to speak for the people of the West.

It is necessary only to describe the sample of Westerners in some detail for it to be appreciated that there is here, if not a perfect sample of the Western public, at least the most representative group whose opinions, attitudes, and backgrounds have been made a matter of record. Of the group, 47% are men; the census of 1950 showed 50.23% of the population of the Western states to be men. Of our sample, 10% work in the professions or semiprofessions, the census of 1950 having shown 8.81% of the working population to be in those occupations. Of the Westerners, 1% had no schooling, whereas the census of 1950 showed 1.72% to have no schooling; 17% of the sample group completed grade school but did not go beyond it; the corresponding figure from the census was 17.8%. Of the sample, 26% completed high school; the census of 1950 showed 25.82% of the Western population had completed high school. The sample shows that 8% had completed college; the corresponding census figure was 7.6%. In the sample, 42% rented their dwellings; the census figure in 1950 was 38.25%. Of the Western group 54% were aged 21 to 44 and 47% were 45 or older; the corresponding census figures were 56.6% and 43.4%. In the cross section of the West, 75% were urban dwellers and 25%, rural; the census of 1950 showed 72.4% and 27.6%.

When the Westerners were asked during the campaign for whom they

intended to vote, 58% of those whose minds were made up said Eisenhower; 42% said Stevenson. Eisenhower, in fact, received 57% of the Western vote; Stevenson 42.3%. It was stated earlier that only one-half of the sample was reinterviewed in a shorter interview after the election. Of those reinterviewed who had voted in the election, 62% had voted for Eisenhower and 38% had voted for Stevenson. There is, therefore, a difference of 4% between the vote of this part of the sample and the official election returns. To the professional researcher these are respectably small differences in a sample of this size. Since this is not a study intended to predict any election, one need neither be unduly pleased by the precision of the election figures in the full sample, nor worried by a difference of several percentage points in the half sample.

If one is interested in trying to explain this difference, however, some of the complexities of such an explanation can be pointed out here.[1] The very close strike of the full sample might well have been two or three points on either side. The postelection half sample made possible an even wider difference, because the size of a sample—though laymen tend to exaggerate the importance of size—does affect the probable error. The postelection sample is, therefore, generally less useful. The difference in accuracy of the two samples in regard to the election figures may be due simply to sampling error. That this may be the proper explanation of the difference is attested to also by the fact that a comparison of the cross section with the census figures does not show any consistent tendency to select people who are ordinarily Republican because they earn more money, have greater education, or live in rural areas. On the other hand, there may be a bandwagon effect operating to cause an apparent error in the sample: a few people may have said that they voted for the winner, Eisenhower, whereas in fact they voted for Stevenson, or not at all.

On the whole, one can be confident that the several hundreds of people

[1] The technical reader is referred to Appendix F of *The Voter Decides*, by Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, for a more rigorous description of the method used in the survey, and the tables of sampling errors. Very few of the comparisons made in this book are statistically significant at the .05 level, owing to the small size of the sample and the intrinsic nature of opinion breakdowns of a large natural population on attitudinal and behavioral questions of importance to political study, which constantly produce small differences. Special attention was consequently given evidences of consistent trends, internal consistency of the data, consistencies of findings with previous discoveries of similar surveys in other areas, and corroborative data supplied by external criteria such as interviews, newspapers, voting returns, and the census.

whose opinions and backgrounds contribute to this work are a representative cross section of the Western public on a wide variety of questions regarding how the West lives, thinks, and acts in politics. Analysis of the actual election returns in the hundreds of counties of the West, coupled with common sense in the statistical analysis of the sample, makes it possible to report the story of the Western public accurately. Furthermore, a study was made of other polls of public opinion; experts and participants in the campaign were interviewed; and an analysis of the Western press on a number of questions pertaining to the campaign was made.

Many discoveries about the West, unearthed by different methods, may, as a result, be presented. An account of the general results of the 1952 election in the West can be given. The political campaign can be described: how Westerners followed the parties and the candidates; what the Westerners regarded as the main issues of the campaign; how the campaign reached the voters via the press, radio, television, and political agitation; who were apathetic and indifferent in this hotly contested campaign, and why they were so; why many Democrats, Republicans, newspapers, and public opinion specialists thought a big switch from Eisenhower to Stevenson was occurring late in the campaign; and how Eisenhower helped the local Republican candidates in the various states of the West.

The story that follows will also describe some of the underlying social divisions of the Western public. In the first place, it will reveal the pictures that Westerners themselves had about what was to be the outcome of the election, and how various groups would vote. It will delve into the political differences between the poor and the well-to-do, between the country and the city voters. It will treat the question whether women differ from men, politically. It will examine the differences between native sons of the West and the more recently arrived voters. It will see whether Westerners and other Americans have markedly different politics. And, finally, the narrative will conclude with a look into the future behavior of the Western public.

Chapter I

VERDICT AT THE POLLS, 1952

THE NATIONAL TICKET of the Republican Party swept the Western states in the November elections of 1952. While Dwight D. Eisenhower captured 57.3% of the Western vote, his opponent, Adlai Stevenson, won only 41.9%. The General fared somewhat better in the West than in the country at large, where he obtained only 55.1% of the total vote as opposed to 44.4% for Stevenson. Minor parties had a negligible influence on the 1952 elections, earning merely a half of one percent of the total national vote and three-quarters of one percent of the Western vote. Eisenhower's national majority, as represented in the percentage he captured of the popular vote, was a trifle higher than Franklin Roosevelt's in 1940 and 1944. However, Harding in 1920, Hoover in 1928, and Roosevelt in 1932 and 1936 won larger percentages of the popular vote.

In moving solidly into the Eisenhower camp, the Western states were typical of the rest of the country outside of the South and West Virginia. Even in the South, the ordinarily Democratic states of Florida, Texas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia went for the Republican candidate.

The change from 1948 was striking. The Republican proportion of the Western popular vote for President increased 11% between 1948 and 1952 while the Democratic proportion declined 7.4% and the minor-party vote declined from 3.5% to almost nothing. The corresponding changes for the nation as a whole showed an increase of 10% in the Republican vote, a decrease of 5.1% in the Democratic vote, and a decrease of 4.9% in the minor-party vote. Table I shows the extent of the changes from 1948 to 1952 in all of the Western states. The smallest change was in California, where the Republicans gained 9.3% and the Democrats and minor-party candidates each lost over 4%.

California is the giant of the West in population and resources. In 1952 it cast 56.2% of the votes of the eleven Western states. This one state accounted, therefore, for more than half the total vote cast in the vast stretches of the West. This fact must be borne in mind when considering the West in national politics and in understanding what must be

TABLE I

THE VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN THE WESTERN STATES, 1948 AND 1952*

	Total	Rep.	% Rep.	Dem.	% Dem.	Other	% Other	State's % of total Western vote
Country as a whole								
1952....	61,547,861	33,927,544	55.1	27,311,316	44.4	309,996	0.5	—
1948....	48,688,289	21,969,170	45.1	24,105,695	49.5	2,613,424	5.4	—
West as a whole								
1952....	9,151,182	5,245,066	57.3	3,836,944	41.92	69,172	0.8	—
1948....	7,207,687	3,340,092	46.4	3,559,686	49.3	307,913	4.3	—
Arizona								
1952....	260,570	152,042	58.4	108,528	41.6	...	...	2.9
1948....	177,065	77,597	43.8	95,251	53.8	4,217	2.4	2.5
California								
1952....	5,141,849	2,897,310	56.4	2,197,548	42.7	46,991	0.9	56.2
1948....	4,021,538	1,895,269	47.1	1,913,134	47.6	213,135	5.3	55.8
Colorado								
1952....	630,103	397,782	60.3	245,504	38.9	4,817	0.8	6.9
1948....	515,237	239,714	46.5	267,288	51.9	8,235	1.6	7.1
Idaho								
1952....	276,231	180,707	65.4	95,081	34.4	443	0.2	3.0
1948....	214,816	101,514	47.2	107,370	50.0	5,936	2.8	3.0
Montana								
1952....	265,037	157,399	59.4	106,213	40.1	1,430	0.5	2.9
1948....	224,278	96,770	43.1	119,071	53.1	8,437	3.8	3.1
Nevada								
1952....	82,190	50,502	61.4	31,688	38.6	...	...	.9
1948....	62,117	29,357	47.3	31,291	50.4	1,469	2.3	.9
New Mexico								
1952....	238,608	132,170	55.4	105,661	44.3	777	0.3	2.6
1948....	185,767	80,303	43.3	105,464	56.7	...	...	2.6
Oregon								
1952....	695,059	420,815	60.6	270,579	38.9	3,665	0.5	7.6
1948....	524,080	260,904	49.8	243,147	46.4	20,029	3.8	7.3
Utah								
1952....	329,554	194,190	58.9	135,364	41.1	...	...	3.6
1948....	276,305	124,402	45.0	149,151	54.0	2,752	1.0	3.8
Washington								
1952....	1,102,708	599,107	54.4	492,845	44.7	10,756	0.9	12.0
1948....	905,059	386,315	42.7	476,165	52.6	42,579	4.7	12.6
Wyoming								
1952....	129,251	81,047	62.7	47,934	37.1	270	0.2	1.4
1948....	101,425	47,947	47.3	52,354	51.6	1,124	1.1	1.4

* Compiled from the official reports of the several secretaries of state.

meant if one speaks of "the Western public." The map on the next page (Fig. 1), "The American West," is drawn in a distorted fashion to show the relative voting strengths of the eleven Western states. A glance at it will reveal that after California come Washington with 12% of the total vote cast in the West; Oregon and Colorado, with around 7%; then Montana, Idaho, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona with about 3% each; and finally, Wyoming and Nevada, each with about 1% of the total vote of the West.

Because of the great differences in number of the votes cast by the eleven Western states, large Eisenhower majorities in several states are watered down in the average of all the states. Eisenhower's vote was 56.4% of the total in California, and it amounted to 55.5% in New Mexico. The other states gave him heavier majorities, ranging up to Idaho, which gave him 65.4% of its vote. Nine of the eleven states ranked among the first 20 of the 48 states in terms of the size of the Eisenhower vote. The top two Western states, however, ranked only ninth and tenth in the nation.

Along with the Presidency, Republicans won most senatorial, congressional, and gubernatorial offices that were at stake in the same election. They won senatorial seats that were already held by Republicans in California, Nevada, and Utah. They captured Senate seats from Democratic incumbents in Arizona and Wyoming. But Republican Senators were unseated by Democrats in Montana and Washington. An additional setback to the Republicans was the defection of Senator Morse of Oregon, not himself a candidate in the election, to the Democratic candidate. The California victory was overwhelming; Senator William F. Knowland captured the nomination of both parties in the June primaries and ran without Democratic opposition in November. He received the largest vote ever accorded any candidate in the state: 3,982,448.

In Arizona the Republican victory was striking, too. There Barry Goldwater defeated Ernest McFarland, who had been Majority Leader of the Senate. Goldwater is only the second Republican ever elected Senator from Arizona. In Nevada, the Republican incumbent, George W. Malone, narrowly escaped defeat at the hands of a newcomer, Thomas B. Mechling, and probably would not have succeeded without the help of the Democratic Senator from Nevada, Pat McCarran. In Wyoming,



FIGURE 1

THE AMERICAN WEST

(States drawn in proportion to the total vote each cast in November 1952)

Governor Frank A. Barrett wrested the Senate seat from Joseph C. O'Mahoney, who had held it since 1933.

Two other close races resulted in Democratic victories. Mike Mansfield defeated incumbent Republican Zales N. Ecton by only 5,749 votes in Montana. In New Mexico, Senator Dennis Chavez again defeated Patrick J. Hurley, this time by 4,018 votes. The election was contested, but to no avail. Finally, the Democrats scored a resounding triumph in Washington, where their candidate, Representative Henry M. Jackson, won by 131,881 votes over the incumbent, Senator Harry P. Cain.

The senatorial races in the West pose several interesting questions.[1] First, what role did personalities play? The answer seems to be that, even in the shadow of an exciting presidential contest, the Western Senators have important roles of their own. How many Republican Senators could have been elected if Eisenhower had not run? We shall take up this question in detail later, but a glance at the pluralities of the Republicans in Arizona, Wyoming, and Nevada suggests that the Republican candidates may have won by the grace of their presidential candidate. Their seat in Utah, on the contrary, was probably "earned" in this sense. Likewise in California, where Senator Knowland was unopposed, the likelihood is strong that he would have won tidily, the Republican presidential candidate notwithstanding.

A more striking picture of Republican gain can be seen in the outcome of the contests in the 57 Congressional Districts in the eleven states. The Republicans gained 8 seats in California and lost 2 to the Democrats. They gained 2 seats in Washington, 2 in Utah, and 1 each in Arizona and Nevada. They lost 1 in Idaho. Republicans captured 14 seats in all, losing only 3, resulting in a Western delegation of 38 Republicans and 19 Democrats in the 83d Congress.

The 1952 Republican candidates for Congress in the West increased their proportion of the major-party vote over that of 1950, the gains ranging from 2.4% in Oregon to 13.5% in Arizona. In California, however, the Republican vote decreased from that of 1950.[2] This fact should challenge any rash evaluation of the Republican victory in the West in 1952. In ten of the Western districts that went Republican, and in eleven that went Democratic, the winning majority falls between 50% and 54.9%.

[1] See Appendix B, Table I.
[2] See Appendix B, Tables II and III.

The Nevada District and the 13th District of California were won by Republicans by less than 5,000 votes; however, six districts went Democratic by less than 5,000 votes—the Colorado 1st, the California 6th and 14th, the Montana 1st, and the Idaho 1st.

Scrutiny of Figure 2 below reveals that the Republicans have more



FIGURE 2

THE REPUBLICAN VOTE IN WESTERN CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS

safe districts than do the Democrats, if a plurality of 5% over a 50% majority is used as the minimum margin for safety. A modest Republican victory threatens a considerable number of Democratic seats. It takes a Democratic landslide to capture the bulk of Republican seats. A slightly better showing by various Republican candidates in 1952 would have taken another half-dozen Democratic seats.

All of the Western states but Montana had Republican governors before the election, and Montana made it a clean sweep in 1952.[3] Where the governors' chairs were in contest, the Republican incumbents bettered their pluralities of previous years. There were no contests in California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, or Wyoming. In Arizona, Governor Howard Pyle ran 9,000 votes ahead of Eisenhower in retaining his post. The Montana race saw Democratic Governor John W. Bonner upset by a small margin of 5,054 votes. The Republican candidate in Montana, J. Hugh Aronson, ran about 23,000 votes behind Eisenhower. While Aronson boosted the Republican percent of the total vote by 7% over 1948, Eisenhower boosted it by 16%. Hence, the Republicans probably owe the Montana governorship to Eisenhower.

The Republicans made some gains wherever state legislative contests

[3] See Appendix B, Table IV.

were conducted.[4] Most Western state legislatures have Republican control of both houses. Nevada and New Mexico are divided. Both houses of Washington swung from Democratic to Republican control in 1952. So did the New Mexico House and the Utah Senate. Only Arizona is Democratic in both chambers.

In summary, Republican strength in the West in 1952 was concentrated in the contests for the Presidency and the governorships, with a good showing in the congressional and legislative elections, and a rather poor showing in the senatorial contests. Going behind the bare fact of victory in every state, the Republicans must recognize that the Democratic vote is still formidable and threatening.

One of the questions that should be asked is whether the Republican victories generally were the result of Eisenhower's pull at the head of the ticket. How many of their candidates were carried to triumph on his coattails? Although this is an important political question, its solution is, unfortunately, difficult.

The first fact to consider is that Eisenhower ran ahead of his running mates in the Western states for all offices except the governorship of Arizona and the average congressional seat in Oregon.[5] In this connection, the following facts are important to consider:

1. Eisenhower ran 9% ahead of the Republican senatorial candidates in the Western states, excluding California, where Knowland had both the Democratic and the Republican nominations.

2. He ran 3.3% ahead of the House candidates.

3. He ran 2.5% ahead of the House candidates, if we exclude his and the candidate's vote in the uncontested districts of California.

4. He ran 2.5% ahead of the gubernatorial candidates in those states where the governorship was at stake.

5. He ran 4.2% ahead of all three categories.[6]

In the nation since 1896, presidential candidates, losing or winning, averaged 4.4% more votes than the total congressional vote of their party.

[4] See Appendix B, Table V.

[5] Appendix B, Table VI.

[6] This figure was obtained by subtracting the Republican portion of the total votes in the states for the House, the Senate (except California), and the governorships from the Republican portion of the votes for President in all House-election states, senatorial-election states, and gubernatorial-election states.

The fourteen winning candidates since 1876 led their congressional tickets by an average of 8.1%. Of these, Harry Truman alone ran behind his ticket; that was only by 1/10 of 1%, and one should remember that this difference can be accounted for by the Dixiecrats' running their own presidential candidate alongside Democratic congressional candidates. In 1952, Eisenhower led his congressional ticket in the nation by 19%. This is the highest margin achieved since 1896, and perhaps in any election.

At first sight, this evidence may seem to indicate that Eisenhower had the strongest personal pull of any presidential candidate in modern American history, that the other Republican candidates were very weak, or some combination of both these factors. This surmise should, however, be qualified in the light of Eisenhower's personal campaign and several victories in the South, which had very little influence on the fortunes of Republican candidates for other offices there. This impressive figure, therefore, can be partially accounted for by the influence of Southern totals.

The use of election returns to estimate the "coattail effect" of a presidential candidate has many pitfalls. In elections since 1896, a substantial lead by a Republican candidate over his running mates can usually be accounted for by the precise phenomenon which has just been observed in the 1952 election. Herbert Hoover's lead of 11.9% over his congressional ticket in 1928, for example, can be accounted for by the unpopularity of Alfred E. Smith in the South. The traditional method of estimating the coattail effect, in terms of the percentage lead of the presidential candidate over his congressional ticket, is open to another general objection: the large margin itself may only indicate that the personal popularity of the presidential candidate has not been transmitted to his party's ticket. This was the estimate of the effect of Eisenhower's candidacy which was made by Senator Robert A. Taft and his supporters, and the validity of this estimate cannot be tested on the basis of election returns. However, an effective measure of the coattail effect of Eisenhower's candidacy can be derived from the national sample. It also makes it possible to compare Eisenhower's coattail effect with that of Stevenson.

It was possible, first of all, to probe the motivation of straight ticket voting. Of the 716 persons who voted for Eisenhower, 147, or 21%, seemed to be voting for him primarily as a personality. Since it was felt that the coattail effect would be operating chiefly among this group of individuals, the proportion was sought of these people who voted a straight Republican

ticket for high office.[7] Ninety-six seem to have done so.[8] Of these, 27 were discovered to have been Democrats, strong, weak, or independent; and 9, to have been Independents.

Of the 518 persons who voted for Stevenson, 23, or 4%, seemed to be voting for him primarily as a distinct personality. Of these, 18 voted a straight Democratic ticket for high office. Of these 18, only 1 was a regular Republican, and 1 an Independent. It would seem then that the attraction of Eisenhower as a personality to Democrats and Independents greatly exceeded that of Stevenson to Republicans and Independents; and furthermore, Eisenhower was relatively effective in motivating Democrats and Independents to vote a straight Republican ticket. It should be noted, however, that the proportion of straight-ticket voters, of all party affiliations, among those who voted for Stevenson as a personality, exceeds that of those who voted for Eisenhower as a personality. The figures are 79% and 65% respectively.

Of the 1,014 Democrats in the sample, 3% were sufficiently swayed by Eisenhower's personality to vote a straight Republican ticket for high office. Of the 612 Republicans in our sample, only 1, or less than .2%, was induced to vote a straight Democratic ticket for high office by the force of Stevenson's personality. Of the 103 Independents in the sample, 9, or 9%, were swayed to straight Republican ticket voting for high office by Eisenhower's personality, and only 1, or less than 1%, was sufficiently impressed by Stevenson's personality to vote a straight Democratic ticket for high office.

It is apparent that Eisenhower's coattail effect far exceeded that of Stevenson. Although the effect of the head of the ticket in inducing persons to cross party lines was not as great (3%) as in attracting independent voters (9%), the total result was impressive. The voters who embraced the whole Republican ticket in casting their ballots for Eisenhower amounted to 5% of the total Republican presidential vote. They comprise a slightly higher percentage of the total Republican vote cast for the other offices.

If this percentage is spread evenly throughout the nation, it accounts for Republican victories in 39 congressional contests, 13 senatorial contests, and 7 gubernatorial contests. It thus appears that the 83d Congress owes its Republican majorities to Dwight D. Eisenhower's candidacy.

[7] By "high office" is meant the Presidency, a seat in Congress, or a governorship.
[8] See Chapter XIII, p. 162.

The national political record of the Western states since 1916 remains on balance a Democratic one. In the ten elections since 1916, only Oregon and Colorado have been Republican more times than Democratic. In four of the ten elections, however, they have been found in the Democratic column. California and Wyoming have seen Democratic victories in half of the ten cases. The remaining Western states have been Democratic six out of ten times.

Various experts have declared that the West tends to move in the same direction as the rest of the nation in national elections—but more so. This finding is confirmed by the events of 1952. The Republican presidential vote in the West increased by .8% more than in the country as a whole, and the Democratic presidential vote decreased by 2.3% more than in the country as a whole. The Mountain States swung more vigorously to the Republican side than the Pacific States. The eight Mountain States showed a Republican increase over 1948 of 14.6%, and the Pacific States, an increase of 9.7%. Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming swung the most; California, Oregon, and Washington, the least. The coastal states seem to be settling down at a point where the two major parties must wage a war of attrition to win. The greater populations and the heterogeneous commercial, industrial, and agricultural interests of these states probably account for this trend in recent years. The Pacific States are beginning to resemble the large and cosmopolitan states of the northeastern part of the United States.

Chapter II

REGULARS AND MAVERICKS

EVERY SURVEY, whether it be of a tract of land or of a population, needs a benchmark or some other kind of fixed reference point. The benchmark helps to order and to facilitate the measurement of the relations of many objects. It helps to fix moving objects and to determine their direction and speed. Politics are full of both objects and movement. Everyone and everything is related to everything else, but to gauge all the relationships a fixed point is needed. The measurement of the coattail effect is a good example of this. What its proportions were could not be determined until it was known who had been Democratic and who Independent.

Many basic political relations cannot be discovered until a person's general politics are known. Party is the basic affiliation. Know a man's general party position, and you can speak of many things—whether he believes in all that the party stands for, whether he is moving away from his party, whether his party is a youthful party, whether a workers' party, and so on. When the party affiliations of a whole population are known, there is a fixed point for the determination of many things about that political universe.

Party affiliation is more than the simple casting of a ballot. "Republicans" voted for Roosevelt in 1932, and many "Democrats" voted for Eisenhower in 1952. A person's party can very well be defined as his judgment of the party he "feels at home in." If he identifies his thinking and behavior with the Republican Party, regardless of occasional lapses, he is a Republican; if with the Democratic Party, he is a Democrat.

The feeling of affiliation is a matter of degree, too. A person may be a strong Republican, a weak one, or an independent one; likewise with a Democrat. If a person has no feeling of party affiliation, he may be called an Independent. These are the terms precisely as they shall be used in this book. Westerners will be designated as Strong Democrats, Weak Democrats, Independent Democrats, Independents, Independent Republicans, Weak Republicans, and Strong Republicans. When the term Democrat or Republican is used without giving the degree of affiliation, it will refer

to a person of any of the three degrees of Democratic or Republican affiliation.

When speaking of "a 1952 Democrat" the reference will be to any person who voted for the Democratic presidential nominee in 1952; and when we speak of "a probable Democrat" the reference will be to any person who is adjudged from his interview to be likely to vote for Stevenson in 1952. The same applies to Republicans in relation to Eisenhower. An Independent is always a person who has been determined by the interview to have no party attachment.

Unless in usage one of these terms is specially modified or qualified by another word, its meaning should not be extended. If a group, for example, is referred to as "the 1952 Republicans," it should not be inferred that they voted Republican in 1948; one who is a Strong Republican in 1952 may have been neither Strong nor a Republican in 1948. Some were, in fact, Democrats. All that is said is that these people voted for Eisenhower in 1952.

The primary benchmark, then, is the degree and direction of the party identification of a person. This was determined from replies given to several questions. Each person was asked whether he thought of himself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or something else. If the reply was either Republican or Democrat, the person was asked whether he regarded himself as a strong Republican or Democrat, or not a very strong Republican or Democrat. This divided the strong and weak segments of the parties. If the person had described himself as an Independent, he was asked whether he thought himself closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party. If his answer indicated a partisan leaning, he was classified as an Independent Republican or an Independent Democrat. If it did not, he was classified as an Independent.

The West has acquired a reputation in the nation as a whole for being made up of political mavericks. It is commonly believed that, together with the absence of party organization, goes a deep aversion among the people of the West for supporting either major party regularly. Chapter XIII will discuss whether any considerable difference sets off the West from the rest of the nation in this respect, but a general answer can be given now. The figures in Table II yield the fact that the great majority of Westerners join themselves, at least psychologically, to one of the major parties. Contrary to the widespread impression, the Western public is not maverick or nonpartisan.

TABLE II

PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS OF WESTERNERS

	Number of cases	% of total
Strong Democrats (SD)*	99	22
Weak Democrats (WD)	105	23
Independent Democrats (ID)	43	10
Independents (I)	29	6
Independent Republicans (IR)	31	7
Weak Republicans (WR)	59	13
Strong Republicans (SR)	71	16
Don't know and inappropriate	15	3
Total	452	100

*** In other tables hereafter only the abbreviations will be used to denote party identification.**

Only 6% of the people seem to be thoroughgoing Independents, with scarcely a shadow of inclination toward any party. But 38% of the people, many more than claim independency, are strongly partisan, while 91% express some degree of attachment to a major party.

Notable, too, is the highly significant fact that the Western public is predominantly Democratic in sentiment. About 45% of the population are Strong or Weak Democrats and only about 29%, Strong or Weak Republicans. These figures are in accordance with the party registration patterns in California and elsewhere. If Westerners adhered staunchly to their party allegiance and all of them voted, few Republicans would have a chance of victory in the West.

These confessions of party affiliation are not made lightly. The evidence of people's behavior attests to that. Table III shows how the several categories of Westerners said they voted in 1948 and how they expected to vote in 1952.

These figures affirm that when people say they are one or another kind of regular or maverick they mean it. They tend to vote according to their party affiliation or lack of it. Party stalwarts adhere to their party's candidates more than do less enthusiastic groups. It appears that the stronger the party identification, the more likely is a person to vote for his party. Independents are more divided in their political loyalties and in their voting behavior.

Strong, Weak, and Independent Republicans might seem to be more firmly attached to their party than are the corresponding categories of

TABLE III

THE 1948 VOTE AND THE PROBABLE 1952 VOTE BY PRESENT PARTY AFFILIATIONS

	1948 Vote			1952 Probable vote			% Party affiliation followed both times	Number of cases
	% Voted Truman	% Voted Dewey	% Other; nonvoter or inappropriate	% Will vote Stevenson	% Will vote Eisenhower	% Other; nonvoter or inappropriate		
SD	74	2	24	71	6	23	60	99
WD	51	7	42	43	31	26	26	105
ID	35	12	53	42	26	32	21	43
I	28	24	48	14	45	41	—	29
IR	19	49	32	6	71	23	39	31
WR	15	63	22	5	80	15	53	59
SR	3	79	18	1	92	7	75	71

Democrats. Whereas about 74% of the Strong Democrats voted for Truman in 1948, about 79% of all the Strong Republicans voted for Dewey. The contrast in 1952 for all categories was more striking because the election was more one-sided. Most of this difference, however, was due to the greater proportion of nonvoters among the Democrats in 1948, especially the Weak and Independent Democrats. Evidence from more elections is needed to determine which party has the more "faithful" stalwarts.

Party regulars admit that they support their candidate for the sake of their party. Independents, on the contrary, tend to vote for the man rather than for the party. The interview posed this difficult but quite realistic question: "Suppose there was an election where your party was running a candidate that you didn't like or you didn't agree with, which of the following things comes closest to what you think you would do?" The tabulation of the answers is given in Table IV.

It is interesting to note that most Democrats and Republicans hesitate to admit that they would support a "bad" man from their party. And yet

TABLE IV

COMPARISON OF PARTY LOYALTY OF STRONG AND WEAK PARTISANS

	% SD	% WD	% WR	% SR
"I probably would vote for him anyway because a person should be loyal to his party"	35	11	9	20
"I probably would not vote for either candidate in that election"	19	15	5	21
"I probably would vote for the other party's candidate"	42	72	86	59

a good many, especially the stalwarts, stick to their guns. Fortunately for the voter's peace of mind, this conflict may not often arise. Most people seem to adjust nimbly to their party's idea of a decent candidate, and parties don't usually shock their supporters with obviously disagreeable candidates.

The next question was asked to determine the prevailing attitude toward straight-ticket voting among the partisan categories: "Some people think that if a voter votes for one party for President, he should vote for the same party for Senator and Congressman. Do you agree or disagree with that idea?" The Westerners responded as shown in Table V.

TABLE V

PARTISAN ATTITUDES TO STRAIGHT-TICKET VOTING

	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR
Agree	53	27	14	12	19	32	52
Disagree	35	51	65	69	61	58	28

From these figures it is made clear that the stronger one's party tie, the more likely one is to vote a straight ticket. The reasons given for voting straight tickets varied. The majority argued that this was the way to achieve party responsibility, to avoid a stalemate between the Chief Executive and the Congress and to give the President the support he needs to carry out his policies. A large minority affirmed the need for "sticking together." Those who argued against straight-ticket voting maintained that it was preferable to vote for each man on his merits and for the policies he represents rather than for the party label he bears. Five of the Independents offered reasons for straight-ticket voting even when one has no party tie. They emphasized the need for "party responsibility" and avoiding a "stalemate in government" as their reasons for agreeing with the principle of straight-ticket voting. Thus they seemed to recognize a need of parties for effective government despite their personal detachment from party ties.

The partisans, by and large, took greater interest in the 1952 campaign than the Independents. They were more frequent participants in preelection activities and a greater proportion of them voted. They associated more with their political kin than did the Independents, and their enthusiasm about the candidates of their party and their concern with issues of the campaign was greater than that of the Independents. They have, in

short, a "team spirit." The Independents, on the other hand, while more phlegmatic in their reactions to the "temperature" of the campaign, were more discriminating in selecting their candidate for each office.

The study supports the thesis that one's political outlook is usually enduring and that it is often derived from one's parents. When the Westerners were asked whether they always voted for candidates of the same party or of different parties for President, 54% said that they always voted for candidates of the same party; 5%, that they usually did so; and 22%, that they voted for candidates of different parties.

Going beyond their own records, the Westerners of the survey described the voting habits of their parents. The parents of almost two-thirds of them were both either Republican or Democratic. Only about 12% had parents who were Independent, divided in party allegiance, or nonvoters. The parents of a majority of Western Republicans, likewise, were Republican. On the other hand, the parents of a majority of Western Independents were partisan, either Democratic or Republican.

Table VI affirms the fact that party stalwarts breed the next generation

TABLE VI

THE TRANSMITTAL OF PARENTAL PARTISANSHIP

Parents	Children							Total %	No. of cases
	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR		
2 Dem.....	36	33	10	4	4	6	7	100	164
2 Rep.....	5	9	5	8	8	27	38	100	120
1 Dem.; 1? ..	20	33	20	..	7	7	13	100	15
1 Rep.; 1?...	40	13	13	7	7	7	13	100	15
Other*	14	25	21	9	9	14	8	100	52
Inappropriate†	25	28	7	9	11	11	9	100	71

* Not consistently partisan; one of each; neither voted.

† Not an influence; parents unknown; their parties unknown; etc.

of party stalwarts. Table VII adds the discovery that the chances are about 1 in 6 that a Strong Republican had Democratic parents, and about 1 in 16 that a Strong Democrat had Republican parents. Independency, on the other hand, does not correlate markedly as between generations. Only about 1 Western Independent in 6 had parents that were not consistently partisan. Furthermore, of those Westerners whose parents were not con-

TABLE VII

PARENTAL POLITICS OF TODAY'S PARTISANS

Children	Parents							
	% 2 Dem.	% 2 Rep.	% 1 Dem.; 1 ?	% 1 Rep.; 1 ?	% Other*	% Inappropriate†	Total %	No. of cases
SD	60	6	3	6	7	18	100	99
WD	51	11	5	2	12	19	100	105
ID	37	14	7	5	25	12	100	43
I	24	35	0	3	17	21	100	29
IR	20	32	3	3	16	26	100	31
WR	17	54	2	2	12	13	100	59
SR	17	63	3	3	6	8	100	71

* Not consistently partisan; one of each; neither voted.

† Not an influence; parents unknown; their parties unknown; etc.

sistently partisan, more than 20% are strong partisans, and more than 38%, weak partisans. It should be pointed out also that almost 60% of the offspring of parents of this type are, in some degree, Democratic; slightly more than 30%, some brand of Republican; and less than 10%, Independent.

There seems to be some leakage, between the generations, from the Democratic Party to the Republican, Democrats seeming to be more likely to raise Republicans than Republicans to raise Democrats. Whereas 13 out of 57 Strong Republicans and 10 out of 42 Weak Republicans had Democratic parents, only 6 out of 65 Strong Democrats and 11 out of 65 Weak Democrats had Republican parents. This trend from Democracy to Republicanism holds true not only between the last two generations, but also in the present one as it ages. Of the 161 persons who declared they were Republicans, 32, or 20%, had once been Democrats; while of the 247 persons who declared they were Democrats, 26, or 11%, had once been Republicans. Of the 29 who regard themselves as Independents, 5, or 17%, had once been Democrats; and 4, or 14%, had once been Republicans. This is evidence for the thesis that the long-run trend is for the Democratic Party to lose membership to the Republicans and Independents.

Added evidence for this can be derived from an analysis of the distribution of the parties. Of the 211 persons in the sample who were 45 years and over, 94, or 45%, claim some affiliation with the Democratic Party; and precisely the same number claim affiliation with the Republican Party.

Of the 241 persons under 45 years of age, 153, or 64%, show Democratic affiliation, while only 67, or 28%, claim Republican affiliation.[1]

But there is another current countering the shift from Democracy to Republicanism. Democrats apparently have more children than Republicans, as evidenced by the figures in Table VIII. The Democratic Party,

TABLE VIII

DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOLCHILDREN AMONG WESTERNERS

Parents	Children in school		Total %	No. of cases
	% Yes	% No		
SD	34	66	100	99
WD	38	61	99*	105
ID	37	63	100	43
I	28	72	100	29
IR	29	61	100	31
WR	32	68	100	59
SR	20	80	100	71

* The group contains one individual whose answer is unascertained.

therefore, has a natural long-term advantage over the Republican Party, resulting from its greater number of children. It is probable that the shift to the Republican fold from one generation to the next and from the process of aging does not offset the advantage of the Democrats from reproduction.

The net effect of these cross currents, it appears, is one of the factors which compel the Republican Party to move continuously toward the Democratic Party in sentiment, doctrine, and propaganda—in the language of the campaign, to espouse "Me-tooism." Not only do Democrats have a partial monopoly of direct material appeals to the largest number of people (Chap. V), but more people are born Democratic and must become Republicans if they change at all.

The enduring effects of party affiliation, to which this discussion of the political biographies of Westerners testifies eloquently, make the political

[1] It is interesting to note that while only 29 % of all persons under 45 claimed strong party affiliation, it was claimed by 48 % of those 45 and over. This factor also holds within each party. Of the 153 Democrats under 45 years of age, 52, or 34 %, are Strong Democrats. Of the 94 Democrats 45 or over, 47, or 50 %, are Strong Democrats. Of the 67 Republicans under 45, 25 % are Strong Republicans. Of the 94 Republicans 45 and over, 57 % are Strong Republicans. This would seem to imply that an increasing rigidity of opinion goes along with the aging process.

party test basic for understanding the Western public. Like the rest of the United States, outside of the South, the West is founded politically upon a division of the population into two parties. In troubled times, though, one is always reminded of the limits to the durability of party loyalties. Ordinarily, the personalities and issues of a campaign will not greatly affect the voting of many people. Their party identification will consistently outstrip any other single event, candidate, or set of issues in determining their votes. Indeed, the party influence permeates the personalities and issues of the campaign. As the question is approached of how much the candidates mattered in 1952 and, thereafter, the question of what issues dominated the campaign, it can be expected that both were highly colored in the public mind by their party associations. Most people fitted the candidates and issues to their party convictions as they would fit the pieces into the pattern of a jigsaw puzzle.

Chapter III

HOW WESTERNERS SAW THE CANDIDATES

In politics, as in war, many campaigns are won before they are begun. The sinews of war are factories, arsenals, military forces, and morale. Behind a political campaign lie the traditional forces and resources of each party. In America, the two major parties have been fairly well balanced, so that it has been rather difficult to predict the outcome of their campaigns. In 1948 most experts expected a victory for the Republicans and were shocked by the triumph of Harry Truman. In 1952 there seemed to be little change in the party situation, except for the war in Korea, the effect of which on public opinion was not well known.

If the Republicans were to choose a party leader as their candidate for the Presidency, the election might have been expected to run along lines similar to those of 1948, with the probability of one party shading the other by a couple of percentage points. But the Republicans chose Dwight D. Eisenhower, a popular hero, who had come to flower under Democratic administrations and who was the choice of many Democrats for their party's nomination. The result was that the election contest was laid open to extraordinary currents of public opinion. It can never be known whether the Republicans would have won under the banner of Robert A. Taft. But experience with the candidacy of Eisenhower and the manner in which people reacted to that candidacy give an indication of how much the Republican victory was due to the personality of the unusual candidate they had chosen. The popular image of Eisenhower can be compared with that of his Democratic rival, Adlai Stevenson, scion of a distinguished Democratic family.

Hints of what was to come were already contained in reports of public opinion published before the presidential nominating conventions. It had been known for months that Eisenhower led as the people's choice for the Presidency, whether as Democrat or Republican. When, with the other leading Republican contenders, he was matched against prospective

Democratic opponents, he was consistently rated first among his peers. Long before the Republican Convention, it seemed that Taft, Warren, or any of the others, would have a stiffer fight than Eisenhower, in the West and in the rest of the country.

When the Republicans gathered in Chicago, in July 1952, the word went around that the Republicans could win with Eisenhower, but that they might easily lose with Taft. It was, indeed, quite clear to the newspaper reporters on the scene and to the televiewers in their homes around the nation that many delegates were stirred to rally behind Eisenhower because he looked like a winner. Some were delighted; others winced in making an act of sacrifice for the Grand Old Party. Reports from a nationwide group of political scientists who studied the selection of the delegates and their conduct in the convention reaffirm the validity of the impressions gained at the time: the best hope for Republican victory, particularly among calculating political workers, was believed to reside in the strong personal appeal of General Eisenhower.

Republicans of the West seem to have been more pleased with the outcome of the Republican Convention than they usually are with conventions as a means of nominating candidates. More than half of the sample disapproved of the party convention as a technique for nomination. Some expressed definite disapproval; others, mild forms of approval. Some of those, however, who objected to the nominating convention on principle were pleased that Eisenhower was the Republican nominee. Some 78 persons in all would have preferred an alternative to Eisenhower. Of these, 39 remained convinced, even in the heat of the campaign, that Taft would have been a preferable candidate, and a scattering referred to General Douglas MacArthur as their choice.

Among the Democrats, the situation was similar. Over half of the people were critical of the convention system of nominating a presidential candidate or would have been pleased with its abolition. Ninety-nine persons of the sample preferred another nominee to Stevenson. The strongest second candidate by far was Estes Kefauver, whom 78 persons mentioned as having been their first choice for Democratic nomination. There was also some sentiment for Harry Truman and for Alben Barkley.

People gave varied reasons for liking or disliking the presidential nominating convention. Those who approved of the convention method were not vocal in explaining their approval, but a number of them argued

that the convention method had worked in the past and experience had shown it to be satisfactory. Some had suggested that it afforded interest and excitement, but only a few defended it as being a democratic way of nominating Presidents. The most frequent objection of those who opposed the nominating convention was that it was boss-ridden, undemocratic, and exclusive of the people. Many thought it was too much of a spectacle or circus. When asked to suggest reforms of these objectionable features, 90 Westerners urged that Presidents be nominated in a national primary by a direct vote of the people. Fourteen persons specifically urged that all states should have a presidential primary. Better than a quarter of the Western public, in other words, is dissatisfied with the presidential nominating convention to the extent of favoring a specific reform, the popular nominating primary election. They are supplemented by another quarter of the electorate that objects to the nature or the mode of conducting the national presidential nominating convention.

In American politics, both politicians and people must often wonder how candidates appear to the people who pass judgment upon them. The electorate is so large today, its personal contact with the candidates is so rare, and the influence of press, radio, and television is so indirect and uncertain, that an easy understanding of the popular images of candidates is impossible. Intensive conversations with a great many electors representing a cross section of the public is just about the best way of recreating the popular images of the candidates.

Yet it can never be complete, for there are always too many images. A candidate represents different things to different people, just as the father of a numerous family may appear in a different light to each member. In this sense, too, there is no "correct" image. They are all "correct," in that people fit their private images to their own lives and act accordingly. The father of a family is yet a boy to his parents, while to his young son he may be a patriarch, and to his wife, an easygoing companion. All are true images. So it is in politics. A single candidate may be a truly different and even contradictory being to different voters.

Eisenhower and Stevenson were not exceptions to this rule. It is quite likely that all that was believed about them could not withstand an examination of their actual lives and would not be borne out in their behavior subsequent to the election. Few people know even very close relatives well enough to give completely accurate accounts of their past or future.

The only reasonable questions to ask of the electorate are whether their varied images of the candidates were seriously contrary to fact, not whether there was only a simple consistent image; whether the multiple aspects of the candidate were perceived and whether the weight of judgment was passed with fair regard to reality—not whether all that was said of the candidates could be verified by exact and measured tests.

When the Westerners spoke of Eisenhower and Stevenson, they saw many characteristics differently but they tended to retain a consistent general picture of each man and they were friendly to both of them. They were asked whether there was anything that would make them want to vote for Stevenson and, separately, for Eisenhower. Then they were asked if there was anything that would make them *not* want to vote for the two men.[1] The replies, numbering many hundreds, were divided according to the voting intentions of the respondents. The general character of replies is shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX

Comments of Westerners on the Presidential Candidates

Nature of remarks	Respondents' presidential voting intentions		No. of remarks
	Democratic	Republican	
% Pro-Stevenson	69	31	471
% Pro-Eisenhower	18	82	740
% Anti-Eisenhower	75	25	261
% Anti-Stevenson	10	90	314

Table IX shows that among Westerners favorable thoughts and words on Eisenhower (740) came more readily than those on Stevenson (471). This in itself is an important fact, for it shows that people were much more familiar with the Republican candidate, and they were pleased with him. Furthermore, although Stevenson was less well known, Westerners voiced more displeasure with him than with Eisenhower. One might retort to this statement that, of course, more Republicans than Democrats must have given expression to their feelings. But there were not more regular Republicans than Democrats in the sample. It must be remembered that *this* election saw many Westerners shift their votes to the

[1] See Appendix A-I, Questions 10 and 11.

Republicans, and their attitudes to the candidates were part of the reason for this.

There are other facts that add to our knowledge of Eisenhower's strong appeal to the voters. Almost half of the people who intended to vote Democratic had a favorable word for Eisenhower. A much smaller fraction of Republicans had reciprocal remarks to make about Stevenson. Thirty-five persons had no fewer than 5 laudatory comments to make about Eisenhower, while only 16 advanced 5 such comments about Stevenson. So there was great magnetism in the image of Eisenhower.

What kind of person was this widely known and admired man, Eisenhower, in the image of the Western electorate? If all items of description that were given by 10 or more people are taken, some measure of the popular image can be reproduced. The result will be a composite of the partial insights of many individuals, pieced together into an outline of the most prominent features of his public face. Eisenhower was a worthy candidate, highly qualified for the post of President (72 persons). He was a man of integrity (63) and he would clean up corruption (23). He had valuable military skill and experience (43) and was a born leader, a good administrator, and organizer (27). He was educated and intelligent (24). He was likable as a person (15) and was popular and got along well with people (12). He had had world-wide experience (44), as well as having been generally experienced (10). He was strong and decisive (20), patriotic (19), sincere (15), and independent and unbossed (15). He would bring needed change (15) and would be a good representative of the Republican Party (20). His election promised a good chance for peace or a favorable conclusion of the Korean War (21) as well as for peace generally (13). Finally, his wife and family relations were entirely praiseworthy (10).

On the negative side of Eisenhower's character there was relatively little said. The points cited here were mentioned by at least 5 people. His being a military man seemed unfavorable to 84 persons. This was worse than having no experience in civil government or politics (27), being a Republican (26), or being tied to Taft and the Republican Old Guard (17). There was, furthermore, some doubt expressed as to his general qualifications (7). Some felt that he did not know much about domestic problems (5); some others even asserted that he lacked steadfast principles (5) and stood for nothing specific (8). It was feared, too, that he

might be bossed, being merely a front man for the real Republican powers (10).

In summary, although he was not a politician, Eisenhower was a likable fellow, and although some suspected him of militarism, he was possessed of great administrative and military ability, and of knowledge of world affairs, and his high intelligence and inspiring leadership could be counted upon to bring peace in Korea and honesty in government at home.

An interesting feature of the estimate made of him by the public concerns his military career. For centuries democratic philosophers have worried over the relations of the military to civil affairs. The greatest of the liberal writers, represented, for example, in America by James Madison and in Europe by Gaetano Mosca, advised caution from the lessons of history, in which republican or popular governments have succumbed to the despotism of the military. These lessons of the past and the hard experiences of the present century are thought by many observers to have been lost upon Americans today. The Eisenhower victory, they maintain, confirms this.

The detailed records of the present study give a more complex picture of this important phenomenon in democratic society. Arguing in favor of voting for Eisenhower, 43 persons said that he was a military man and that his military experiences help to qualify him for the Presidency. Of these people, 33 intended to vote Republican and 10, Democratic. Standing squarely opposite, 84 people, a fifth of the sample and a third of those who said anything against Eisenhower, declared that the fact of his being a military man was a drawback in his qualifications for President. It may seem that Americans would spontaneously express more disfavor than favor toward a military man entering politics. However, many of the expressions of favor for Eisenhower are related directly to his record as a military man. He was credited by many with great experience and a thorough knowledge of world problems, and with being a good organizer, attributes presumably attained during his military career. He was credited by many also with being strong and decisive, with having great patriotism, and with being an inspiring person and a natural-born leader—all traits commonly expected of military leaders. In short, although a larger part of the American public is antimilitarist rather than promilitarist, this has little control over the favorable impressions that go along with a successful military career. The continuous nonpartisan publicity given a military

leader creates a general good will to his person and a high regard for some of the personal qualities required for success in a military career. Only very rarely can a civilian politician achieve this kind of public esteem.

What was the public image of Adlai Stevenson? It has already been noted that people had less to say about him than about Eisenhower. There were only 10 characteristics favorably mentioned by 10 or more persons. The most common remark about Stevenson (53 persons) was that he was a generally good man who was qualified for the post. His political and civilian experience was valued by many (39) and his success as Governor of Illinois was quite well known (24). He was regarded to be intelligent and well educated (42) and a man of integrity (33). Many found him to be a good representative of the Democratic Party (47) and a good campaigner and speaker (20). Some favored him specifically because they agreed with his policies (10) and because he was for the common man (11) and the working people (10).

Whereas there were only 9 comments against Eisenhower that were repeated by 5 or more persons, there were 20 made against Stevenson. The outstanding negative comment was that he was connected with Truman (47 persons). That was apparently worse than being a Democrat (38) or being controlled by the party and its bosses (20). Quite a number found his divorce and family affairs unpleasant (19). Some thought he lacked integrity or was "just a politician" (14), that he was generally unqualified (7), weak and indecisive (5), had been a bad governor (5), was not independent of the bosses (7), and would not clean up the "mess" in government (5). Six did not like him as a person. A few disliked him because his family was of the privileged class (5) and some because he had "supported" Alger Hiss (7). His reluctance to take the nomination was held against him (6), although others had nothing against him but said they knew little about him (8), or that he was a "nobody," or words to that effect (5). Some just dismissed him by saying they weren't going to vote for him (12).

An analysis of the details of the contrasting images of the candidates suggests a good deal that experts hardly discerned during the campaign or even since. Eisenhower was an extremely strong candidate. Stevenson was a weak candidate. Strength and weakness are here used as among the people at large, not among pressure group leaders, the elite, or the

intelligentsia, for their votes are few. Stevenson's cause suffered from the cumulative attrition of many little shortcomings, without having had a great initial reservoir of public favor. He lacked positive character to a great many people and never assumed a well-understood role. His integrity, his education, his general qualifications, and his successful record—his most attractive personal virtues—were surpassed in popular appeal by the same virtues in Eisenhower. It is a striking fact that in the general area of foreign affairs, where he had had considerable experience, only 11 persons commented on Stevenson favorably, while 88 persons remarked favorably on Eisenhower's grasp of foreign affairs.

Stevenson did not compensate for these deficiencies in his public esteem with other positive qualities. Contrary to the opinion of many experts, his campaigning, his speeches, his sense of humor, and his personality were not ingratiating to the Western public. A charitable interpretation would concede to him a slight edge over Eisenhower in these respects.

One-tenth of all favorable comments about Stevenson referred to him as a good party representative, whereas only one-thirty-seventh of Eisenhower's favorable comments were to that effect. On the unfavorable side, Stevenson was bombarded with remarks of disfavor because of alleged links with Truman and party bosses. Only an extraordinary man indeed could have allayed popular suspicion on this point. Clearly Stevenson suffered greatly from the image of him as a regular Democrat.

The weakness of Stevenson as a candidate, attested to by the analysis of the coattail effect in Chapter I, as well as by this analysis of the popular images of the candidates, is further confirmed by a consideration of the voting behavior of those individuals who were dissatisfied with the candidates of both major parties. Individuals were asked whether they were satisfied with the candidates that the parties had chosen. Ninety-nine of them, or 22% of the sample, were dissatisfied with the Democratic candidate; only 78, or 17% of the Westerners, were dissatisfied with the Republican candidate. Of those dissatisfied with Stevenson, 78, or 17% of the sample, said that they would have preferred the candidacy of Estes Kefauver; of those dissatisfied with Eisenhower, 39, or 9% of all those interviewed, would have preferred the candidacy of Robert A. Taft. A comparison of the probable voting behavior of those who were dissatisfied with Stevenson's candidacy with those who were dissatisfied with Eisenhower's candidacy shows that 38, or 38% of the former, intended to vote for

Eisenhower; and 12, or 12% of them, intended not to vote at all. But only 12, or 15% of the latter, intended to vote for Stevenson; and 7, or 9% of these, intended not to vote at all. Thus the loss to Stevenson arising from dissatisfaction with his candidacy exceeded the parallel loss to Eisenhower. An examination of the probable voting behavior of those who had favored the candidacy of either Kefauver or Taft shows that 34, or 44% of the former, intended to vote for Eisenhower, and 8, or 10% of them, intended not to vote at all, while only 10, or 26% of the latter, intended to vote for Stevenson, and 6, or 15% of these, intended not to vote at all. Thus the inclination to defection among dissatisfied Kefauverites was greater than that of dissatisfied Taftites. It not only appears that Westerners were more ready to accept Eisenhower as the Republican candidate than Stevenson as the Democratic candidate, but also that, even if they did not approve of them in the first place, they became much more easily reconciled to Eisenhower's candidacy than to Stevenson's.

The relative weakness of Stevenson's candidacy was enhanced by a peculiar additional source of strength in Eisenhower's candidacy. This lay in the public's unwillingness to assign a party label to him, thus enabling him to appear to be "above" party.

The people were asked whether Eisenhower was a real Republican. Replies to this question were interesting: 27 said "yes, definitely"; 129 people replied in the affirmative, but qualified their point; 150 gave a qualified negative; 19 persons said that Eisenhower was definitely not a real Republican. The Westerners were pressed to give reasons for their answers. The gist of those who thought him a real Republican was that he had always voted Republican, had come from a Republican family, and had never voted Democratic. A few were more specific, arguing that he agreed with the ideas of other Republicans, that he agreed with Republican principles, or that he would support the Republican platform. The answers of those who thought that Eisenhower was not a real Republican were more varied and significant in revealing some of the sources of support for the candidate. Ten said that he was not a politician and hadn't had anything to do with politics, and 10 said that he was really just a military man. Seventeen didn't know what his party was; while others claimed that he voted Democratic or that he used to be a Democrat (8), or that the Democrats wanted him for their candidate or that he could well have been a Democrat (14). Seventeen replied that

he was above politics and that the important thing was that he was a real person, even a wonderful person. Some declared that he had liberal or progressive ideas that were more advanced than his party (11), thought he had good or different ideas of his own (5), or declared that he agreed with the Democratic platform and principles (8) or differed from Taft and the Old Guard Republicans (4). Others replied that he was not a real Republican because he stood for their particular group, implying that the Republicans had never done right by them (17), or confessed that they didn't know the meaning of the term real Republican or didn't know whether he was a real Republican (112). That there was so much doubt expressed about the meaning of the term Republican, or whether the term applied to Eisenhower, is another confirmation of the fact that Eisenhower, while appearing to a great many people as a Republican, appeared to many others as a candidate without party ties.

A consideration of Table X, which summarizes the opinions on the

TABLE X

Is Eisenhower a Real Republican?

% Party identification	% Yes and yes with qualifications	% No and no with qualifications	% Don't know	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
SD	33	38	20	9	100	94
WD	27	42	23	8	100	105
ID	23	54	14	9	100	43
I	21	52	20	7	100	29
IR	26	32	29	13	100	31
WR	44	37	10	9	100	59
SR	59	22	10	9	100	71
Sample as a whole	35	38	18	9	100	432

question of Eisenhower's Republicanism according to the party identification of the respondents, indicates that the personal appeal of Eisenhower was not closely associated with the Republican Party.[2] Well over two-thirds of the Democrats and Independents refused to identify Eisenhower as a real Republican.

In sum, Stevenson was at the time a relatively weak candidate. This

[2] This table also contains an interesting sidelight in political psychology. It appears that strongly partisan individuals attribute strong partisanship to others more readily than their less partisan and independent compatriots.

conclusion is supported by a study of the election returns, which shows that there were widespread defections from the Democratic ranks. It follows that the Democrats may have acted unwisely in nominating Stevenson. Millions of ordinarily Democratic voters and newly enfranchised voters cast their ballots for Eisenhower. Had the Democrats been aware of Stevenson's weak position they might have forestalled defections by nominating someone else. The Democratic Convention occurred later than the Republican so that the identity of the Republican candidate and his formidability were known to Democratic delegates. Some man whose personality contrasted more sharply with Eisenhower's, a man of controversy, of great appeal to the metropolitan electors, someone who could not possibly have seemed a faint image of Eisenhower, might have made a better contest. Stevenson was quite obviously not the man for this job. Appeals to the "common man" and to the "working class" have been in recent decades primarily the prerogative of the Democratic Party and its candidates. Stevenson by no means aroused great enthusiasm for himself in these respects. He received three times as many favorable comments as Eisenhower on the same matters, but he received only twenty-four in all.

When the nomination of Eisenhower gave warning to the Democrats of the full measure of the Republican challenge, they might have acted to muster the full complement of their basic support among the millions who seek greater social recognition as Americans, among Catholics, and among the "blue collar" groupings, both in the metropolitan areas and in the Solid South. When the Democrats (or Republicans) lose where they customarily win, they not only lose one election but prejudice their chances for the next, because hundreds of local organizations are weakened and the opposition, accordingly, is strengthened. However, as is well known, political parties are not rationally administered. The Democrats behaved as they did for reasons so numerous as to take a book of great size to recount them.

Chapter IV

THE PEOPLE CALL THE ISSUES[1]

"COMMUNISM is the issue," declared a Republican candidate. "PEACE OR WAR THE ISSUE," read some editorials. "I'm voting Republican because I want a two-party system," wrote a reader to the editor. "Tidelands oil is the big issue in California," reported a businessman at a convention. "Trumanism is the issue," announced the Republican "truth squad" following after President Truman's whistle-stop tour. And so on.

Were these the issues in 1952? Wishing did not make them so. How did editors, Senators, or columnists *know* these were *the issues*? How many voters were excited by them? Were there no other issues? If they were all issues—and there were also many others named—then which ones did the Western public decide and which not? Of those it decided, what specific action was demanded, if any?

The riddles of the public's feelings about candidates are simple when placed alongside the mysteries of its beliefs about issues. Some people attack politicians for their "unconcern" with public opinion. They assume that opinion is like a vegetable garden from which ripe produce may be picked daily. For better or worse, this is far from the truth. Neither politicians nor experts in opinion analysis can find opinions where there are no issues, nor find one opinion where there are many, nor find a public opinion on those precise matters about which they would like to know.

An exhaustive examination of what Westerners described as their reasons for supporting one or another party or candidate produced no insight into any overriding issue that decided the election. What was found, rather, was a mass of opinions, hundreds of them, some very general, others quite specific, ranging over many subjects, from the Korean War to unemployment compensation.

[1] The analysis of this chapter and the one that follows it is based largely upon the answers to general questions, such as, "Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican Party?" Such questions allowed individuals to express freely what they liked and disliked about the parties and candidates. A maximum of five discrete points was recorded for each respondent on each question, although there were only a few who made that many points in replying to any of the questions. From this tabulation it was possible to get an impression of those issues which were important in the public mind during the campaign.

All of these subjects were the issues of the 1952 campaign. It is no use to pick out a problem that somebody or other thought *ought* to have been an issue. An issue is whatever subject concerns a voter and influences his judgment of the actors on the political stage. The problem can be narrowed somewhat by requiring that at least a moderate number of people ought to be concerned about a subject before it is called an issue. It is a matter of some degree of urgency to such voters that their views be taken into consideration by the parties and the candidates. They cast their votes for those who they believe will support their views.



FIGURE 3
INTERACTION OF LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC OPINION

Out of what do such views originate? They grow out of the common needs of men and women in everyday life, and they are molded and given emphasis by the press, the politicians, and the active public generally. A great many people are inarticulate about their needs. They do not know how to phrase them or where to turn to fulfill them. The political process, and especially the election process, affords a social means for expressing their needs. As anyone knows who has ever had a lawyer frame a legal document, a person's opinion can be changed in the process of expressing it. So it is that the opinions of individuals resemble the opinions of their leaders, and the opinions of the leaders, those of the public at large. It is a circular process that can be diagramed as in Figure 3.

This fact is apparent when listening to people talk about the campaign. After hearing many people talk, the impression is one of a refrain that

has been heard before. Common ways of expressing needs grow up from this circular process until a public vocabulary develops. To put it simply, everybody talks about the same things in the same way. Thus are issues expressed.

There are at least three general classes of issues, from the standpoint of their function. One is a specific matter of legislation or policy that is either pending or extant and that stimulates a conflict of opinions. The Taft-Hartley Act would be an example of this in 1952. Although many people regard this as the only kind of issue, they could never explain the currents in an election in terms of such issues alone. In most instances, such issues are fully understood by only a few; and, furthermore, many people hold opinions that are not amenable to such specific and concrete statement.

Another kind of issue arises from the existence of pressure groups, issues that find their way into party platforms and into the resolutions of conferences and rallies. Examples of such issues would be a declaration of intention to save Eastern Europe from Soviet aggression or a resolution to eliminate racial discrimination. These are issues in the sense that some people are greatly disturbed about them, but they are not in the sense that they can become legislative proposals.

A third type of issue, very general in nature, is what people are thinking about and looking for in the political process as a whole. "War," "peace," "jobs," "government inefficiency," and "communism" are examples of such issues. This form of issue is ascertained best by those sample surveys in which people are allowed to speak freely. Almost every person has a worry that he believes politicians could take care of if they would. If he were asked about every one of the hundreds of bills before the last session of Congress, he might express a definite opinion about very few, if any of them. It might be concluded that he had no opinions and that his views were of no political consequence. But this judgment could very well be wrong, for he could hold strong opinions about the processes of politics which were so general that they contained no criteria for the decision of particular issues.

In the last analysis, an issue exists when enough people believe it exists. Editors and politicians can make countless suggestions and can influence people to be concerned about novel issues. This is a way of creating a basis for campaigning. But most issues grow from the predisposition of a

group of people to center their attention on an area of politics. As the parties and candidates compete for votes, they focus on this area and heighten the attention and increase the debate about it. There were a number of such areas in varying degrees of focus during the 1952 campaign in the West. The best way to learn what these areas are in any campaign is to ask the public, and this was done in 1952.

The Westerners of the sample were asked a number of questions on the issues of the campaign. They were asked what they thought were the differences between the two major parties. They were then asked why they intended to vote one way or another. They were asked the good and bad points about the candidates and the parties. They were asked if they thought that they would be better off financially if one or the other party won the election. Finally, they were asked to take a stand on seven "issues," so called by the politicians and the press.[2] It is well to note that only this last tactic in a specific sense "put words in their mouths." The other information about issues was elicited from the people with general questions.

What was the character of the issues that were uppermost in the minds of the public? Table XI is a list of those issues mentioned five times or more in response to the questions on what the voters liked or disliked about the parties and candidates.[3] The issues are grouped arbitrarily into categories of three degrees of specificity. There were a great many more responses on issues of a general nature than on either of the more specific types. This indicates a tendency for the Westerner to respond more to the categorical than to the concrete type of issue. If the initial cause of a person's attitude is a specific occurrence, such as the indictment of a tax official, he seems to project it onto a more general plane of political morality. The more general the issue, the greater significance attached to it for many people. Even those issues that have been classified as quite specific do not usually refer to a specific legislative proposal. The table also tends to minimize the thesis that the party in power generates opposition from its legislative record. The issues most in favor of the Democrats stemmed from their identity with social and economic legislation tending to promote prosperity and the interests of special groups. The issue most adverse to the Democrats was the allegation of corruption in government.

[2] See Appendix A-I, Questions 3–7, 9–13, 21–27.

[3] See Appendix A-I, Questions 4–7, 10–13. A maximum of five responses to each question were coded for each respondent.

TABLE XI

FREQUENTLY MENTIONED ISSUES CLASSIFIED BY PARTY OR CANDIDATE ASSOCIATION AND DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY

	Like about Republicans	Like about Democrats	Dislike about Republicans	Dislike about Democrats	Like about Stevenson	Like about Eisenhower	Dislike about Stevenson	Dislike about Eisenhower	Totals
General									
Ideas in general	11	9	..	..	..	10	..	..	30
Efficiency of administration	22	..	..	24	..	..	..	5	51
Action on "mess" in Washington	5	..	..	8	..	8	5	..	26
Action on honesty in govt.	33	..	9	58	6	23	14	..	143
Chances for peace	15	..	..	10	..	..	..	..	25
Time for a change	64	..	..	30	..	15	..	..	109
Extent of govt. activity	10	..	..	16	..	..	..	..	26
Favorable to progress	14	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	20
Effect on nation's moral fiber	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	..	5
Liberal	..	9	..	13	..	..	..	..	22
Conservative	18	..	18	..	..	..	..	17	53
Good for all the people	..	9	..	..	..	..	..	..	9
Good for the common people	5	41	12	..	13	5	..	..	76
									595
More Specific									
Govt. controls	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8
Govt. spending	35	..	5	37	..	..	..	..	77
Tax policy	19	..	5	28	..	..	..	..	52
Policy toward domestic communism	..	6	..	12	..	..	..	..	18
Inflation policies	13	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	13
Policy toward govt. centralization	8	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8
Foreign policy	..	..	35	..	..	15	..	..	50
Isolationism	..	9	12	..	..	..	..	..	21
Prosperity	..	..	43	73	..	..	..	..	116
Jobs	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	6
									369

TABLE XI (*Continued*)

FREQUENTLY MENTIONED ISSUES CLASSIFIED BY PARTY OR CANDIDATE ASSOCIATION AND DEGREE OF SPECIFICITY

	Like about Republicans	Like about Democrats	Dislike about Republicans	Dislike about Democrats	Like about Stevenson	Like about Eisenhower	Dislike about Stevenson	Dislike about Eisenhower	Totals
Quite Specific									
Korean War	15	..	..	30	..	21	..	..	66
Point IV Program.	..	..	..	5	..	..	..	..	5
Social Security and pensions policy	..	25	..	..	..	..	..	..	25
Conservation policy	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Labor policy	..	9	9	..	..	..	..	..	18
Good for the workers	..	72	14	8	5	..	..	..	99
Good for the labor unions	..	18	13	9	..	..	..	..	40
Good for the businessman ..	5	7	54	..	..	..	..	..	66
Good for farmers .	..	11	..	..	..	..	..	..	11
Good for Negroes	..	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
									342

There was dissatisfaction with the high level of spending and taxes, but this was not great enough in itself to offset the favor derived from their record on social reform.

Another and striking point that emerges from Table XI is that there is no sharp definition of issues between the parties in American elections. This contrasts with the British and the Commonwealth Governments, whose campaigns are usually waged about cleavages on issues. The Democrats and Republicans hardly joined in battle on issues; they tended to talk over each other's heads. This matter will be analyzed further in Chapter V, but it can be said here that a listing of what people liked and disliked about parties and candidates shows few head-on collisions. The supporters of the two parties tended to point to their own strong points and their opponents' weak ones, and to wink at the assaults from the other side. There is an overlap among the voters of both parties in their position on issues. Many Republicans and Democrats support one another and

many dispute with members of their own party. It is extremely difficult to discover a pattern of conflict. People were concerned about efficient and honest government, about government spending, about conservatism and liberalism, about social change and progress. They were interested in the welfare of the "common man," the workers, farmers, Negroes, and businessmen. They vented their hatred of communism and they looked suspiciously at their allies abroad. They demanded lower taxes. They talked of prosperity and good times, of the Great Depression of 1929–36 (which appears to be almost as slow-healing a wound as was the Civil War). They discussed the rights of labor unions and the right to social security. They were deeply disturbed by the Korean War and everyone responsible for it.

Most voters had probably formulated the issues for themselves long before the campaign began. They were prepared to cast a general judgment upon the parties and candidates. Only miracles of campaigning and cataclysmic events could have changed their dominant attitudes and targets of attention.

No issue *won* the election. Scarcely any issues in themselves swayed more than a few votes. In this sense it was a normal American election. A great many things were combined—personalities, traditions, local party activity, and general beliefs about government—and together they swung the vote the way it went.

But the Republicans had a lever that had a compelling effect on the election results. It was a situation that aroused people. This was the unifying issue of the Republican campaign. It was the Korean War. The entrance of the United States into the war in Korea ultimately defeated the Democratic Party in the West, in November 1952. There were three general areas of public concern, but the Korean War by its own impact and its implications in these and other areas was the key issue. It was the only new, specific issue of great consequence to people, and it lent force and meaning to many other issues.

In terms of the number of times an area of concern was mentioned, the three major ones were general prosperity and the prosperity of particular groups (337), honesty and efficiency in government (297), and peace and an end to the Korean War (91).[4] Although the Korean War

[4] The area of concern called "Prosperity" is a composite of these responses: prosperity, good for the workers, good for the labor unions, good for the businessmen, good for the

issue was not mentioned as frequently as the other two major areas of concern, it gave impetus to some attitudes which help to explain the effectiveness of the Republican campaign in these areas.

The Korean War affected popular concern about prosperity in two ways. First, it increased anxiety over government spending, inefficiency, and taxes because of the large military expenditures. Second, it caused a certain reluctance on the part of the Democratic Administration to make more of a positive issue out of the high level of prosperity, as they might otherwise have done. To the Democratic claim to be the party of prosperity, the public might retort, "What good is prosperity in wartime?" One of the Democrats' chief sources of appeal to the public was thus greatly compromised by the Korean War.

The Korean War affected popular concern about corruption in government in this way. It magnified the dangers to the life of the Republic involved in corruption. The startling revelations and exposures of corruption had a greater impact on the public because they were coupled with suspicions of bungling abroad and irresponsibility in critical times.

In addition to its effect on these major areas of concern, the Korean War worked to the advantage of the Republicans on several other less critical issues. It suggested that a man expert in military skills might be desirable in the Presidency at that juncture in the nation's history. It emphasized the threat of world communism and Soviet aggression to the free way of life and encouraged a "get tough with Russia" policy.[5]

These attitudes reflected a considerable sentiment in favor of a change in government. One hundred and six people stated that it was "time for a change." The Democrats had been "corrupted by power." The two-party system had to be preserved. The arguments advanced by those who were to vote Republican for a change in administrations and for a cleanup of the "mess" in Washington seemed to epitomize the entire picture.

Figure 4, on the next page, is an attempt to show how the Korean

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farmers. "Honesty and efficiency in government" is a composite of these responses: efficiency of administration, action on the "mess" in Washington, "honesty" in government and government spending. "Peace and an end to the Korean War" derives from a single response referring to the chances for peace and an end to the Korean War.

[5] It is interesting to note that the issue of subversives in the domestic community was not primary in the minds of those interviewed. It was mentioned only six times. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy was mentioned only once as a leading Republican personality. The public may have included the issue of subversion in the general subject of corruption, but the extent to which this may be so cannot be ascertained from the data at hand.



FIGURE 4

HOW THE KOREAN WAR ISSUE PERMEATED THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1952

(Showing how a number of commonly mentioned issues in the campaign were either diminished or heightened in effect by the Korean War, and how they combined to blunt the force of main Democratic appeals)

War affected the 1952 elections. It illustrates how the Korean War, in direct and indirect ways, helped to bring about the Republican victory.

A distinction has been made for purposes of analysis between party attraction, candidate attraction, and issues. It should be pointed out, however, that many people seemed concerned primarily or exclusively with party and/or personality. Some voted automatically for a party and others made up their minds principally on the basis of the candidates' personalities.

The three elements—issues, parties, and candidates—are in reality tied up closely. While one man may declare that he votes for a particular

party or candidate because that party or candidate stands for efficient government, another may declare that he votes for a party or candidate because the party leaders or the candidate are good organizers. While one woman may demand immediate peace in Korea, another will "like Ike" because he is familiar with world conditions (and presumably this would help bring peace). If we range the favorable and unfavorable comments made about the candidates alongside of those made about the issues, we find that issues are mentioned 52% of the time when people are defending or attacking a political party, and 15% of the time when people are defending or attacking a political candidate. In references to parties and candidates taken together, issues were mentioned in 33% of the remarks. Table XII gives a rough measure of the extent to which people look for

TABLE XII

THE NUMBER OF REFERENCES TO PARTIES, CANDIDATES, AND ISSUES

	% Comments referring to parties	% Comments referring to persons	% No. of references to issues	Total %	Total number of comments
What are the good and bad points about the parties? ...	34	14	52	100	1,611
What are the good and bad points about the candidates?	19	66	15	100	1,705
Both questions	26	41	33	100	3,316

issues per se, as against looking for issues through party labels or personal attractiveness in a presidential campaign.

Further evidence of the relative importance people attach to issues, parties, and candidates was obtained from the replies given to the question: "What would you say is the most important reason why you are going to vote for (Eisenhower) (Stevenson)?"[6]

Table XIII summarizes the results of an analysis of the replies.

Just after the election, when people in the reinterview named the candidates for whom they had voted, they were asked the most important reason why they had supported whom they did. Their replies, analyzed in the same fashion as the pre-election responses, differed very little from the earlier ones. This suggests a hypothesis that will be discussed fully in Chapter VI, namely, that the campaign itself caused few changes. One

[6] See Appendix A-I, Question 36*a*.

TABLE XIII

PRINCIPAL REASON FOR PREFERRING A PARTY OR CANDIDATE, 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

	Will vote either Dem. or Rep.	Will vote Dem.	Will vote Rep.	May vote Dem.	May vote Rep.	Total	% of all reasons
Party identification	113	59	54	5	..	118	28
For a candidate	64	12	52	..	7	71	18
Against a candidate	7	3	4	1	..	8	2
Issues (whether both foreign and domestic or in general)	14	5	9	..	..	14	4
Foreign policies (Korea, war, peace, etc.)	11	1	10	..	1	12	3
Domestic issues (excluding those following)	10	2	8	1	..	11	3
Corruption, "mess" in Washington, time for a change	35	..	35	1	1	37	9
Prosperity, good times, fear of depression, lower taxes, other economic	34	27	7	2	1	37	9
Party is best for respondent's group	37	34	3	3	..	40	10
Personal influence	8	2	6	1	1	10	3
Other	2	1	1	..	..	2	1
No outstanding reason	17	4	13	11	14	42	10
Total						402	100

feature of the postelection replies was the more frequent claim of the Republicans that it was time for a change and that the Democrats had been in power too long. There was also a slight increase in affirmative reactions to Stevenson's personality among the Democrats. But ending the Korean War held its place as the predominant, specific reason for voting Republican.

The measures used here, however crude, indicate that nearly a third of the sample kept issues, rather than parties or candidates, in the forefront of their decisions. The major issues, as ascertained by this analysis, were the *loss of confidence in the Democratic Administration (including time for a change, corruption, and too much power), Korea and the anxieties of war*, and such *economic circumstances as labor relations, prosperity, and taxes.* It seems probable that these were also the chief issues of the campaign.

Noteworthy by their absence are issues peculiar to the West. The response of the sample to the general questions on what they liked and disliked about the two parties and their candidates showed that there was very little concern about issues peculiar to the West. About 4% of the sample said they were against centralization and creeping socialism. Only one person said he liked the Republican Party because it upheld states' rights in the matter of civil rights. Two or three people expressed themselves as liking the Republicans because their local Republicans were good men. Barely half a dozen people (1 to 2% of the sample) brought up the subjects of conservation and power policies, all of them applauding the Democratic Party on these questions. What might be called localism undoubtedly entered into remarks that people made against the extension of other governmental functions. On the whole, however, the tinge of Westernism that entered into the people's *conscious* thoughts about parties and candidates was faint.

One reason for the seemingly few Western issues is that this was a *national* election. The attention of the public quite naturally centered upon the national and international level. The capturing of the public attention was assisted materially by the news services, the national magazines, and the radio and TV networks, all of which emphasized national and international affairs, reducing regional, state, and local affairs to a decidedly secondary importance.

A second reason is that many Westerners were interested primarily in national and international affairs. It is pointed out elsewhere that people freely acknowledged this greater interest in national elections. Their differences in participation in national as compared with local elections confirms this fact, since people said they were more active in national elections.[7]

A third reason is that many of the local and immediate sources of agitation are problems which have the same origin and character as problems in other parts of the country. For example, the high cost of living, housing shortages, and problems of labor relations are local in effect, but are general throughout the nation in scope. In this sense, a peculiarly Western problem exists only when the West is treated by nature or by law in a discriminatory way. The 1952 election campaign raised few of these

[7] See Chapter VI.

Western problems, and there was, by and large, little to distinguish the Western issues from those of the rest of the nation.

This lack of Western problems made it difficult to expose what special Western concerns there were by the sample survey method. The sample was too small. There are, undoubtedly, small numbers of people in each state who have deep and self-conscious interests in state and local governments, but it would require a sample of opinion in every state and locality to find the special issues there. Questions such as, "What do you feel are the two most troublesome problems in this community?" would have to be asked. Barring that, newspapers might be referred to, to see what they regarded as the Western, state, or local issues. The candidates might be consulted and the opinions of "experts" sought. In any of these cases, it should be realized, first, that the editors and candidates among these men were making or anticipating issues as much as they were discussing issues that the people felt strongly about. Second, many of these men addressed themselves to very select audiences of people actively engaged in politics or directly concerned with the issues.

Two examples of newspaper issues emerge from a study of the files of the *Los Angeles Times* and the *San Francisco Examiner* for the period of the campaign. Natural resource development and the tidelands controversy were stressed from the Republican standpoint. The *Times* was especially concerned about the Fallbrook water rights and the Central Arizona project disputes, while the *Examiner* was more concerned with the general policy of returning control of resources to the state governments. In the newspapers of Idaho, Oregon, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, and the other Western states, similar natural resource and conservation issues would be found. It is quite likely that some people voted as they did because the newspapers played up such problems, but it is unlikely that their number was either decisive or significant in the result. It has been noted previously that only 1 to 2% of the sample thought to mention conservation and power as an issue, all favoring the Democratic policies. This is not to say that, beyond the few persons whose vote is decided on natural resource questions, there is not a vast number who hold opinions on these matters. But their votes are not swung by such questions, alone or even in considerable part. Many resource questions are not partisan but sectional issues, since Western interests and sentiments are quite united on them. Hence they were not contentions in the campaign.

Both candidates certainly addressed their messages to Western audiences and framed them in Western terms. Stevenson made sixteen speeches in the eleven Western states; Eisenhower, nine. In seven of his sixteen addresses, Stevenson raised such local issues as natural resources, appeals for local congressional candidates, and federal-state relations. He devoted the following proportion of paragraphs to local issues in all the speeches: 41% at Cheyenne; 53% at Portland; 80% at Seattle; 21% at Phoenix; 61% at Casper, Wyoming; 56% at Spokane; and 60% at Pendleton, Oregon. Eisenhower raised local issues in three of his nine Western speeches. He devoted about 14% of his address in Boise to local issues; 43%, in Seattle; and 17%, in Portland.

Stevenson spoke more in the West and of the West than did Eisenhower. The net effect of his Western campaigning is impossible to measure. He may have reduced his ultimate margin of defeat, or he may have affected only a few negligible votes. A final judgment on this will have to await publication of the diaries or memoirs of those who accompanied the candidates (if any good ones are written) and an analysis of some thousands of Western newspapers.

Probably the most satisfactory picture of the Western issues of the 1952 campaign to be had was drawn by experts who wrote after the campaign. This appraisal of the election was made by a political scientist from each state on the campaign in that state, and appeared in the *Western Political Quarterly*. From these articles the following résumé of the most prominent local and regional issues in each state can be constructed:

WESTERN ISSUES AS SEEN BY EXPERTS

General

"Western voters did not seem fearful that a Republican president or Republican congressman would desert those programs, such as conservation and development of natural resources, which were close to their hearts." (Hugh Bone)

Arizona

"The new incumbents probably will have the same sensitivity to proposals of immediate concern to the major economic interests of Arizona and to the issue of Colorado River water as had their predecessors." (Paul Kelso)

California

"Federal control of the tidelands was a burning issue in the Long Beach area. In San Diego County, the Department of Justice suit against

farmers of the Fallbrook community to determine the water rights of Camp Pendleton, produced a storm of protest over 'federal encroachment.' In the Central Valley, Bureau of Reclamation policies have met with determined opposition. The impact of scandal in the San Francisco Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue must have been a factor in the Bay area. There is little reason to believe, however, that either Senator Nixon's candidacy or these local issues were determinative." (Ivan Hinderaker)

Colorado

"Local issues were relatively unimportant in Colorado in 1952. The only ones of any significance were the personalities of the two candidates for governor, and the question of whether there should be a severance tax imposed upon the oil industry in the state. The latter subject came before the voters in the form of an initiated amendment to the constitution. . . ." It was defeated. (Curtis Martin)

Idaho

"The potato farmers who lost money in the spring of 1952 because of price controls, voted the Republican ticket. . . . Mrs. Pfost (winning Democratic candidate for Congress) supported Hell's Canyon Dam, but the Republicans did not make it a serious issue." (Clifford Dobler)

Montana

"The basic ingredients of the engulfing tide in the agrarian sections of Montana were falling livestock and grain prices and curtailed sugar-beet acreage; these were attributed to federal policies." Defeat of Democratic Governor Bonner was explained in part by his "timidity on submerged issues like oil royalties on school lands and highway trucking taxes, which failed to attract independent voters." (Jules A. Karchin)

Nevada

No state issues of note. Internal dissension in the Democratic Party accounted for Republican victory. (C. C. Smith)

New Mexico

"Major issues in state and congressional races failed to develop. . . . The senatorial race was the most bitterly fought and closest of the campaign. Senator Chavez based his appeal chiefly on the advantage his seniority in the Senate gave him in obtaining favors for New Mexico and the folly of electing a sixty-eight-year-old 'freshman' to a body where effectiveness depends so much upon length of service. General Hurley countered with grandiose schemes of diverting water to New Mexico from the Mississippi basin and controlling waste of the Rio Grande's flood waters. The voters apparently paid little attention to the arguments of either candidate." (Charles Judah)

Oregon

"Nor was the campaign (in Oregon) marked by any concentration on local and regional issues such as public power." (Maure L. Goldschmidt)

Utah

No state issues of note, despite the great intensity of the campaign. (M. R. Merrill)

Washington

"With General Eisenhower and the Republican state ticket representing predominantly the liberal wing of the party, fear that vital Northwest development might die was stifled, while promises of a continuation of the parity program ended farmer fears, which had swelled the Truman vote in 1948." Democratic Congressman Mitchell, running for Governor, was attacked for inexperience in state problems and "depended heavily on issues such as welfare, highways, tax reform, and schools," but lost. (Daniel M. Ogden, Jr.)

Wyoming

"Wyoming politicians conduct themselves on the assumption that they must have the support of cattle and sheep interests and, to a lesser degree, beet, bean, and grain growers. More recently, oil has assumed major status with beef and sheep, as this election clearly demonstrated. Thus campaigns are generally waged about the issue of who is friendliest to whom." Senator O'Mahoney lost partly because he had not done enough recently for these interests. (John T. Hinckley)

Once again, it must be acknowledged that there is little criteria to measure the impact of these issues on the vote. When the Western sample was asked why they voted as they did, hardly a person gave prominence to these issues. If they were effective issues, they were merged into the general background of party affiliations, social and economic status, and the general appeal of the candidates. It seems clear that the 1952 election was not perceptibly determined by issues peculiar to the West.

In later chapters there will be a discussion of how the Democrats and Republicans, the rich and poor, the educated and uneducated, and others, aligned themselves on issues. However, this general survey of the issues facing the Western public should not be concluded without gaining an understanding of opinion on the issues that confronted the nation, whether the public discussed them readily or not. In addition to the knowledge of those issues that were uppermost in the minds of Western voters in 1952, it was desired that their views on certain specific subjects be sought. The

Survey Research Center framed seven questions[8] on what seemed important problems of the time. These problems included the proper scope of national government activity; federal government action in preventing racial discrimination in employment; the Taft-Hartley labor relations law; the proper degree of American involvement in foreign affairs; the culpability of the American government in China's accession to communism; the propriety of the American entry into the fighting in Korea; and the preferred policy to be followed in Korea in the then existing circumstances.

Figure 5 presents the responses to these questions in graphic form. Varied replies were reduced to alternatives and then matched with the voting intentions of the respondents to each question. As an indication of the combined ignorance, indifference, and indecision that was exhibited on each issue, a separate tabulation of these categories is placed at the left of the chart. Finally, to convey some idea whether these issues, that were posed directly to the public, had excited spontaneous responses, the number of times each of the closely similar ones had been mentioned in reply to the general questions about candidates and parties is indicated by the bars at the right of the chart. Thus the bar chart helps to show the extent of interest, whether it was pro or con, and the extent of indecision and indifference among the party divisions of the voters.

Reading both the bar chart and the table of responses in Appendix C, some interesting conclusions may be drawn about each issue in turn. The author has described elsewhere the important dimensions to watch for in an issue.[9] These are:

1. The number of alternative opinions that exist on the issue.
2. The number of people holding the various opinions.
3. The distribution of social groups as they adhere to one or more of the alternatives.
4. The intensity with which people hold their opinions on the issue.
5. The degree of organization and political power of the groups involved.
6. The rate of opinion change over time periods. (This, however, cannot be discussed in the present case, since there are no comparable questions and data for the past, or since 1952.)

[8] Appendix A-I, Questions 21–27.
[9] De Grazia, A., *The Elements of Political Science*, p. 127.



FIGURE 5

EXTENT OF THE VIEWS AND OF INTEREST, INDECISION, AND INDIFFERENCE OF WESTERNERS ON SEVEN ISSUES

If one maintains that these are the kinds of information about opinion on an issue that are wanted, the replies of the people to the seven issues described can be examined accordingly.

The first question asked people whether they thought the national government should try to do more or to do less in dealing with problems such as unemployment, education, and housing. Most people agreed that government activity was at about the right level in the United States. Those favoring a change tended to be slightly on the "liberal" side in this respect, since some wished rather more activity and a smaller number wished for less. Extremes of feeling on this subject were quite rare. Rather than being bipolar, public opinion on this question tended to adjust around a fairly "liberal" average. Only about 20 people out of 452 believed that the government should definitely do more or definitely do less. As may be seen from the chart, quite a few people fell into neither the pro nor con position. Few people, in fact, had no opinion at all on the matter, but quite a few people (63 in all) argued for more or less intervention in certain areas, but not in others. Although a majority of those who said the government was doing about enough were Democratic in sentiment, many Republicans shared the view, or at least were not excited to strong objection. It can be concluded that the opinion of the Western public is stabilized around the current level of national government activity and that drastic efforts at reducing that level, or at increasing it, might arouse considerable opposition.

The second question asked whether the people thought the federal government ought to act in the matter of discrimination against Negroes in getting jobs, and what action they thought the government should take. This was quite a different kind of issue. There was hardly any heated interest or spontaneity on the issue. Only 14 people had taken up the subject under the general questions about issues, whereas 150 on the question of government activity had commented spontaneously on one side or another. There was a fair amount of indifference to the issue also, even when it was posed directly, since 40 persons from the sample either gave no answer or did not know anything about the matter. Opinion was divided on the issue of discrimination. Some thought that laws were the cure for the problem; others, that informal means were adequate. Some felt that states should pass laws rather than the federal government. Some held that government should stay entirely out of the problem.

Some even favored restrictive legislation. The largest body of sentiment, about a quarter of all those who had opinions on the subject, thought that the federal government should pass laws forbidding racial discrimination in hiring. The next largest body of opinion held that government should stay out entirely. The third largest group held that the states should take action rather than the federal government. Over all, more of the public preferred action by some level of government to inaction.

The California Poll asked a more simple question of Californians during the campaign, limiting its question solely to the subject of a law on discrimination in employment. It found that 40% of its sample of Californians agreed with the statement that the federal government should pass a law to the effect that no one should be refused a job because of his race, color, or religion; that 16% agreed with the statement that state governments should pass a law to the same effect; that 32% agreed with the statement, "I don't think it would be a good idea to pass any laws of this kind"; and that 7% had no opinion on the question.

Returning to the more diversified replies of the Western sample, it can be noted that the opinion of those who possessed Republican tendencies was fairly evenly distributed throughout the various alternatives. On the other hand, the strongest support for governmental action, and the strongest opposition to governmental action, came from Democratic ranks. In the West, as in the nation at large, the question of fair employment practices legislation caused greater internal dissension among Democrats than among Republicans.

The question of the Taft-Hartley law finds considerable difference again in the profile of opinion. Some 233 persons spontaneously offered comment on the Act, or on matters closely connected with the Act, in their answers to general questions about parties and candidates. On the other hand, a large body of opinion could not recall or had not heard previously of the Taft-Hartley Act. In contrast with issues already mentioned, the Taft-Hartley Act was a partisan issue in which the most vocal opposition was registered among Strong Democrats, and staunch approval was concentrated among Strong Republicans. Surprising as it may be, there was a considerable amount of pro-Taft-Hartley Act sentiment among Weak Democrats. Although the Taft-Hartley Act apparently was a partisan issue, it was not a very decisive issue, for sentiment approving the Act or favoring amendment of the Act was quite evenly distributed among

all shades of party affiliation. But sentiment for repeal followed party lines closely. Sentiment for and against the Act was evenly divided. Undoubtedly, the proposals made by both parties for changes in the Act met with fairly general approval among Westerners. When the California Poll forced its sample of Californians into a position either for or against the Taft-Hartley Act, it resulted in a bipolar distribution of opinion, as might have been expected, in which the Democrats expressed strong disapproval of the law and Republicans strong approval of it. But there was also a third of the population that had no opinion or knew nothing about the law.

An examination of the replies to the question of foreign involvement gives yet another kind of opinion profile. As with the question on the proper sphere of government activity, this resulted in a unipolar distribution of opinions, but it was negative in feeling that America had gone too far in concerning herself with problems in other parts of the world. A clear majority of the sample, even when persons undecided on or indifferent to the matter were taken into consideration, held the dominant view. This question had considerable moment for the Western public, for the measure of spontaneity shows that 184 people brought up this issue in one form or another in their replies to general questions. The dominant opinion was not a partisan one either, although there was some tendency for Democrats to respond in a defensive key. Only one-half as many people thought America had not gone too far as believed that she had.

Especially in view of Eisenhower's assurances that he would respect America's foreign commitments, it can be seen here that the people were reacting against politicians of both parties and against most official opinion in Washington. Eisenhower's cause benefited from this reaction to the foreign policy of the past, even though he was on record as asking for much the same co-operation abroad as the Democrats had established, and indeed had been active in their councils. Apparently, the public's dislike of foreign involvements operated as a drag upon Democratic voters who might otherwise have voted according to their basic party affiliation. One hundred and eight Democrats of all kinds said that the United States had gone too far in foreign affairs; 65 said that she had not gone too far. Sixty-one, or 30% of those who said that America had gone too far, intended to vote Democratic; whereas 40, or 37% of those who said she had not gone too far, affirmed their intention of voting Democratic. This

is some evidence that the "dissatisfied" Democrats had cooled to their party more than the others. The large number of nonvoters in the gone-too-far category may indicate a loss of Democratic votes.

The public did not assign blame for the Chinese debacle so readily. A large majority felt that it was not our government's fault that China went over to the Communists. That this question was identified in the public mind with other problems of international affairs generally, was evidenced by the absence of spontaneous comments on the subject. A quarter of the sample, furthermore, held no opinion whatsoever on the question. It will be recalled that during the campaign the Republicans made much of the argument that the Democratic Administration, especially Truman, Acheson, and, to a lesser extent, the American generals and State Department officials in the Far East were responsible for China's accession to communism. The replies to this question indicate that this argument was made especially by Strong Republicans. Among the rest of the Westerners sampled, this particular issue was not a deeply partisan one. Of those who did not assign blame to the American leaders, more intended to vote Republican than intended to vote Democratic. The repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, it has been noted, was a demand concentrated among the Strong Democrats. This Chinese-fiasco issue was one that centered among Strong Republicans. The China issue tended, like the one of foreign involvement, to weaken Democratic morale. Quite a few Democrats believed it was the government's fault and quite a large number of Democrats expressed no opinion on the subject, which may indicate defensiveness or internal conflict about the charge.

The question of the Korean War, it may be remembered, was the most effective Republican issue of the campaign. Some 73 persons in the sample directly or indirectly alluded to the Korean problem in replies to general questions. The Korean question flowed over into questions regarding foreign involvements, anticommunism, corruption in government, and the time-for-a-change issues. The notable fact about the profile of opinion on the question of American participation in the fighting in Korea is that it was largely nonpartisan. The Strong Republicans divided about evenly on the question and the Strong Democrats had a majority, but not a great one, favoring America's action in Korea. A category of "no answer" and "don't know" on the question was preponderantly Democratic in affiliation and was Republican in terms of voting intention, another situation of in-

ternal conflict in which many Democrats took a subdued and hesitating position on an issue, perhaps in some cases as a preliminary to changing their vote.

When people were asked what would be the best policy to follow now in Korea and were given three alternatives, they showed great impatience and aggression. Many people were fed up with the difficult situation and were prepared for drastic means to end the Korean War. The Democrats were badly divided. About 100 Democrats of varying degrees of affiliation wanted to bomb Manchuria and China as part of taking a firmer stand. At most, only half of these could have been among the 53 persons in the sample who said they intended to vote Democratic. Some of the greatest impatience was exhibited by Strong Democrats. Once again, the morale of many Democrats seems to have been badly shaken. It can be seen from the reactions to this question how Eisenhower was able to exert great appeal, because with his military background it was felt that he, more than anyone else, would either bring peace or pursue the battle to final victory.

Chapter V

THE PARTY LINE

THE LAST CHAPTER revealed the issues of the campaign in the West. It drew a picture of what concerned people and showed how people divided on some critical issues. However, except on the specific issues put before the voters by the interviewers, it did not show the total position of Republicans and Democrats on all issues. Therefore, the next inquiry should disclose whether a general party line was being followed by those who intended to vote Democratic and another party line by those who intended to vote Republican, and whether the shifters who voted Democratic in 1948 and who intended to vote Republican in 1952 joined one or the other party line or pursued their own view of the situation.

What kinds of problems concerned the Democratic public during the 1952 campaign? When they were asked what they liked about the Democratic Party and what they didn't like about the Republican Party, the 1952 Democrats responded with some interesting replies. Using those given by at least 5 of them, an image of the Democratic Party as seen by its supporters can be constructed. Some of the 1952 Democrats gave reasons for liking the party that did not directly pertain to the issues of the campaign: some liked the party because it was the party of Franklin Delano Roosevelt; others said they had always been a Democrat and didn't even consider other possibilities; some said simply that they just liked the Democrats and the way they operated.

But many of the 1952 Democrats cited substantial grounds for liking the party. The Democratic Party was the party of progress and social change. It introduced and supported social security and pension legislation. It helped people and their families. It consistently brought higher wages and more jobs. It was the party of prosperity and good times. The Democrats treated people as equals. The party was helpful to people like themselves; it was the party of the common people. A large number pointed to the Democratic record of supporting the aspirations of the country's workers. The party was good for labor and for the labor unions. Some declared that the Democrats benefited the businessman as well.

To the same 1952 Democrats the Republican Party had a number of defects. Apart from disliking such leaders as Eisenhower and Taft and the kind of campaign the Republicans were waging, the Democrats attacked what they considered to be consistent characteristics of the Republican Party. The Republicans were too conservative, it was asserted. They were the party of depression in the past and would bring about a new depression. Under their rule there would be fewer jobs and poorer working conditions. The Republicans opposed the interests of the common people. They were especially antagonistic to the working man, to labor, and to labor unions. The Taft-Hartley Act was advanced as an example of this Republican prejudice. Furthermore, the Republicans favored big business, the rich, and the upper classes. They couldn't be trusted with power.

Those who intended to vote Republican viewed the Republican Party differently. Numerous claims were made by 5 or more people. Many supported the party simply because of its leaders, mentioning Eisenhower, Taft, or Nixon. Some had always been Republican and thought that that settled the matter. Then came more concrete reasons. The Republicans had correct policies. They would provide efficient administration and restore honesty to government. They would clean up the "mess" in Washington. The Republicans were conservative. They would spend less money, would eliminate a number of controls over business, and would reverse the trend toward centralized government. They would halt the rise in the cost of living, improve economic conditions, and lower taxes. They, rather than the Democrats, were good for the common people. Their foreign policy was superior. They would bring the Korean War to some satisfactory end and would provide greater opportunity for lasting peace. They would get rid of Communists in the government. Furthermore, some of those who intended to vote Republican asserted as a reason for liking the party that it was time for a change and that the nation ought to reaffirm the principle of the two-party system.

To the Republican way of thought, the Democratic Party had some severe defects. Its leaders, especially Harry Truman and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, were excoriated. The Democratic bosses were castigated, too. Some said simply that they could not bear the Democrats and others said that the Democrats were waging a bad campaign. The Democrats had been in power too long, and they had been inefficient and wasteful. They

had brought corruption and graft into government. They had created a mess in Washington that had to be cleaned up. They were spendthrift and bad for the moral fiber of the nation. They intervened too much in private affairs and introduced high taxes. The effect of the Democratic administrations was to develop and encourage "creeping socialism." Furthermore, the Democrats were good for the wrong kind of worker, while they were bad for the ordinary working man. They would in fact provide fewer jobs and poorer working conditions than the Republicans.

The foreign policy of the Democrats was hurting the country severely by its fumbling, wastefulness, and support of the wrong interests. The Democrats brought on the Korean War and would continue to be the party of war. They had wasted money in sending aid to underdeveloped areas. They were, moreover, "soft" on Communists at home.

In accord with the ancient adage that it is easier to see the mote in your neighbor's eye than the beam in your own, members of both parties were harder on the opposition than they were on themselves. Table XIV

TABLE XIV

VERBOSITY AS AN INDEX OF PARTISAN SELF-ESTEEM

Type of remarks	Average no. of remarks per person	Total no. of remarks
Democrats vs. themselves	1.5	92
Republicans vs. themselves	1.5	106
Democrats pro Republicans	1.5	49
Republicans pro Democrats	1.6	176
Democrats pro themselves	2.2	339
Republicans pro themselves	2.5	448
Democrats vs. Republicans	2.2	254
Republicans vs. Democrats	2.7	450

shows the number of "likes" and "dislikes" mentioned by the different partisans and the average remarks per person.

If anything, the Republicans were more vindictive and full of self-praise than the Democrats. They had more compliments for their own party and more bad things to say about the Democrats.

The contrast in the beliefs of Democratic voters and Republican voters and the contrast in their image of the other party bear significantly

upon the future of America. It is to be remembered that these pictures came directly from the minds of the voters. They were spontaneous. Unique in the archives of political science, they show in detail the contrast between the values and perceptions of those who support one party and of those who support the opposing party. To understand what may be the meaning of these contrasts requires a brief tracing out of political theory.

The history of modern democracy in general has seen a movement from limited to universal suffrage. Most of the authors of the American Constitution, in company with a number of prominent political theorists of England and the Continent, urged at an early date the proposition that universal suffrage was incompatible with republican government, and ultimately with democracy itself. Their theory, summarized briefly, held that, when everyone possessed the vote, a politician would have to make extreme appeals to the multitude in order to be elected. Gaetano Mosca, who presented the theory in its most systematic form at the end of the 19th century, believed that universal suffrage would eventually defeat the rule of law. He asserted that only when smaller electorates chose political leaders would the elective process maintain an orderly pace and not threaten the constitutional order.

Since these theories were presented (and, it should be added, rejected by most political theorists), much information concerning the types of propaganda used in political campaigns has been gathered. Probably most experts on propaganda analysis would agree that under conditions of universal suffrage, direct and dramatic appeals are more effective in winning elections than indirect or long-term appeals. That is, a great majority of people, who are deciding now who shall be their representative, will prefer the man whose immediate actions will be pleasing to the man whose policies involve postponing present gratifications for future ones. For example, it may or may not be true that increased centralization of government will ultimately be costly or bad from the standpoint of their own interests, yet most people will be unconcerned with that kind of problem and decide a question of more or less government activity in terms of its immediate asserted benefit and other prompt effects.

One tendency of a democracy, therefore, is to settle questions on a short-term basis because arguments about long-term effects or consequences do not have great appeal to the voters in the heat of a campaign.

So a political party in a democracy strives to make its propaganda as direct and dramatic as possible in order to defeat the opposing party.

If this is true, then the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States constantly strive to develop direct and dramatic appeals to the citizenry. But here the two parties diverge in a significant way. Studying the responses of citizens regarding their own parties and the opposing parties, one is struck by the partial monopoly the Democrats have over constructive, material, mass appeals. The Democrats identify their party with good times, good working conditions, respect for the common man, social progress, and concern for the multitude. The Republicans, on the other hand, are left with limited direct appeals. Many fewer of them look to their party for benevolent assistance. Some of them think that their taxes will be reduced and their businesses will be less controlled if their party is in power, but they are a small segment of the population and of the vote. So the Republicans' direct appeals to the multitude tend to be negative. Controls will be removed, administration will be honest and efficient. More Republicans are antiforeign and isolationist in foreign affairs. The lack of immediate material issues, plus negativism, plus exclusiveness, leads to an emphasis upon dramatic appeals that differ from those of the Democrats. If the Democratic Party monopolizes the immediate, material, progressive appeals, the Republican Party has to counter with exciting revelations and solemn accusations. If the Democrats were laboring over a long period for peace in Korea, the Republicans were impelled to promise decisive and immediate peace or action. The Republicans would get rid of the Communists in government and would startle the electors with the Communist issue.

As this process accelerates, it tends to reinforce a core of sentiment in the Republican Party holding rather well-defined beliefs of a restricted government, a hostility to foreign involvements, especially "give-away" programs, and a fear of communism in domestic life. The contrasting Democratic core of sentiment is more optimistic, regarding the government—honest or not—as the instrument of the common people for material and social betterment, and it is not as excited by the threat of domestic or foreign communism and does not mind helping foreigners. To put the matter crudely, there is an important and numerous kind of Democrat who is like a pup that feeds happily at the mother's breast, serenely believing that there will always be room for another pup. Some Republicans

are like the pup that believes all the positions are occupied, and that probably one of them is taken by a Communist spy. If these tendencies of the Republican and Democratic parties were to be strengthened greatly, America would be embarked on what would ultimately be either a self-destructive, centralizing, socializing, and extravagant course of action or a negative, destructive, and liberty-repressing course. Such is the irony of historical determinism that either course, perhaps the latter more quickly than the former, would bring about both evils in the form of centralized, police-state despotism.

However, working against both tendencies is the heterogeneity of the two parties. The "switchers" move from one party to another, confusing established tendencies in either party. Besides the shifters are the elements who belong in both parties for traditional or "nonrational" reasons, who do not seem able to get the party lines straight and who do not care if they cannot. Furthermore, there are the constitutional obstacles of the Supreme Court and of the division of powers between the President and the Congress, that block any party from becoming the pure expression of either tendency. Finally, there is a margin of "rationality" that may be developed in educating both the young and the old to acquire objective perspectives on issues such as communism, witch-hunting, and foreigners on the one hand, and on problems such as the long-range versus the short-range consequences of a proposed government activity on the other hand.

Probably the most interesting of these groups in the 1952 campaign was the "switchers." Since the postelection sample was smaller than the pre-election sample, switchers were defined as persons who voted for Truman in 1948 but were probable Eisenhower voters in 1952. Forty-one persons, or 9% of the sample, fell into this category.

The first fact to notice about them is that they were drawn to a large extent from persons whose party identification was Democratic. Four of them were Strong Democrats, 17 were Weak Democrats, 4 were Independent Democrats, 3 were Independents, and 12 were Republicans of one variety or another.

The next point of note is that they were the group which was crucial in swinging the election for Eisenhower. Most experts believe that an election upset is usually accomplished by previous nonvoters voting, by new voters swinging the balance, or by shifts among the Independents, or by two or more such occurrences. An examination of 41 persons in the sample, too

young to vote in 1948 but old enough in 1952, shows that 11 of them were probable Democrats and 15 were probable Republicans. An examination of the 85 individuals in the sample who did not vote in 1948, but who intended to vote in 1952, indicates that 20 of them were probable Democrats and 24 were probable Republicans. Switchers among the Independents numbered only 3. These figures indicate that the Republicans drew a lesser proportion of their vote from these three groups than they drew from the Democratic switchers. Thus the usual theory of election upsets does not apply to the 1952 election and it follows that Eisenhower's victory was primarily due to his inroads into Democratic strength. If the Democrats of 1952 had held their 1948 voters, Eisenhower would have been defeated. Table XV shows this to be so.

TABLE XV

THE SOURCES OF THE VOTE

	Probable Democrats	Probable Republicans
Persons who intended to vote in 1952 the same as they had voted in 1948	100	113
New voters	11	15
Persons who did not vote in 1948 but intended to vote in 1952	20	24
Switchers	7	41
1948 voting behavior undetermined or other	6	8
Total	144	201

The next problem is to probe into the political psychology of the switchers. They are a politically complex group, whose behavior in 1952 is not easy to analyze. Beginning with the evidence for their motivation, it is notable that, as a group, the switchers exhibited a high degree of candidate orientation: 26, or 63% of the switchers, gave candidate-oriented responses to the questions as to their main reason for voting the way they did.[1] This compares with a figure of 20% for the sample as a whole.[2] Further, not only were the switchers personality-oriented, but Eisenhower-

[1] See Appendix A-I, Question 36*a*.
[2] See Chapter IV, Table XIII.

oriented. All 26 of the candidate-oriented switchers gave a pro-Eisenhower main reason for casting their vote in the way in which they did.

The next point to notice about the switchers is that they were midway between the probable Democrats and probable Republicans in their degree of enthusiasm for the two parties and for Stevenson, but exceeded both groups in their enthusiasm for Eisenhower. One test of this fact is the relative loquacity of the three groups on these subjects. The premise is that people are more ready to speak well of what they like than of what they do not like. Hence, if you asked a Democrat to say what he liked about the Democratic Party and Stevenson, he would be more wordy than if you asked him to state what he liked about the Republican Party or Eisenhower. If the switchers are in between the other two groups in volubility on every question but Eisenhower, then this is added evidence of what the switchers were like. Accordingly, the number of statements made on each question by each group was divided by the total number of persons asked the question in each group. The results are given in Table XVI.

What was suspected seems to be true. The switchers were the intermediate group on party questions and on the Democratic candidate but were the most vocal in their support of Eisenhower. Many of them were resentful of Truman, the alleged inefficiency and corruption in government, and of high taxes. When they were asked if there was anything they disliked about Stevenson, the most frequent remarks were that he was a Democrat and was Truman's man. However, they were perhaps closer in social philosophy to the loyal Democrats than to the Republicans, for they tended to mention favorably the social security program and to identify the Democratic Party with the interests of the common people, workers, and farmers. Most striking was their frequent use of the slogans that "one party had been in power too long" and that "it was time for a change." Thus, when asked what they liked about the Republican Party, 11 said they liked Eisenhower; 14 said it was time for a change; 7 said they thought the Republicans would spend less or balance the budget; and 4, that they liked the Republican foreign policy. Examination of the scattering of remaining remarks favoring the Republican Party shows practically no sharing of the general philosophy of Republicanism.

The switchers up to this point appear to be a group which, although sharing the general philosophy of the Democrats, reacted to the record of

TABLE XVI

SWITCHERS AS AN INTERMEDIATE, STRONGLY PRO-EISENHOWER GROUP, BY A VOLUBILITY TEST*

	Most voluble group and its score†	Intermediate group and its score†	Least voluble group and its score†
What do you like about the Democratic Party?	Democrats (2.29)	Switchers (1.09)	Republicans (.81)
What do you dislike about the Democratic Party?	Republicans (2.35)	Switchers (1.80)	Democrats (.63)
What do you like about the Republican Party?	Republicans (2.36)	Switchers (1.70)	Democrats (.34)
What do you dislike about the Republican Party?	Democrats (1.70)	Switchers (.65)	Republicans (.49)
What do you like about Stevenson?	Democrats (2.27)	Switchers (.80)	Republicans (.68)
What do you dislike about Stevenson?	Republicans (1.48)	Switchers (1.17)	Democrats (.25)
What do you like about Eisenhower?	Switchers (3.04)	Republicans (3.01)	Democrats (.93)
What do you dislike about Eisenhower?	Democrats (1.30)	Republicans (.32)	Switchers (.29)

*** The score was arrived at by dividing the number of responses given by a group to a question by the number of persons in the group.**

† Probable Democrats (144 persons): People who voted either Democratic or Republican in 1948 and intended to vote Democratic in 1952. (Only seven persons who had voted for Dewey in 1948 intended to vote Democratic in 1952.)

Probable Republicans (160 persons): People who voted Republican in 1948 and intended to vote Republican in 1952.

Switchers (41 persons): People who voted Democratic in 1948 and intended to switch to Republican in 1952.

the Democratic Administration and saw in Eisenhower an extremely attractive alternative. That the degree of revulsion to the Democratic Administration was extremely high in this group is shown partly by their stands on the major issues and partly by their answers to the question on whether Eisenhower was a real Republican.

Table XVII shows the comparative stands of the switchers on the seven specific issues discussed in Chapter IV.

It is significant that, in spite of the fact that in answering the open-ended questions about parties and candidates the switchers seemed to

TABLE XVII

COMPARISON OF THE PROBABLE DEMOCRATS, PROBABLE REPUBLICANS, AND SWITCHERS ON THE SEVEN MAJOR ISSUES

Issues	% Probable Democrats agreeing*	% Probable Switchers agreeing*	% Probable Republicans agreeing*
More social legislation by national government	29	15	18
Positive action against racial discrimination by national government	33	15	21
The Taft-Hartley Act should be changed	51	24	35
United States has become too involved abroad	49	54	53
United States to blame for China turning Communist	22	24	51
United States should have gone into Korea	42	32	38
A peaceful settlement in Korea should be sought	45	32	19

* **The three groups are the same as those defined in the footnote to Table XVI.**

share the philosophy of the Democrats, they were even more conservative than the Republicans when it came to such specific domestic issues as social legislation, action against racial discrimination, and the Taft-Hartley Act. It appears that their antagonism to the Truman administration resulted from a high degree of negativism with regard to specific acts of government intervention. Yet this opposition to specific acts of government intervention did not seem in 1952 to have permeated their general philosophy. The fortunes of the two parties in future elections may well depend upon whether this negativism will seep down into the general philosophy of those people who switched in 1952. The extent of disagreement between switchers and Democrats was in general less marked on foreign issues. Here, however, is a remarkable fact. Though somewhat sympathetic with the Democrats on the proper extent of foreign involvement and though less likely than the Republicans to take up the cry of "bungling in China" and "bomb Manchuria," the switchers were the most opposed of all to the Korean War.

The decisive swing away from the Democrats by the switchers is also evidenced by their answer to the question of whether Eisenhower was a real Republican.[3] Of the switchers, 22 or 54%, thought that Eisenhower was a real Republican. This contrasts with 35% for the sample as a whole.[4] The only group which was more convinced of Eisenhower's Republicanism than the switchers were the Strong Republicans (59%). This would seem to imply that the desire of the switchers for a change was sufficiently great for them to believe, to an extent exceeded only by the Strong Republicans, that there would really be one if Eisenhower were elected.

The switchers were, for all these reasons, the vital force behind the Eisenhower victory. Their behavior was a fascinating exhibition of the power of events to change party fortunes without necessarily transforming the more general ideals of the public.

[3] See Appendix A-I, Question 15.
[4] See Chapter II, Table VIII.

Chapter VI

HOW THE CAMPAIGN REACHED THE VOTERS[1]

IN A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN the candidates would be playing solitaire if they did not find channels for communicating with the public. It has already been described how Eisenhower, with a great lead on Stevenson before the campaign began, maintained the attention of the voters in a superior fashion. His channels of communication had been wide open and operating for years, while Stevenson entered the campaign with primarily local and special channels—Illinois and the professional politicians. Did the Democratic channels to the public ever open up fully? Apparently not—then why not? How the public learned of the candidates and made up its mind about them can now be shown. Campaign issues, likewise, cannot even exist without a public to attend to them. The public did hold a set of issues in mind in 1952, so that it may be asked: Through what channels or media did these issues make their way into the popular mind?

There were many such media or channels. Every means of provoking the interest of a person in the campaign qualifies as a channel. During the campaign the political party is itself a great channel of communication; its operations are devoted in great part to agitation and propaganda on behalf of its candidates. In addition to the party, there are the so-called mass media: the newspapers, radio, television, and magazines (movies are probably less important). Beyond these are the face-to-face channels of personal communication: the citizen's friends, co-workers, and family. Thus there are a number of ways of capturing attention and changing views. These questions can be asked about each medium in turn: Who was reached by it? What messages were transmitted by it? and What effects did it have on the voters' decisions? After treating the channels separately, it can be asked how all the turmoil of the campaign affected the voters: When did they make up their minds? How many minds were

[1] The questions upon which this chapter is based were asked in the postelection interview from a sample of 210 persons. See Appendix A-II.

changed by all the agitation and propaganda? What events wrought these changes of mind? First, then, to describe the particular channels in question.

The political parties of the West as a whole are beyond doubt failures at communicating directly with the people. Even in the 1952 campaign, one of the hottest in history, relatively few people heard directly from any political organization. Were the great organizer, Thomas Jefferson, alive today, he would be astonished by the few direct encounters a political party today has with the citizenry. The political parties have all but lost their ancient function of meeting with the individual voters. They rely more and more upon filtering and feeding their messages through the mass media. The change has occurred not only because the parties find other work easier, but also because most people resist a direct approach in favor of an impersonal approach. Of the 210 persons who were asked whether anybody from either of the parties had called them up or been around to talk to them during the campaign, only 42 answered in the affirmative. Seven were contacted by Democrats, 19 by Republicans, 13 by both parties, and 3 could not say by whom. Of the sample, 167, representing 80% of the population of the West, reported having had no contact from a political party.

But that is not all. Who were these people who were contacted? Were they undecided people who needed help in making up their minds? Or were they just a random sample of the electorate? Of the 20 persons contacted by the Democratic Party, 4 were already Strong Democrats and needed no evangelism. Of the 32 contacted by the Republican Party, 8 were already Strong Republicans and probably as convinced of Eisenhower as Sherman Adams himself. Not one of those contacted by the parties admitted that the visit or call had a definite effect on their vote; 7 reported a limited or qualified influence resulting from the contact; 27 declared that the calls influenced them hardly at all; and 2 felt that the contacts had no effect whatsoever.

One must conclude that the grass-roots machinery of the political party may be too weak to make much of a difference in the elections in the West. Exceptions exist in certain localities, parts of some cities, and a number of precincts. Some individual candidates also introduce energetic personal efforts into their campaigns.

What about other kinds of party efforts in the campaign? Were the

parties generally active? Too little reliable information is at hand to answer this question. One would need to know how much money the parties spent—information that is available in different forms, but always imperfectly and unsuitably. According to reports filed with the Congress the total expenditure of both parties in the West amounted to $672,167.75. Of this sum the Republicans spent $415,356.06 and the Democrats spent $256,631.69.[2] These figures are incomplete since they only represent sums reported by the candidates themselves and by national committees working on their behalf. They do not include the money spent by state committees, which are not required to file reports nationally, or any unofficial spending carried on by friends of the candidates. However, there seems little reason to doubt the general impression conveyed by these figures that the Republicans spent much more on the campaign in the West than did the Democrats.

The mass media definitely reached more people than were contacted directly, although here too there were some severe limitations. People were asked in separate questions whether they read about the campaign in the newspapers, listened to any campaign speeches or discussions of the campaign on the radio, watched any programs about it on television, or read about it in any magazines. If they had, they were asked whether they did this quite a lot, pretty much, or not very much. Finally they were asked which of all these ways of following the campaign gave them the most information. The campaign audiences of the several channels of communication in 1952 responded as shown in Table XVIII.

In terms of sheer quantity of attention, the newspapers held their tra-

TABLE XVIII

Effectiveness of the Communication Media During the 1952 Campaign

	% "Pretty much" or "quite a lot"	% "Not very much"	% "None"	Total	No. of cases
Newspapers	44	39	17	100	208
Radio	39	33	28	100	208
Television	36	20	44	100	206
Magazines	21	31	48	100	209

[2] "Cost of Electing Congress," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. II, No. 29 (July 17, 1953), 915–40.

ditionally superior position. Almost half of the people (91 out of 208) followed the campaign with some degree of regularity through the newspapers. About 1 person out of 6 paid no attention to the campaign in the newspapers. Radio is second in the intensity and extent of its use, followed by television (not easily available in all areas), and finally by the magazines. Half the sample said they had read nothing about the campaign in magazines.

A number of people apparently paid no attention at all to the mass media of communication: 7 reported no reading, listening or watching. These were all Democrats. In the 1952 election 6 of them were going to vote for Stevenson and 1 did not intend to vote.

At the other end of the scale were the highly attentive people who consumed information about the campaign with voracious appetites. Five declared they used all media quite a lot; and 38 said they used all to some extent. Of those who used them all, 22 were Republican and 17 were Democratic by party identification. Twenty-six of them intended to vote Republican and 7, Democratic. The Democrats seem to have consumed less campaign material from the mass media than did the Republicans.

Perhaps this is just as well for the Democrats' peace of mind, since the overwhelming majority of newspapers and magazines supported Republican national and state candidates. A survey by *Editor and Publisher*,[3] professional journal of newspaper management, based on a sample which included 93% of the United States daily circulation, indicates that papers with 82% of the total daily circulation in the West supported Eisenhower. Those dailies which supported Stevenson had only 4% of the total daily circulation in the West. The national news magazines and most other weeklies and monthlies were for Eisenhower as well.

There will be no attempt here to say whether Democratic news and arguments received equal respect in the newspapers and magazines as a whole. That is a matter for special study at great length, using rigorous methods of content analysis. Probably not even the most vigorous protagonist of either party will gainsay the statement that bias in the news over the whole news front existed, and that this bias was preponderantly in favor of the Republicans. The problem is far too intricate, however, to put forward a glib statement about the "great effects" of this bias, the precise extent of which is not known, let alone its results.

[3] The issues of September 6 and November 1, 1952.

The radio and television situation is of a different kind, though it is unbalanced in the same direction as the press. Federal law, which controls the air waves, requires equal facilities for both sides of a political controversy. Therefore, Republicans and Democrats can legally get access to these channels and once in control of them push their views with equal aggressiveness. However, radio and television time is costly and the networks are charged only with making limited free time available. In consequence, superior financial resources enabled the Republicans to sponsor many more radio and television broadcasts than the Democrats. In the 1952 campaign, the chances were that a radio listener or a television viewer who spun his dial at random would have encountered Republican propaganda more frequently than Democratic propaganda.

Of all the mass media, television seemed to have the most striking effect. Although more people read about the campaign in newspapers than watched it on television, this in itself is no indication that they were more effectively impressed by what they read. In fact, the public seemed to rate newspapers below radio and television as the principal source of information about the campaign. Sixty-nine persons reported television as the most informative channel; 58, radio, and 47, the newspapers. Only 11 stated that their chief medium was magazines. Three declared for newspapers and television equally, and 6 for radio and television equally. When one recalls that almost half the people reported *no* watching of television, and that, in all, 172 persons read some newspapers, as contrasted to 115 who saw some television, the greater number who gave television as their most important medium is striking evidence of its political impact. As more people acquire sets, this impact is likely to grow.

Without interviewing of an intensity beyond what is feasible in this kind of study, it is not possible to tell how much people were influenced in their vote decision by mass media. Asking them point-blank whether they were so influenced would have been quite useless. Stating simply that they had attended to these channels and that they took these materials into account in taking up a political position is as much as can be done now. In discussing later how many people said their positions were changed during the campaign, it can be estimated that a certain number of them were influenced by things they heard through the mass media.

With personal contacts the situation is different. People are better judges of the effect of persuasion by other people, though perhaps

less inclined to admit it. Westerners were asked to say how their friends voted in the election—"mostly Republican," "mostly Democratic," or "pretty evenly split." Afterward, they were asked whether their friends' opinions had had anything to do with the way they themselves had decided to vote. Here some interesting facts emerge. Of those persons who said all or most of their friends voted Democratic, 27 voted Democratic themselves; 7, Republican; 19 did not vote at all but preferred Stevenson; and 1 did not vote but preferred Eisenhower. Thus, 46 out of 54 whose friends voted Democratic preferred the Democrats themselves. Of those persons who said all or most of their friends voted Republican, 60 voted Republican themselves; 11, Democratic; 5 did not vote at all but preferred Eisenhower; and 2 did not vote but preferred Stevenson. Thus 65 of 78 persons whose friends voted Republican preferred the Republicans themselves. Apparently people prefer friends with similar political views. This should not be any more startling in politics than in most other spheres of life. Readers of Shakespeare do not habitually associate with avid readers of comic books, nor golfers with nongolfers, nor sewing circles with boxing circles. "Birds of a feather flock together."

The reason this fact seems odd in politics is that some citizens feel strongly that people should be open-minded about politics and that individual views ought not to be so conventional as to match the views of their friends closely. Perhaps they prefer people who live in mixed circles and tolerate diverse views without any adverse effect upon their friendships. There were 48 Westerners whose friends were fairly evenly split in their preference for the Democrats and Republicans. These citizens were divided too, 16 of them voting Democratic; 18, Republican; 8 not voting but preferring the Democrats; and 5 not voting but preferring the Republicans. In addition, there were 22 persons who did not know how their friends voted and they themselves were quite evenly divided. Of these, 6 voted for Stevenson and 8 for Eisenhower; of the remaining 6 who did not vote there was a three-three split in preferring the two parties. Thus about one-quarter of the electorate live in mixed political company, about two-thirds are friendly mostly or entirely with people who agree with them politically, and about one-ninth who do not know their friends' politics probably live in mixed political company.

The habitual politics of this quarter and ninth, whose friends were politically diverse, hold some significance. Fifty-seven percent of them

were Democrats, as against 53% of those whose friends were nearly unanimous politically. When they were asked whether anything said by their friends had anything to do with the way they had decided to vote, those with friends of mixed partisanship were less influenced by their friends than those whose friends were more nearly unanimous. Only 9 people admitted to having been influenced by friends to some degree, whereas 17 denied their friends had had any influence and 122 admitted to none, but with minor qualifications. Of the 9 who were admittedly influenced by friends, 1 had mixed friendships. Of the 16 who denied any influence of friends, 4 were of the mixed friendship group and none were of that 22 who did not know their friends' politics. There is thus a difference between these two groups of voters whose friends were politically diverse—one is political (the 48) and the other is indifferent to politics (the 22).

But perhaps these questions of friendship should be put aside for consideration of the question of co-workers' influence. (One is tempted to write about the three forlorn souls who said they had no friends! After all, though the statistics are unreliable, that is 2% of the "friendly West.") Now there is without doubt considerable overlap between one's friends and one's colleagues or co-workers. But there are two striking differences.

One-half of the sample had fellow workers in their occupations; the rest were farmers, housewives, professional people, etc. The former group were asked how their fellow workers had voted. This half of the population divided roughly into three groups: one-third whose co-workers were all or mostly Democratic; one-third whose co-workers were all or mostly Republican; and one-third whose co-workers were of mixed persuasions. Those who were surrounded by Democrats at work voted Democratic themselves by about three to one; those who were surrounded by Republicans voted Republican by about two and a half to one; those whose co-workers were politically diverse also voted Republican by two and a half to one. These three facts indicate that co-workers are not so politically unified as friends. Political behavior contrary to that prevailing among work groups seems more common than political behavior contrary to the ideas of friendship groups. This may be putting the matter too baldly. The situation is simply that people usually work with others of their political persuasion, but since the aim of work is production, not politics, the amount of political cohesion at work is less than in the voluntary friend-

ship groups. Perhaps one should also note that the work environment did not breed Democratic votes in 1952; it may be observed that the number of "Republican work groups" is about the same as "Democratic work groups." Some people seem to believe that Democratic, but not Republican, propaganda insidiously infiltrates work situations; the figures show this to be unlikely.

As with their friends, so with their co-workers: people admitted to little political influence from their associates. Six gave a qualified affirmative answer to the question of being influenced by co-workers; 59 gave qualified negatives; and 3 denied that they were influenced at all.

Have families a greater influence than co-workers and friends? In terms of sheer unity, the family comes first of all groups. Table XIX shows the picture in tabular form.

TABLE XIX

FAMILY INFLUENCE ON VOTING BEHAVIOR

Way family voted	How respondent voted			
	Democrat	Nonvoter: Democrat	Republican	Nonvoter: Republican
Husband or wife				
Democratic	36	6	2	..
Nonvoter	4	20	4	9
Vote not known	1	2	7	..
Republican	3	1	61	3
Other members (if unmarried)				
Democratic	5	1	1	1
Republican	1	..	6	..
Split tickets	1	2	6	1
Equally divided, Democrats and Republicans	3	..	..	..

Table XIX indicates that Democrats are married to Democrats and Republicans to Republicans. Out of 44 cases of the husband or wife voting Democratic, 42 cases saw the other preferring the Democrats also. Out of 68 cases of the husband or wife voting Republican, 64 saw the other preferring the Republicans too. This conduct is present also in families of the unmarried. In fact, the accord carries over to the nonvoters as well, for out of 37 cases where the husband or wife did not vote, in 29 instances the partner did not vote either. It must be concluded either that husbands and wives consistently fib about their votes, that people are ashamed to tell an interviewer of political disagreement in their homes, or—by far the most

credible interpretation—that family political unanimity is extremely high in the West. It is, moreover, about equally high among both Republicans and Democrats.

What causes this unity of partisanship in families? First, there is mutual influence, whether it be of the husband or the wife. More of such influence is acknowledged than among working and friendship groups. Three persons said they were definitely influenced by their partners; 22 said they were influenced in a qualified way; 92 said they were not influenced but qualified their response; and 7 reported definitely no influence. Of the 25 who admitted to influence, 7 were men and 18 were women. However this is undoubtedly only a fraction of the mutual influencing; it represents mostly the conscious influencing during the 1952 campaign. But marriage itself is a continuous growing together of two people who are constantly working, openly and unconsciously, upon each other's views. There is no reason to believe that politics is an exception to the tendency in marriage for two people to strive for agreement in every sphere of life—tastes, rearing of children, friendships, sex relationship, and so on.

But beyond the great cohesive force of married life itself lie the added forces of the environment. Marriage is usually among persons of the same station in life and marriage increases this community of station. Husband and wife look out upon the world with the same eyes. Perhaps later on can be shown some ways in which men and women do differ in political attitudes and behavior, but the actual vote decision within the Western family shows little of such differences.

In summary, therefore, the public did not seem to react as a whole to any specific personal approach during the campaign. A very few were somewhat impressed by personal contact with party workers. A few seemed to take the opinions of their fellow workers and friends into account. A somewhat larger number asserted that they underwent some changes owing to political discussion in the family. In addition, the mass media occupied the attention of most people during the campaign, but it would be rash to assert that the known Republican advantage in the output of the mass media accomplished many conversions.

From these findings, however, one should not conclude that all of these channels of influence are ineffective. A great lesson of practical politics is contained here: elections, like wars, are often won, not by brilliant strategy, nor by single strokes of genius, but by plodding work on details,

carrying the party's messages into every channel, working at the electorate piecemeal, changing a few minds here and a few minds there. The sum of change through all channels can be significant in affecting the outcome of the election.

Each of the channels of political influence, such as the newspaper or one's wife, transmits messages and also interprets or distorts those messages. That is to say, each channel is both a conductor and a generator, some more than others. When a candidate's personality seems to lack some positive quality, a voter may discover this through any one of several of the channels. He may read it, hear it from friends, be told so by his wife, or so on. But the channel also loads its own evaluation onto the communication. His wife "puts her two cents in" and enlarges or diminishes the "badness" of the trait in question.

Therefore, at the back of each channel—as a channel and not as an influence in itself—is found the original message, which may be an event, a speech, a new bit of information. There are millions of these messages—a psychologist would call them stimuli—that bombard the citizenry in a campaign. But the number of those that are effective in changing people's opinions is only a minute fraction of the total.

In this study, the Survey Research Center tried to discover such significant or effective stimuli. It asked people after the election whether anything in particular happened during the campaign—something they saw, read, or heard about—that helped them to decide how they were going to vote.

About half the people stated that nothing happened during the campaign to help them make up their minds. Another quarter said that they did not know whether anything of that kind had occurred. Probably the latter too can be counted as not having been noticeably changed by campaign events. At any rate, only about one-fourth of the sample said they were definitely helped to make up their minds on how to vote by things that they saw, read, or heard during the campaign. Twenty-four of these individuals declared that something the Democrats had done had impressed them and 23 were influenced by something the Republicans had done. (Other answers will be ignored here.)

A striking fact now emerges. The Democratic campaign affected 17 of these 24 people adversely and only 7 positively, whereas the Republican campaign affected 5 of the 23 people adversely and 18 positively. In other

words, the quarter of the sample who claimed they had been affected by events of the campaign were affected three to one in favor of the Republican Party.

What were these events that had apparently helped, however much, to decide one-quarter of the voters? They are listed in Table XX.

TABLE XX

Impressive Events of the Campaign*

	Pro-Democratic	Anti-Democratic
Truman's whistle-stopping	..	10 (2)
Stevenson's speeches and personal campaign	4 (2)	4
Other Democratic speeches or tone of campaigning	..	2 (4)
Eisenhower's agreement with Taft	*2*	..
Party promises (or lack of same)	1 *1*	2 (1)
Nixon campaign-fund controversy	*1*	*3 (1)*
Noncampaign events during campaign	1	..
Eisenhower's personality and personal campaign	.. (2)	*13*
Other campaign events	1 *1*	1
Total	12 (4)	35 (8)

*** Numbers in parentheses refer to second mentions which some people made; that is, they were impressed by more than one event of the campaign. Items in italics refer to impressions created by the Republican Party.**

It seems that the most impressive features of the campaign were Eisenhower's personal campaign, Truman's whistle-stop tour, and Stevenson's personal campaign. The first two seemed to redound to the favor of the Republican Party, and the last to the favor of the Democratic Party in so far as their direct impact on voting decision was concerned. One has to be cautious in interpreting such small figures, but nothing in them seems out of line with the other observations made about personalities, parties, and issues of the campaign.

Perhaps the most puzzling part of the picture is the small number of Westerners who felt moved by the campaigning, rather than the way in which these people moved. The small number who seemed moved by the mass media, work groups, friendship groups, and the family was noted earlier. Now it seems that the campaign itself wrought little change in opinion. All of these influences, of course, acquire significance when taken together, and many an election has been won by just such an accumulation of detailed support.

These figures on the number of Westerners affected by the campaign-

ing should be checked. The most pertinent check is to ask people when they made up their minds on how to vote. Did they know all along or always vote for the same party? Did they decide as soon as Eisenhower said he would run? Did they decide at the time of the convention, or just as soon as he was nominated? Did they decide after the convention, during the campaign? Did they decide in the last two weeks before the election? Or did they wait until election day to make their decisions?

Twenty-five percent of the sample did not vote. Their behavior is not relevant here. The remaining three-fourths of the people who voted made up their minds on how they would vote at the times shown in Table XXI.

TABLE XXI

WHEN THE VOTERS MADE UP THEIR MINDS

	Number	% of total
A. Before convention (includes those who always vote in the same party, and those whose minds were made up, without regard to candidates, before the convention)	53	34
B. As soon as Eisenhower decided to run	8	5
C. During the convention or as soon as Eisenhower was nominated	47	30
D. During the campaign	32	20
E. During the last two weeks of the campaign	13	8
F. On election day	4	3
Total	157	100

Less than one-third of the Western public waited until the campaign to make up their minds. Two-thirds of the voters had decided that they had sufficient criteria to make up their minds before the campaign had even begun.

The one-third proportion is not directly comparable to the one-quarter figure given earlier for the number of people who were affected by the events of the campaign. In the first place, undoubtedly some of those who had made up their minds very early would have changed them had some striking event occurred. What is more important, it is likely that some of those who had decided late in the campaign had actually made up their minds at the start but reserved final judgment until all the evidence was in and the campaign had ended. In other words, the one-third who decided at some time after the convention is not a figure that holds for all elections; it is not a true measure of the number of people who might have changed their minds had impressive events occurred; and it is not com-

posed entirely of people who had open minds from the beginning of the campaign. But certainly it shows that the number of Westerners who were potential converts was not great. In a political campaign the parties work within narrow margins of possibilities. American politics is the art of the possible and the data in this chapter show how limited is the scope of the possible.

Who were those who made up their minds early? Referring to the preceding categories (A, B, etc., Table XXI), let us see how many voted Democratic and how many voted Republican. (One person refused to say how he voted and one voted for another candidate.)

TABLE XXII

The Time of Decision by the Partisanship of the Voters

Category	% Voted Democratic	% Voted Republican	Total %	No. of cases
A	41	59	100	53
B	..	100	100	8
C	34	66	100	47
D	50	50	100	32
E	31	69	100	13
F	50	50	100	4

Categories A, B, and C include all those who made up their minds before the campaign proper started. Sixty-nine Republican voters did so. Eisenhower had practically enough votes to win the election before he started campaigning. The Democrats would have had to win the votes of over 81 % of the people who had not made up their minds at the time the campaign started, in order to win the election. They received, in fact, less than 50 % of those votes. The Democrats would have had to make spectacular gains during the campaign to overcome Eisenhower's initial advantage. They would probably have had to persuade more minds than have ever been persuaded in any American election campaign in history. They faced an almost impossible task.

Some may say that this evidence of the early decision of the public shows the futility of campaigns. But that is a hasty and rash opinion. In the first place, every campaign does not commence with the lopsided condition of this one; enough people may be persuaded by the campaign to make up the difference. (This probably happened in 1948.) Second, the campaign is like an important court trial with due process of law. Often a person is

indicted by overwhelming evidence but a proper setting is provided to try the indictment. In such a setting the defendant is allowed full and free opportunity to state his case. If he can advance facts that are compelling enough to sway the judge or a jury of his peers, he is acquitted. The fact that an impressive case has been made against him does not give the court or the police the right to deny him a trial. So it is with political campaigns. Even if public opinion is overwhelmingly for one man or party and against another, the campaign becomes the "court" of public opinion in which the candidates are on trial, with full opportunity to present their cases.

In the third place, even in this election the proportion of the electorate which made up its mind after the campaign was under way was quite substantial. Further, if the behavior of the switchers in the 1952 election is examined and the times of their decisions are arranged in the same categories as used in Table XXII, it is found that 57% of them were still undecided, at least to some degree, when the campaign started. (See Table XXIII.) It could be that the Republican campaign was quite instrumental in causing these people to switch.

TABLE XXIII

TIME OF DECISION AMONGST THE SWITCHERS

Category	No. of cases
A	2
B	7
C	7
D	8
E	4
F	1

During the campaign of 1952, many assertions were made by national and Western leaders concerning the trend of the campaign. Hundreds of claims were made that California was moving this way or that way, that Butte or Albuquerque was developing a Democratic trend, and so on. During a campaign most people are so engrossed in the excitement that they are prone to forget how many of these "facts" are wishful thinking and how many are put forward perhaps in good faith but unfortunately with only the local barbershop as the "representative sample" of the Western public.

In retrospect it appears that newspaper editors have exceedingly delicate

tympanic membranes. They can detect political trends over vast distances and from faint whisperings. An analysis of the news columns and editorials during the 1952 campaign of four major Western newspapers, the *San Francisco Examiner*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *Portland Oregonian*, and the *Denver Post*,[4] reveals a wide selection of trends, going both ways. Figure 6 shows a total of 271 trend statements, 63 in favor of the Democrats, 208 in favor of the Republicans. It will be seen that the number of trend stories favoring the Republicans greatly exceeded the number favoring the Democrats throughout the campaign. The number of trend statements favoring the Democrats increased relatively from the week of October 6–12 to the week of October 20–26. From then on it fell, even though the major polls during the final days of the campaign reported increasing Stevenson



FIGURE 6
NEWSPAPER REPORTS OF "TRENDS"

[4] George Turnbull aided the author with this analysis.

trends. Eighty-eight, or 41% of the total number of trend stories, were based upon the results of polls, such as the Gallup Poll and the California Poll. The rest were based on party claims, correspondents' reports, and the like. Evidence is lacking on which to evaluate all the trend claims. However, as a historian would say, the seers are confounded by internal evidence. A glance at Figure 6 will show trends going in every direction, presumably canceling one another out, and throwing doubt on the reliability of the sources. The materials consist only of very general external evidence for the whole West. But they are sufficient to explode two common misconceptions about the campaign.

Those who believed that a considerable shifting of the electorate was occurring during the campaign were wrong. It has already been seen that only a third, and perhaps less, of the voters were in a hesitant mood when the campaign began. There is additional evidence on this point, too. Not content with asking them when they had made up their minds, the Survey Research Center interviewers asked voters if they had ever thought of voting for anyone besides their actual choice. A total of 34 people out of 157 said that they had thought of voting for the other candidate. Eighteen Stevenson voters had thought of voting for Eisenhower, and 16 Eisenhower voters had thought of voting for Stevenson. Obviously, there was no great body of hesitant or vacillating opinions here. The full weight of the Democratic and Republican campaigns fell upon the electorate and yet only about 11% of the voters had ever considered more than one of the candidates seriously.

Furthermore, those who thought they perceived a mounting Stevenson trend toward the close of the campaign were probably mistaken. According to the figures of Table XXI, only about 11% of the Western public decided finally how it would vote in the last two weeks of the campaign (including election day). Only 6 of these 17 cases decided to vote for Stevenson. If anything, and granting that there may be a considerable error with the small figures of the sample, Eisenhower increased his lead as the campaign was ending. The strong conviction of a great switch voiced by Stevenson partisans was a case of self-delusion. This is not rare in politics. Party workers and intensely loyal followers are carried away by their own enthusiasm. They project their feelings to unknown masses of people. Every convert seems to represent a thousand new recruits, with their hurrahs echoing back as a mounting applause from the multitude.

Chapter VII

THE ACTIVE AND THE INDIFFERENT

THE MOTTO of democratic doctrine is an alert, informed, and active citizenry. No one has ever been able to state how alert, informed, or active the citizens must be, or how many of them must be alert, informed, and active. Perhaps the reader is wise enough to make that judgment. But, unfortunately, he must know beforehand the actual extent of these qualities among the people, a condition about which little is known. Science knows more about the habits of migratory waterfowl than it does of the common man.

To know the facts of political activity one must have measures, however rough and unrefined. To this end, the Western public was asked about its interest in the campaign and its concern for the parties and candidates. It was asked about issues and it was also asked about its political activity. Some of the replies are strewn about preceding and future chapters, as they were used to study other questions. They will be summarized here. But other responses on activity call for a more detailed presentation.

An essential preliminary question is whether Westerners were concerned about the campaign. Did they think it would make a great deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans won the election in November, or that it would not make much difference which side won? Here a surprising number of people argued that it made no difference which party won the election. About one-third of the sample expressed this view. Only 97 people felt that the election would produce very important differences in the country, and another 170 felt that there would be some important differences.

The party affiliations of those persons who felt the election would not make much difference to the country are interesting. Those who felt themselves to be Independents and those who were Weak Democrats or Weak Republicans tended to take this view more frequently than Strong Democrats or Strong Republicans. It is apparent from these and related responses that people who feel themselves attached strongly to a political

party believe more strongly that the election process in America is important and that they personally should be concerned about it.

Those persons who felt during the campaign that the election would not make much difference were asked why they thought so. The main reason given by 33 of the respondents was that the nature of political parties prevented any real difference from resulting. Most of them thought that there was little or no difference between the parties, that both were good, or both were bad, or both had their good and bad points. Nine people thought there was not much difference between the two candidates for President. A surprisingly large number of people (59) felt the nature of external conditions and the forces operating in the world kept the election from making much difference to the country. Of these 59, 21 cited world conditions as prohibiting much change as a result of the election; the threat of communism was said by a number to determine the course of American politics. Others cited the power of special interests over the parties; others, the inability of any party to reverse the course of history; and a certain number exhibited sheer fatalism.

After the election, when the smaller sample of Westerners was asked the same question in a different form, namely, "Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country that Eisenhower won instead of Stevenson, or don't you think it will make much difference?" some change was discerned. A smaller proportion of the sample now believed that the election would make no difference and a larger proportion of the people that it would make a considerable difference to the country. Certain interesting crosscurrents were apparently at work here. One might think that after the election heat cooled off people would have been more willing to acknowledge that the election did not make much difference to the country. Similarly, one might believe that the Democrats, once the election was over, would have inclined to minimize the "bad" results of a Republican victory by declaring that the election made little or no difference. While both of these changes may have been taking place, they were obscured by a more general shift toward the position that the election had been important to the country.

One plausible explanation of this seeming paradox is that during the campaign, people are not only affected by the heat of partisanship but they are also and often unconsciously anxious and concerned about the threat that hotly contested elections offer to public peace and order. Their replies

during the campaign may have been reassurances, both to the interviewers and to themselves, that the election was not going to harm national unity. After the election, when this threat to unity had been dispelled and the need for reassurance was no longer present, people felt less threatened by "differences," regarding them as "everyday" differences rather than as "basic" differences.

Approaching the problem somewhat differently, the interviewers asked people whether they personally cared a good deal which party won the presidential election or whether they didn't care very much which party won. On this, 132 persons said they cared very much who won the election; 167 said that they cared pretty much; 96, that they cared a little or didn't care very much; and 38, that they didn't care at all who won. The strongest interest in the election again was found among strong partisans of the Democratic and Republican parties. Less interest was shown by those people who had weaker party attachments.

When asked whether or not they cared a good deal or not who won the state and local elections, a significantly greater number of people expressed a lack of concern. Again, those persons who had the most firm party attachment were most likely to be concerned with the election process on lower levels of government. Approximately the same amount of interest was expressed by Westerners in state elections and in local elections.

In summary, it may be stated that there exists always a large measure of unconcern with the prospects of victory of either party. One-third of the Western public, including both voters and nonvoters, appears to have its tongue in its cheek when confronted with party propaganda and agitation. The whooping and thumping of party drums, as well as a great part of the deep interest in the political process, come from those people who have strong attachments to a party label.

Of course, it is not known whether previous elections have usually stimulated even less public interest, for the same questions were not asked then. The chances are good, however, that the 1952 election was unusually exciting. The record attendance of citizens at the polls (see Table XXIV) certainly indicates this to have been true. This was perhaps the biggest turnout ever recorded in the history of the West.

Fully 80% of the potential voters of Utah cast their ballots. Of the Western electorate as a whole, 70% voted. The smallest turnout occurred in Ari-

TABLE XXIV

NUMBER AND PERCENT OF REGISTRANTS AND OF POTENTIAL VOTERS WHO VOTED IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1952*

State	Potential voters	Registered†	Voted	% of potential voters	% of registrants
Arizona	495,000	330,083	260,570	53	79
California	7,333,000	5,998,300	5,141,849	70	86
Colorado	880,000	660,000 AP	630,103	72	96
Idaho	352,000	300,000 AP	276,231	79	92
Montana	362,000	304,053	265,037	73	87
Nevada	115,000	101,248	82,190	72	81
New Mexico	376,000	360,000 AP	238,608	64	66
Oregon	1,035,000	851,516	695,049	67	82
Utah	414,000	375,000 AP	329,554	80	88
Washington	1,543,000	1,392,594	1,102,708	72	79
Wyoming	180,000	160,000 AP	129,251	72	81
Total	13,085,000	300,000	276,231	79	92

*** This table is adapted from *The 1952 Elections: A Statistical Analysis*, prepared by the Republican National Committee.**

† A number of states do not require registration in advance of the election. Even those which do require it do not always publish registration figures. Therefore, the estimates for these states which were compiled by the Associated Press and released to the public on October 19, 1952, have been used. They are indicated by "AP."

zona, where only 53% of those eligible voted. The West, however, lagged behind the East and the Middle West by a significant margin. Slightly less than a third of the Western public did not cast a ballot. What kept these people from voting? In *The Elements of Political Science*, the author has analyzed the principal reasons why people do or do not vote. The reasons were drawn from American and from foreign experience. Among the more important reasons cited for nonvoting were the following:

1. The young vote less than the old, because they have too many problems getting started in life and only gradually feel a pressure to participate in the community's larger affairs.

2. The educated vote more than the less educated, because the schools train people continuously for citizenship.

3. A tradition of voting in the family helps regular voting.

4. Lack of general tradition of voting helps repress participation. Newly enfranchised groups are generally timid and uncertain at first about exercising their suffrage.

5. A belief that elections are important increases participation. Individuals differ over their belief in the usefulness of elections. Also, foreign or domestic crises heighten interest in voting.

6. More people turn out if the election is believed to be close.
7. Presidential elections bring out more voters than other elections.
8. The poor vote less frequently than the well-to-do, and the poor include more habitual nonvoters.
9. Union members vote more than nonunion members.
10. In the United States, for a number of reasons included above, a larger proportion of Democrats are nonvoters than of Republicans.

The 1952 study of the Western public provided information to check all but the fourth and seventh of these factors, as Table XXV shows.

Perhaps the most important fact for partisan politics is that the Democrats vote less than the Republicans. Two-thirds of those who did not vote

TABLE XXV

FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR NONVOTING*

Subgrouping of sample	% Not intending to vote, 1952	% Intending to vote, 1952	No. of cases
Age			
Under forty-five	20	78	230
Forty-five and over	11	84	210
Education			
Finished high school or more	8	88	234
Less than high school	24	71	213
Past voting record			
Always or usually voted	7	89	285
Sometimes or never voted	36	63	104
Length of residence			
Under five years	32	67	110
Over five years	11	84	336
Importance of elections			
1952 election very important	13	85	267
1952 election not important	18	76	152
Closeness of election			
1952 election will be close	12	85	303
One candidate will win by a lot	18	78	80
Income			
Under $3,000	18	75	127
Over $5,000	8	91	139
Union membership in working class families			
Union members in family	24	74	153
No union members in family	28	72	294
Party preference			
Democratic	19	78	247
Republican	9	89	161

*** A few miscellaneous replies account for the fact that percentages do not equal 100.**

in the 1952 election preferred the Democratic candidate. One-third preferred Eisenhower. In the 1952 election, the total number of Democratic nonvoters was not so large as to have swung the election the other way had it been counted. At other times this might not be the case.

Since, as shall be seen in later chapters, there are more poor and working-class folk among the Democrats than among the Republicans, and since their education is more limited, some of the reasons why the Democrats have more nonvoters can be readily understood. Another reason, which is not generally known, is that there are more Democrats who cannot satisfy residence requirements than there are Republicans who cannot. When people explained before the election why they could or could not vote, their reasons were taken down and checked against state election laws. It was found that 5% of the Western population did not meet legal requirements for voting in the 1952 election. These made up 29% of all those who expected not to vote. It developed that 48% of those who could not legally vote preferred the Democratic candidate and 45% preferred the Republican. By party affiliation 76% were Democrats and 19% were Republicans.

There remained 11% of the population who could vote but did not expect to vote. Of these, 51% preferred the Democratic candidate and 22% the Republican. By party affiliation, 63% were Democrats and 19% were Republicans. After the election, when it was discovered from the half-size sample that one-quarter actually did not vote, these were in turn divided into those legally able to vote and those not able, with roughly the same results as with the pre-election sample. This time the "voluntary" nonvoters (22 in number when the sample was cut in half) were asked more exactly why they had not voted. Four reported they were ill (or too old) to get to the polls; 3 were too busy; 3 did not care who won; and 6 were generally indifferent and rarely or never voted. The rest said that they had not registered. In comparing their responses with their previous interviews, the interesting discovery was made that some weeks before the election all of these cases had indicated that they would not vote.

All of the testable statements are borne out by Table XXV. The most striking indicators of nonvoting are the previous voting record of the individual and the length of his residence in his current locality. The differences between the young and the old, the educated and the uneducated,

the rich and the poor, are also significant. The difference in voting behavior between union and nonunion workers is not great. Union people in the West are not clustered into homogeneous, working-class neighborhoods so much as they are in the eastern United States or in Europe. It is also interesting to note that in 1952 a greater proportion of men (17%) than of women (15%) did not vote, in all probability reversing the situation which existed in previous elections. For a time after the adoption of the 19th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, women nonvoters outnumbered men. A generation (and more, in much of the West) has erased this difference in their participation in political affairs.

One is tempted to become psychological and philosophical on the subject of nonvoting, but it will be left with only one thought of a theoretical kind. Just as some people seem to have more accidents than others (the "accident prone") and some people get into more trouble than others, so there are people who are "nonvoting prone." Though the reasons they give for not voting are often valid and satisfactory, there are sometimes *reasons for their reasons.* Some groups—the poor, for instance—are less likely to vote. Also, individual reasons explain much nonvoting—for example, illness or "don't care who wins." Behind the group reasons there are individual reasons and behind the individual reasons there are group reasons: the poor person may be ill more often and is more likely to feel less faith in the social order, rightly or wrongly, than a man who is well-to-do. In short, the explanations of nonvoting and other forms of behavior are in the situation and in the evidence, but they lead only to further explanations in an infinite series. Depending on the end in mind, the choice of one explanation rather than another will be made.

Going beyond voting, there are other political activities that require alertness and information. A citizen could try to persuade others to support his party or candidate. He could give money, buy tickets, or in other ways materially help his party or candidate. He could attend rallies or he might belong to a political club or organization. When asked after the election about these activities, people acknowledged only modest amounts of them, as Table XXVI shows.

The more strenuous the effort that was demanded, the fewer people engaged in it. Most people had ideas about the campaign and the candidates. Most people also voted. Chapter VI showed that a large proportion read about the campaign in the newspapers (44% read a lot about it)

TABLE XXVI

PARTICIPATION IN PARTY ACTIVITIES IN 1952

	Number	% of sample
Tried to persuade people regarding candidates	72	34
Attended rallies or meetings	26	12
Gave money or bought tickets	18	9
Worked for a party or candidate	11	5
Belonged to a political club or organization	5	2
Did none of the above	123	59

and followed it on the radio. But less than a third tried to persuade others to share their views. About one in ten attended political gatherings during the campaign, though many such occasions were afforded. Only several people out of every hundred gave time or money to the parties or candidates. Only about one person in fifty belonged to a political club or organization, with what that means in demands on time, money, and loyalty.

Active politics is the work of a very few people in America. In addition, a large group engages in a small quantity of direct action. Finally, a fairly large group observes with interest those who are active. In which groups are those found who were at least sufficiently active to attempt to influence the vote of others? Table XXVII examines some of the characteristics of

TABLE XXVII

COMPARISON OF THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE AND INACTIVE

	% of active*	% of inactive†
Voted	89	69
With family income of $5,000 or over	46	27
With high school education	67	47
With residence of over five years in county	81	73
Either Strong Democratic or Strong Republican party sentiment	44	31
Decided how to vote before campaign began	71	41
Voted straight ticket	49	38
Read quite a lot about the campaign in the newspapers	60	35
Self-employed	26	17
Men	58	44
Forty-five or over	51	44
Brought up mostly in a large city	39	28

* Number of cases = 72.
† Number of cases = 135.

this group as compared with those of the inactive public, who didn't try to persuade others to their way of voting.

The politically active may be distinguished statistically from the inactive in many ways. More of them are well-to-do and well-educated. They exhibit a higher degree of party attachment and appear to have made up their minds earlier for whom to vote. They have been residents of their locality for a longer time and are more likely to be over forty-five. All in all, the more active citizens seem to be more secure, better socially rooted, and of stronger political persuasion than their inactive neighbors.

Chapter VIII

"THE OTHER FELLOW"

THE WESTERN PUBLIC is vast and widespread. Its members are largely out of touch with one another. They come from different backgrounds and have different views on the issues and the candidates. They disagreed, we recall, about what traits Eisenhower and Stevenson had, and on what the parties are like. Sometimes weird notions persist about the other fellow—who he is, why he voted differently, what he is up to.

"Know your enemy" is the American Army's slogan to counter unpreparedness and superstition in regard to a foe. Soldiers are trained to have more accurate pictures of the enemy. Knowing the other fellow when he is a fellow American is naturally a lot easier. He is encountered from childhood on. Yet, as with candidates and issues, people have conflicting notions of what the other fellow is like and how he will vote.

In psychology much research goes on in this field of perception. In politics, very often, fortunes rise and fall on the answer to the question, "What do people believe is true?" The question is not what *is* true, but what people *believe* is true. What people believe about the behavior of the other fellow cannot be pictured completely. But a few important and interesting examples of differences in such perception can be given and in some cases what is believed by many to be true can be shown to be false.

Most Westerners seemed to anticipate what was coming in the election of 1952. When asked during the campaign who they thought would be elected President, 169 thought Stevenson would win, while 199 thought Eisenhower would win. But one should not take predictions made in the heat of the campaign too seriously. Thus, of the 169 persons who predicted Stevenson's election, 69 were Strong Democrats; 44, Weak Democrats; and 23, Independent Democrats. Only 7 Strong Republicans predicted that Stevenson would win. Of those who thought Eisenhower would win, only 16 were Strong Democrats, while 53 were Strong Republicans. However, 34% of the Democrats expected that Eisenhower would win; but only 21% of the Republicans expected that Stevenson would win. One gathers

from this that the Democrats experienced a greater foreboding of defeat and more pessimism than did the Republicans.

The same foreboding can be detected in the answer to the question of how close people thought the election would be. Those who intended to vote for Stevenson felt that the election would be closer than those who intended to vote for Eisenhower. Although on the whole people predicted that the candidate they supported would win, their wishful thinking was tempered by an uneasy sense of reality. Democratic voters were anxious throughout the campaign.

Either because they wished to be more accurate or because they knew their local conditions better, the voters seemed more realistic in predicting the outcome of the election in their own states. When asked who would win the election in their state, many more people predicted an easy Eisenhower victory than predicted it for the nation as a whole. The reason for this discrepancy is not clear. The fact that about 90% of the nation's press supported Eisenhower's candidacy should perhaps have presented a rosier picture of the national scene than is reflected in these figures. But perhaps people discounted the press reports of the nation, recollecting the sequence of five national Democratic victories.

A better explanation of this discrepancy is a psychological one. People can allow their wishes to guide their thoughts more easily when they do not have information on a subject. This has been demonstrated in a number of studies of attitudes and propaganda. But where they are confronted with facts they cannot avoid—such facts as would come from the changing views of their neighbors and friends—they cannot so easily rationalize their wishes into a prediction. They are forced to be more frank about things they know something about. This would seem to be the best explanation of why, for example, only 45 of the Strong Democrats believed that Stevenson would win in their state when 64 of them thought he would win in the nation; and why only 25 Weak Democrats thought Stevenson would win in their state when 42 of them thought he would win in the nation. On the Republican side there was a lesser, though similar tendency for people to temper their optimism about the outcome of the election in the state as compared with the outcome in the nation. Once again people probably made allowances for their wishful thinking about the national scene.

The Western public as a whole, therefore, tended to feel that Eisenhower would win the election. The Democrats were more pessimistic in

making predictions about the election results in their home state than in the nation as a whole. The entire public felt that the election results would be fairly close, closer apparently than it actually was. Three hundred and three persons believed that the election would be very close or fairly close, while only 80 thought that one of the candidates would win by a substantial margin.[1]

The Westerners of the sample were also asked a number of questions about how they thought certain groups would vote in 1952. They were asked: "Do you think farmers around the country will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?" The same question was repeated about "working-class people," "Negroes," "middle-class people," "big-business men," "labor union members," "Protestants," "Catholics," and "Jews." Whenever a person felt a particular group was more of one party than another, he was asked why he thought that was so. Table XXVIII shows how the Westerners thought that these groups would vote and how they actually did vote.

This table shows that a majority of those Westerners who had predicted that the voting behavior of major groups would favor one party over the other were correct in seven out of eight cases. The exception is the farmer, whose voting behavior was incorrectly predicted by most of the public. However, as Chapter X will show, the Westerner may have been thinking of the Western farmer, who is more Democratic than the Midwestern and Northeastern farmer. Noteworthy, too, is the large proportion of people who predicted even splits, or who had no opinion. This fact may indicate that Westerners do not have rigid stereotypes of American groups or of "the other fellow."

There seems also to have been a fairly low level of hostility to the various groups. When asked why each group would vote in the manner predicted, in no case did as many as one-quarter of the sample suggest clearly selfish motives. A somewhat smaller number declared that the groups would vote as predicted because of motives looking to the general interest. A large majority gave explanations lacking any highly approving or disapproving moral tone.

[1] Of course, "close" is a loose word. People generally do not fully realize the "closeness" of almost all elections in a free society. Let it be said that to the experts the Eisenhower victory was not "close" and that people who thought it would be close were incorrect in this sense.

TABLE XXVIII

"THE OTHER FELLOW" AS PERCEIVED AND IN REALITY

FARMERS

34 % of Westerners thought farmers would vote Democratic.
14 % of Westerners thought farmers would vote Republican.
29 % of Westerners thought farmers would split evenly as between the parties.
23 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Farmers Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	24 %
Republican	42 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	11 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	17 %
Other	6 %

WORKING CLASS

54 % of Westerners thought the working class would vote Democratic.
8 % of Westerners thought the working class would vote Republican.
29 % of Westerners thought the working class would split evenly as between parties.
9 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Workers Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	39 %
Republican	30 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	16 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	11 %
Other	4 %

NEGROES

37 % of Westerners thought Negroes would vote Democratic.
9 % of Westerners thought Negroes would vote Republican.
15 % of Westerners thought Negroes would split evenly as between the parties.
39 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Negroes Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	26 %
Republican	6 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	42 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	15 %
Other	11 %

TABLE XXVIII (*Continued*)

MIDDLE CLASS

18 % of Westerners thought the middle class would vote Democratic.
27 % of Westerners thought the middle class would vote Republican.
38 % of Westerners thought the middle class would split evenly as between the parties.
17 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How White Collar Workers,* Other than Professional Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	28 %
Republican	52 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	9 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	9 %
Other	2 %

*** Using these as typical of the middle class.**

LABOR UNION MEMBERS

64 % of Westerners thought labor union members would vote Democratic.
4 % of Westerners thought labor union members would vote Republican.
17 % of Westerners thought labor union members would split evenly as between parties.
15 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Labor Union Members Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	43 %
Republican	33 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	13 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	8 %
Other	3 %

PROTESTANTS

3 % of Westerners thought Protestants would vote Democratic.
10 % of Westerners thought Protestants would vote Republican.
46 % of Westerners thought Protestants would split evenly as between the parties.
41 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Protestants Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	26 %
Republican	45 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	13 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	12 %
Other	4 %

TABLE XXVIII (*Continued*)

CATHOLICS

17 % of Westerners thought Catholics would vote Democratic.
9 % of Westerners thought Catholics would vote Republican.
28 % of Westerners thought Catholics would split evenly as between the parties.
46 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Catholics Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	43 %
Republican	41 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	10 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	5 %
Other	1 %

JEWS

16 % of Westerners thought Jews would vote Democratic.
9 % of Westerners thought Jews would vote Republican.
19 % of Westerners thought Jews would split evenly as between the parties.
56 % of Westerners didn't know or didn't answer.

How Jews Actually Voted in 1952

Democratic	65 %
Republican	25 %
Nonvoter, Democratic preference	8 %
Nonvoter, Republican preference	..
Other	2 %

Some people who hold strong party convictions tend to distort reality in their own favor. Among the Strong Republicans or Strong Democrats there were more voters who were overconfident of the support of the other fellow than among the less avidly partisan. Of course, where the other fellow happens to belong to their camp, the strong partisans are "more perceptive" than the others, but when the opposite occurs they are "more deluded." What happens in fact is that they think more with their hearts than with their heads. In Table XXIX the seven party-affiliation categories are ranked in the order of the number of their adherents that feel that a given group is likely to be Democratic. Table XXX does the same for their prediction about a group being Republican. For instance, since 49 % of the Strong Democrats, a higher percentage than any other category,

TABLE XXIX

RANK ORDER OF PROPORTION PREDICTING THAT A GROUP WILL BE DEMOCRATIC

	Category of party affiliation making the prediction						
	SD	WD	ID	I	IR	WR	SR
Farmers	1	3	2	4	6	5	7
Working class	1	3	2	7	5	4	6
Negroes	1	3	5	7	6	4	2
Middle class	1	3	2	4	5	7	6
Labor union members	1	2	3	7	4	5	6
Protestants	2	3	1	5,6,7	5,6,7	5,6,7	4
Catholics	6	5	7	4	3	1	2
Jews	2	5	6	4	7	3	1

said that the farmers would vote Democratic, the Strong Democrats rank first in that column. Since only 16% of the Strong Republicans, the lowest percentage of all, said that the farmers would vote Democratic, the Strong Republicans rank seventh.

Examining the two tables, the conclusion is reached that unusual numbers of people of strong party affiliation predicted that people of the various groupings would vote their way. Among Strong Republicans more people felt that the other fellow was going to be Republican. Among Strong Democrats more people felt that the other fellow was going to be Democratic. There are exceptions to be noted, but the general picture of wishful thinking is fairly clear.

Enough facts have been brought forth to indicate some of the simple illusions of politics. Although there is a good, and sometimes surprising,

TABLE XXX

RANK ORDER OF PROPORTION PREDICTING THAT A GROUP WILL BE REPUBLICAN

	Category of party affiliation making the prediction						
	SD	WD	ID	I	IR	WR	SR
Farmers	7	6	5	3	4	2	1
Working class	6	5	7	2	3	4	1
Negroes	6	5	7	1	3	4	2
Middle class	7	6	5	4	1	3	2
Labor union members	7	6	5	1	2	3	4
Protestants	6	5	7	4	2	3	1
Catholics	3	7	6	5	2	4	1
Jews	5	6	2	4	3	7	1

measure of clear judgment and self-restraint among the public in a political campaign, both misinformation and quirks of the mind sometimes turn wishes and even hallucinations into matters of fact. As if there were not enough conflicts of desire and opinion to enliven the game of politics, some people invent their own facts, often unconsciously, to stimulate it even more. Sometimes they exaggerate the other fellow's differences with and sometimes his likenesses to themselves. They often know little about how he lives and thinks. The less they know, the more likely they are to believe what they wish. Conversely, the more they wish to believe something about him, the less they will seek to know.

Chapter IX

POOR MAN, RICH MAN

THE CHANCES are good that no one reading this book is so naïve as to believe that a Democrat can be distinguished from a Republican by singling out the "good guys" from the "bad guys." Readers with that kind of mentality are probably absorbed in comic magazines at the moment. It is more likely that most ordinary people, if asked what differences marked the one from the other, would reply that the lower income groups would be Democratic and the well-to-do would be Republican.

This is satisfactory as far as it goes, but it doesn't go very far. That tiresome but necessary question of political logic must always be asked: How much does income determine a man's politics, attitudes, and behavior, and what other conditions or considerations affect them? There is little doubt that differences in income between rich and poor, and from one to another of the several levels of wealth in between, accounted for substantial differences in voting behavior in 1952, as always. Although it is far from the truth to declare that a man's income is an index to his politics, it is certainly a good tip as to his probable voting behavior. Previous chapters have already described a number of other factors which helped to determine the Westerner's vote: his temperament, his activities, his exposure to newspapers, his preferences for a certain type of candidate, his associates, and his party tradition. Some other factors remain to be treated later.

If at the beginning it is known that something about a man's politics is determined by his income, it is also known that his income does not determine all his behavior. Income, furthermore, isn't the only economic index to the vote. The economic conditions that help determine a man's politics include the kind of work he does. Between the skilled and unskilled worker, between owners and nonowners, between clerical and professional people, there arise political differences that are not measured purely in income terms. The factor of occupation represents a blending of pure income with a social factor in which the prestige of the occupation has importance. In referring to the effects of a man's occupation on his political

behavior, one is not speaking merely in pecuniary terms, but, in fact, in terms of his very way of life and his role in society.

Besides income and occupation there is education, which may or may not be simply a gloss on a man's income and occupation. It may of itself be an independent determining factor of his politics. There is also the question whether he owns his home or rents it. There is the matter of the difference between his occupation and that of his father. If a man's work is not the same as his father's, does he behave differently from people who work in the same occupation as their fathers? These additional socio-economic factors deserve consideration here if the total impact of a man's material way of life upon his general politics and his behavior in the election of 1952 is to be known.

The first and basic figures on the relation between a man's economic status and his politics are contained in Table XXXI. The same table also includes the probable voting intentions of the several income groups. The most surprising fact about the party identification of the several income groupings is that the differences among the income classes are so small. For example, the proportion of Strong Democrats in the lowest income

TABLE XXXI

INCOME, PARTY AFFILIATION, AND PROBABLE VOTE OF WESTERNERS

	% of income groups		
	Lower: $0–2999	Middle: $3000–4999	Upper: $5000 or more
Party identification			
SD	24	21	19
WD	17	29	22
ID	10	10	9
I	7	7	5
IR	5	7	9
WR	10	12	18
SR	20	13	15
Unclassified	7	1	3
Total	100	100	100
1952 voting intention			
Probable Democrat	6	30	30
Probable Republican	37	41	56
Probable nonvoter	18	20	8
Other	9	9	6
Total	100	100	100

group is higher than in the group that earns $5,000 or more per year. Similarly, the proportion of Strong Republicans is higher in the former than in the latter. To a certain extent this is made up by the differences among the Weak Democratic and Weak Republican groupings of the same two income classes. A more consistent though strikingly undistinguished picture is presented when the middle income group is compared with the high income group. Obviously there is a great deal of muddling of incomes and party affiliations in the American West. Income does not define sharply the politics of Republicans or Democrats.

In the probable vote in 1952, the difference among the three income classes stands out a little more clearly. The proportion of probable Democratic voters drops from 35% among the lowest income earners to 30% among the middle income group. Once again, the difference is not great. More significantly, the proportion of Republicans rises rather sharply from the lowest to the highest income groups. The proportion of nonvoters is considerably lower among people earning $5,000 or more a year, as was expected. Apparently, in the specific action of voting in 1952, people clarified somewhat the relevance of the factor of income in determining their votes.

By breaking the income groupings into $1,000 levels it is possible to sharpen up the party differences. (The precise tabulations are not presented here.) The group of people that earns $10,000 or more per annum is heavily Republican. There are among them 21% Strong Republicans, 33% Weak Republicans, and 15% Independent Republicans; but there are only 12% Strong Democrats, 3% Weak Democrats, and 6% Independent Democrats (33 cases in all). The group with an annual family income of less than $2,000 shows a much stronger attachment to the Democratic Party than to the Republican Party. A great part of the overlapping of party affiliations occurs in the middle income groups, where most of the families of the West are to be found. The conclusion is that in the Western states Democrats predominate among persons of very low income and Republicans among persons of very high income, but that one must proceed with great caution in predicting a man's vote from his income if it happens to fall in the middle range of income, where indeed the vast majority of Western incomes fall.

Another fact that is to be discovered in Table XXXI and that persists under a more intensive and minute scrutiny of the materials, is that in-

dependency of party is not the province exclusively of the well-to-do. Not only are Independents, in the true sense, very rare in the population as a whole, but they tend to be distributed evenly from the lowest to the highest income groups. Independency is determined by personality, by family tradition, and by the pressure exercised by opposing forces that pull a man toward a nonpartisan position. It is not dependent in any marked degree upon the size of a man's income.

Combining the effect of income with the effect of the occupation of the income earner does not add greatly to the knowledge of what determines the vote. Although it is possible to see in some of the figures of Table XXXII distinct trends showing, on the one hand, the influence of income on party and, on the other hand, the influence of occupation on party, the table as a whole does not seem to respond to either influence. Thus the middle income group has fewest Strong Democrats among the self-employed, managers, and officials; more Strong Democrats among the clerical and sales people; and many more again among the skilled and semiskilled workers. This shows the dependence of political affiliation not only on income but also on the type of occupation a person is engaged in.

TABLE XXXII

OCCUPATION, PARTY, INCOME, AND THE PROBABLE 1952 VOTE OF WESTERNERS

	% of party identification								% of probable vote in 1952			No. of
	SD	WD	ID	I	IR	WR	SR	Other	Dem.	Rep.	Other	cases
Self-employed businessmen and artisans; managers and officials												
$0–2999	..	28	9	9	18	..	27	9	36	46	18	11
$3000–4999	14	29	14	7	7	7	22	..	14	50	36	14
$5000 or more...	24	14	..	5	14	14	19	10	29	62	9	21
Clerical and sales; buyers, agents, brokers												
$0–2999	20	20	20	..	20	..	20	..	40	60	..	5
$3000–4999	21	26	23	8	5	13	5	..	36	23	41	39
$5000 or more...	17	17	12	..	12	24	18	..	23	59	18	21
Skilled and semiskilled												
$0–2999	14	..	43	..	14	29	..	..	29	14	57	7
$3000–4999	33	29	13	4	4	17	..	..	46	25	29	24
$5000 or more...	15	28	27	3	3	15	6	3	33	43	24	33
Unskilled, service workers, and farm laborers												
$0–2999	32	21	10	..	..	5	21	11	47	21	32	19
$3000–4999	67	16	..	..	..	..	17	..	33	17	50	6
$5000 or more...	33	33	..	..	..	..	34	..	67	33	..	3

A similar variation occurs among Strong Republicans in the $5,000 or more bracket, when comparing one occupation with another. Throughout the table there seems to be a slight tendency for people to hold party affiliations in accordance with the principles "the higher the income, the more the Republicanism" and "the whiter the collar, the more the Republicanism." That is, one could scarcely lay more than even money on the chance that he could predict, using the twelve categories of the table, a Westerner's party by knowing his line of work and income.

Inquiry into the movement of the same variables, income and occupation, within the probable vote of Westerners in 1952 reveals similar tendencies.

Considerable confusion is again manifest. There is some tendency for income to relate positively to Republicanism and for occupation to determine the vote regardless of income level, but neither is without a lot of contradictory behavior. It is possible that there is a true conflict of income and occupational groups producing a confusion both in the figures and in the voting behavior the figures represent. There is also the possibility that income and occupation in the American West follow only vaguely definite patterns or channels as determinants of the vote. There is even a further possibility that the number of cases are so few as to fail to sharpen these vague tendencies.[1] This is probably the case to some extent, because if there had been hundreds of additional cases a few of the inconsistencies might have disappeared. The probability is also that with many more cases the general picture would still be one of the income and occupational factors in the West having little utility as predictors. Neither the party affiliation nor the probable vote of the Westerner in 1952 followed lines clearly economic or occupational. The Western public in 1952 seems to have behaved politically without much reference to income and occupational lines. The importance of such factors as were mentioned earlier in this work—the personality of Eisenhower, the party identification of people, and the general search for relief from anxieties concerning the conduct of government and of foreign affairs—must be accorded greater importance in determining why the West went Republican so decisively.

[1] An attempt was made to increase the number of cases in Table XXXII, by using the occupation of the *head* of the household, rather than that of the respondent, thus allowing the classification of many housewives, etc. No greater clarity of trend was apparent.

The next question is whether education operated as a mere reflection of income in 1952 or as an independent factor that made people vote one way or another. Table XXXIII presents a division of the Western sample

TABLE XXXIII

INCOME, EDUCATION, AND PARTY AFFILIATION OF WESTERNERS

	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
Some high school or less										
$0–2999	28	16	13	4	6	5	19	9	100	84
$3000–4999	24	29	13	7	5	9	12	1	100	84
$5000 and over.	14	43	14	..	..	14	15	..	100	7
High school or high school and other training										
$0–2999	16	20	8	12	..	20	16	8	100	25
$3000–4999	20	30	7	7	11	14	9	2	100	56
$5000 and over.	15	32	13	8	11	13	8	..	100	47
College degree or some college										
$0–2999	13	19	..	19	6	38	6	..	100	16
$3000–4999	13	32	7	7	7	13	23	..	100	31
$5000 and over.	17	13	8	6	10	25	21	..	100	48

into three levels of education: some high school or less; high school diploma, or some high school and other training of a special kind; and college-degree holders or people who have some college training. The Strong Democrats may be analyzed for illustration. Among Strong Democrats of the middle income level, 24% are from the lowest educational group, 20% from the middle educational group, and 13% from the highest educational group. This is remarkable. It seems to indicate that people of the same income will vote according to their educational level, and that the higher the educational level, the less likely a person is to be a Strong Democrat. Among Strong Republicans of the middle income level, 12% are from the lowest educational group, 9% from the middle educational group, and 23% from the highest educational group. Again, within the same income group education makes a difference in favor of Strong Republicanism. The tendencies for different income levels to determine a person's party affiliation are still evident, but in view of the examples cited and of others that might be drawn from the table it is clear that education causes a difference in the political partisanship of Westerners. The less the edu-

cation, the more likely a person is to be Democratic, regardless of his income. The more the education, the more likely he is to be Republican, regardless of his income.

How can this be explained? The more enthusiastic Republicans would probably claim that the more educated a man, the more intelligent, and the more intelligent, the more Republican. This would resemble the practice of some Democrats of similar enthusiasm who have been in the habit of saying that since education is available only to those who can afford it, and since people vote according to the level of their income, education is merely a gloss on income and has no independent force of its own. Undoubtedly, the findings will also surprise a number of Republicans who have felt all along that educators try, and sometimes succeed, in making Democrats out of students. Likewise, some Democratic professors will probably be disillusioned to learn that they have not been producing as much change in people as they had expected.

Most of these arguments have been concocted in an ivory tower. Education, rather than pointing directly at income, is probably an index of a way of life—the circles in which one moves, the tastes he has, the people he pays attention to in politics, and the basic moral and conventional code that he acquires. Together, these tend to build an outlook that favors Republican voting in the middle of the twentieth century. In the West the people discharged at the higher stages of the educational process are more Republican than Democratic in sentiment.

Another feature of a person's economic condition that may have something to do with his politics is home ownership. It is sometimes assumed that home owners tend to be Republican, and renters, to be Democratic. After making this assumption, it is usually followed by talk about the essential stability of the Republican and the lack of a stake of the Democrat in the community. This may be so in large cities or in other parts of the country than the West. Frequently the Democratic vote in the cities can be explained by other conditions, such as that high land values near the heart of a city require the construction of large buildings for rent. But the general problem need not be settled here, because the question at the moment is whether Westerners conform to the common belief.

Table XXXIV presents the incomes and party affiliations of those who rent their homes and of those who own them. In the lowest income level the party affiliations of home owners and home renters are practically in-

TABLE XXXIV

PARTY IDENTIFICATION ANALYZED BY INCOME AND HOME OWNERSHIP STATUS OF RESPONDENTS

	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
$0–2999										
Home owners ..	24	16	10	10	5	10	20	5	100	61
Home renters ..	26	19	10	5	5	9	23	3	100	58
$3000–4999										
Home owners ..	36	22	25	2	2	5	8	..	100	88
Home renters ..	19	32	10	6	6	13	14	..	100	79
$5000 or more										
Home owners ..	19	19	12	2	11	24	12	1	100	90
Home renters ..	21	29	5	9	5	7	24	..	100	42

distinguishable. Both home owners and home renters are distributed in roughly equal proportions among the Westerners of varying degrees of party attachment. In the middle income bracket the home renters are actually more Republican than home owners. In the upper income bracket the home renters are again more Republican than the home owners. When the data are broken down to a finer degree than is presented in the table, the greater Republicanism of the home renters seems to hold in the very important and numerous $5,000 to $7,500 income bracket, but among families with incomes of $7,500 or more per annum the positions are reversed and the home renters are more Democratic than the home owners. The facts certainly challenge, if they don't destroy completely, the myth that home owners are more Republican than are home renters.

The conclusion is confirmed when one looks at the probable vote of home owners and home renters as given in Table XXXV. There, the renters in the middle and upper income groups are more Republican than are the owners. Again no distinction appears in the lowest income level.

One further distinction may be made between home owners and home renters in the West. A greater number of the nonvoters are home renters than home owners. This is true on every economic level. Of course, in interpreting this finding it should be appreciated that the renters are more mobile and often are not settled long enough in a place to acquire the legal qualifications for voting.

The comparison of those who own their homes with those who rent them was another way of determining whether people's politics were altered by differences in the material conditions of their lives. Still another

TABLE XXXV

THE PROBABLE 1952 VOTE RELATED TO INCOME AND HOME OWNERSHIP

	% Probable Democrat	% Probable Republican	% Probable nonvoter	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
$0–2999						
Home owners	40	39	13	8	100	61
Home renters	34	35	19	12	100	58
$3000–4999						
Home owners	35	40	14	11	100	88
Home renters	24	46	25	5	100	79
$5000 or more						
Home owners	28	60	8	4	100	90
Home renters	36	52	10	2	100	42

method is to compare the political behavior of people who have undergone more social change with that of people who have undergone less social change, as represented by those who do not have the same type of jobs as their parents and those who have or had. When a man or woman works at a type of job that differs from that of his or her parents, the change, representing as it does an altering of social outlook, might show up or be reflected in behavior and attitudes that contrast with those of people who work in positions resembling those of their parents.

In Table XXXVI people who are in the same general kind of occupation as, when they were children, the heads of their households were in are compared with those whose present occupations are different from those of the heads of their households when they were children. The absolute rate of mobility is interesting in itself. Between two and three times as many people have an occupational status different from that of their parents as hold the same status. This alone accounts for much of the similarity of thought and behavior among Westerners that has been observed in looking into the effects of factors such as income, political independency, or occupation alone. Class differences have never had a chance to stabilize and develop.

Only a few differences are revealed in the figures. The occupationally mobile people seem to have a greater inclination to independency than those whose occupation is in the same general category as their fathers. But the former probably voted in 1952 along the same lines as the latter. One interesting difference shows up. The socially mobile people included more nonvoters proportionately than the socially nonmobile did. Sociolo-

gists would probably suspect that underlying this difference was a greater amount of social disorganization among those whose occupations differed from their parents than among those whose occupations were the same. This theory probably should be accepted as best fitted to explain the facts. Some of the occupationally mobile, in changing their life work from that of their parents, have not adjusted to their new status and acquired that settled outlook with which the voting habit is, to some extent, related.

TABLE XXXVI

OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE, PARTY, THE PROBABLE 1952 VOTE, AND BELIEFS ABOUT SOCIAL CLASS

Political differences	Occupation of respondent*	
	% Similar to parents'	% Changed from parents'
A. Party identification†		
SD	19	23
WD	30	23
ID	11	10
I	3	7
IR	4	8
WR	16	11
SR	16	14
Other	1	4
Total	100	100
B. Probable 1952 vote†		
Democratic	33	33
Republican	45	41
Undecided	7	2
Not voting	12	19
Other	3	5
Total	100	100
C. What social class would you say you belong in?‡		
Upper class	3	2
Middle class	38	41
Working class	58	54
Lower class	1	3
Total	100	100

*** The number of cases in A and B is based upon the occupation of the head of household where it was ascertained. The totals in C are based upon the respondent's occupation; in the cases of housewives and students, upon the occupation of the head of the household, and in the cases of retired or unemployed individuals, upon their usual occupation.**

† In the class of those with similar occupations, the number of cases is 102; of those with changed occupations, 243.

‡ In the class of those with similar occupations, the number of cases is 106; of those with changed occupations, 290.

Another hunch might be tested by the same technique. Those whose occupational status differed from their fathers' might be expected to have a different conception of what social class they belonged to. Perhaps if they were moving up the occupational ladder from an occupation of less prestige to one of greater prestige, they might be more conscious of this change and place themselves in a higher social class. Perhaps, also, those whose mobility had brought them into a lower occupational level than that of their parents might in their own estimation raise the social class to which they belong, in order to keep themselves above the actual social level to which they had fallen. Unfortunately the occupational categories that have been used in this study are a little too general for an easy measure of whether a person is moving up or down in changing his occupation from that of his father. Hence the same general index of occupational mobility versus occupational constancy has been retained in Table XXXVI without remarking direction of the mobility, whether up or down. This may be one reason why there is little distinction between the responses of the mobile people and the constant-status people to the question of the social class to which they belong. Moreover, the difference that is manifested in the table is difficult to interpret. Fewer of those who are mobile assign themselves to the working class than assign themselves to the lower and middle classes. One can appreciate that the difference shown between those who have moved and those who have remained constant may be real and not merely psychological. That is, those who have been on the move may actually and objectively hold higher occupational levels than those who have been constant. The cases in this sample are too few to check this point.

When the same question about social class is applied to the party affiliations of Westerners, however, a rather striking difference appears to separate Democrats and Republicans. Table XXXVII makes it possible to see whether the different kinds of Democrats and Republicans put themselves into different social classes. It shows that about two-thirds of the three types of Democrats allocate themselves to the working class. In contrast, among the Republicans the only type of which more than half the group puts itself into the working class is the Independent Republican group. Almost two-thirds of the Strong Republicans call themselves middle class. There can be little doubt that, economic conditions aside, the central focus of the Democratic Party is on a general working-class sentiment, which a

TABLE XXXVII

SOCIAL CLASS BELIEFS AND PARTY ATTACHMENTS

	What social class would you say you belonged in?						
	% Upper	% Middle	% Working	% Lower	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
SD	2	26	63	1	8	100	99
WD	1	36	58	3	2	100	105
ID	..	28	70	..	2	100	43
I	3	35	55	7	..	100	29
IR	..	36	58	3	3	100	31
WR	7	46	44	2	1	100	59
SR	3	65	27	3	2	100	71

majority of Westerners share, and that the central focus of the Republican Party is on a middle-class sentiment.

This difference is so distinct that it is much more important than the apparent political effects of having a given income, of changing one's occupation from that of one's parents, or of one's own occupation. Undoubtedly all of these contribute to a person's feeling of belonging to the working class rather than the middle class, but it is the general idea or sentiment that seems to be more important in placing a person politically. This conclusion is important, but it should be clear in interpreting it what the people themselves mean when they put themselves into these two different groups. They do not think of these classes as rigid divisions. Many of them would not ordinarily think of themselves as being a member of a class. They were asked specifically to put themselves into one of the groups and were told that some people thought these groups existed. There is no organization of the working class or of the middle class. There is no class hatred implied therein.

Additional data show little difference between Republicans and Democrats in responding to a question as to whether there is much opportunity in America.[2] The responses do bring out a kind of general orientation of those who usually vote the Democratic ticket toward those who work with their hands, toward those who have fewer opportunities, and perhaps away from the kind of easy life portrayed by the movies and slick magazines as

[2] The majorities of the political units—Strong Democrats, 83 %; Weak Democrats, 84 %; Independent Democrats, 79 %; Independents, 90 %; Independent Republicans, 83 %; Weak Republicans, 83 %; Strong Republicans, 83 %—are agreed that opportunity exists, in an unqualified or qualified way. Democrats qualify their statements more than Republicans. (See Appendix A-I, Question 49.)

the typical American way of life. No doubt this different orientation of the constituents of the two parties must guide the statements of the party platforms and the appeals which the parties must make to the electorate during and between elections. The difference is a subtle one, and a party or candidate who reads too much into it is liable to find himself defeated. It is one of style more than content. The Democrats like matters put one way, and the Republicans like them put another way.

There are smaller differences of an objective or real character that undoubtedly produce twists and turns of a distinctive kind among Republican and Democratic leaders. But those tactics or policies are and will remain specialized. The Democrats would fail miserably if they were to take too seriously the social class orientation of the Democratic voter and put forward a true workers' program. The Republicans would fail just as badly if they were too "middle class" in their attitudes or became too stuffy about life's down-to-earth problems.

Chapter X

COUNTRY AND CITY

SOME PEOPLE'S work must be done in cities; others—the farmers and those who serve them—must work in the country; and some occupations are to be found both in city and country. When speaking of the country vote or of country politics one should think not only of the farmer but also of the other people who ply their trades and carry on their professions in the country towns. Perhaps the most satisfactory line that can be drawn between city and country is one that defines people in towns below 2,500 population and those living in unincorporated places and open country as being the rural population. All living in places larger than 2,500 or within commuting distance of large cities would then be called urban. In such terms the rural population over twenty years of age in the Western states is 3,619,887, or 28 % of the total population. The urban population is 9,488,228, or 72 % of the total population.[1]

The West then is heavily urban. The rest of the world knows it as the land of "wide-open spaces." This is not entirely accurate. The West is a land of cities whose people have easy access to wide-open spaces. Its eighteen metropolitan areas alone in 1950 contained 61 % of the population of these eleven vast states.

No other region in the nation has this distribution of people. Where cities are large and many, as in the East or the Middle West, the country is more fully occupied. Where the cities are few, as in the South, the rural population is indeed an isolated population. The West is the only region in which much of the population is concentrated in metropolitan areas but which still retains a sense of great space and freedom of movement. Perhaps this feature of Western human geography helps account for the progressive nationalism of the West, a distinctive blending of urbanity and openness of mind and spirit.

The city and country Westerners of the sample were employed in the various types of occupation, as shown in Table XXXVIII.

Table XXXVIII shows that when one speaks of country dwellers, one

[1] These figures are based upon the 1950 census.

TABLE XXXVIII

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF WESTERNERS IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS

	% Urban*	% Rural†
Professional and semiprofessional	7	4
Self-employed businessmen, artisans, and officials	11	9
Clerical and sales, buyers, agents, and brokers	9	7
Skilled and semiskilled	18	21
Unskilled, service workers, farm laborers	9	6
Protective service	2	2
Unemployed	2	..
Farm operators	1	11
Retired	6	5
Housewives	33	35
Students	1	..
No answer	1	..
Total	100	100

* Number of cases = 338.
† Number of cases = 114.

is talking about people with a number of different occupations. The last chapter revealed some of the political differences between people of different occupations. These same differences tend to hold both in the country and in the city. The differences in environment and in interests of the city and of the country should result in contrasts between the people of the country and of the city, regardless of their occupations. The major contrasts will be described here.

One of the most commonly cited comparisons is that rural citizens are much more conservative than are the urban. Through the pages of history there has been a constant conflict of agrarian and town interests. History cannot be denied, but it has its exceptions. Table XXXIX shows a striking

TABLE XXXIX

PARTY AFFILIATIONS OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS

	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
Urban ..	23	22	9	6	6	14	17	3	100	338
Rural ...	19	26	11	7	9	11	11	6	100	114

	% All Democrats	% All Republicans
Urban	74	78
Rural	26	22

fact about the American West: rural and urban citizens are not divided along party lines to any noticeable extent.

It must be concluded either that the American parties somehow represent rural and urban Westerners equally well by compromising their differences, or that rural-urban differences in the American West are relatively few and unimportant.

The towns and cities are not strongly Democratic nor the country strongly Republican, as many previous studies have shown and as most experts believe. Roughly similar proportions of all seven degrees of party attachment are found in town and country. Even the proportion of Independents is about the same.

When a test of the effect of being reared in the city or in the country upon party affiliation was made, even more interesting results appeared. Each respondent declared whether he grew up in a large city, a small town, or a farm. This gave an indication of the lasting impression environment made upon that person's character. Table XL presents this information,

TABLE XL

THE TYPE OF AREA IN WHICH WESTERNERS LIVE AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY WERE REARED, BY THEIR PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Environment in which reared	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR	% Other	No. of cases
Urban residential area									
Farm	27	20	10	8	5	11	11	8	80
Small town ...	21	29	9	5	5	11	18	2	129
Large city	21	14	8	7	7	19	22	2	123
Rural residential area									
Farm	24	27	11	9	4	9	9	7	55
Small town ...	17	22	10	7	15	12	15	2	41
Large city	8	39	15	..	15	23	..	..	13

according to the party identification of the respondents. Taking the most extreme contrast, urban people who were raised in a large city can be separated from rural people who were raised on a farm. The rather surprising discovery is made that the first group is relatively the stronger Republican group, and the latter, the stronger Democratic one. The rest of the table supports this finding. In the West in 1952 the most fertile sources of Republican strength were urban people with a big-city background and rural people with a small-town background. The most fertile sources of

Democratic strength were rural people with a farm background and urban people also with a farm background. It might be concluded that if the Western United States were used as the laboratory for the theory of sociology there would never have been the famous theory of *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (folk community versus urban society) that has played so large a part in the social theory of the past century.

The Western American may be a new type of countrified city dweller or citified countryman. Despite the vast spaces of the West the people move to and fro rapidly. They can drive hundreds of miles with ease and often do, for the most casual reasons. The small towns have marvelous inventories of goods and services. Farming and ranching are largely rationalized and are operated as enterprises of production. The town and city dwellers own homes and gardens and spend much time outdoors. They crowd the highways and vast public parks and forests which comprise a great part of the entire West. Moreover, in many places the cities share with the country such problems—to name just four—as the scarcity of water, hydroelectric development, the building up of industries to provide jobs for urban workers and markets for farmers, and conservation of natural resources. It is perhaps more important that the population has been so mobile[2] and the settlement so recent that the distinct social and temperamental types one finds in Europe and in many other parts of America have not had a chance to develop. Nor will they at this late date, since the static civilization itself that fostered such differences has been vanishing. But perhaps these remarks go too far. The one discovery of fact may be too slim a basis for the broad, even though plausible, theory here evolved from it. Highly significant differences might be found if other bases for comparing the rural and urban dwellers of the West were taken up.

Did the vote in 1952 itself reveal an urban-rural split in the West? There are two measures of this available, one from the sample survey and the other from the analysis of the election returns. From Tables XLI and XLII it can be seen that there was little difference between rural and urban voters in the degree of their support of Eisenhower and Stevenson.

The more detailed breakdown of urban and rural groupings into types of population area given in Table XLIII lends greater clarity to the party

[2] The proportion of people in the several population categories who have lived five years or more in the same county (as of 1952) are as follows: urban metropolitan, 83 %; suburban metropolitan, 57 %; rural metropolitan, 88 %; cities 50,000 and over, 75 %; cities 2,500–50,000, 78 %; cities under 2,500, 72 %; open country, 77 %.

TABLE XLI

PROBABLE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS

	% Urban*	% Rural†
Probable Stevenson voters	32	30
Probable Eisenhower voters	45	43
Undecided, not voting, and other	23	27
Total	100	100

* Number of cases = 338.
† Number of cases = 114.

TABLE XLII

HOW URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS VOTED IN 1952

	% Urban*	% Rural†
Voted for Stevenson	26	35
Voted for Eisenhower	48	42
Nonvoting and other	26	23
Total	100	100

* Number of cases = 158.
† Number of cases = 52.

TABLE XLIII

PROBABLE VOTE OF WESTERNERS FOR PRESIDENT IN 1952, BY THE TYPE OF THEIR RESIDENTIAL AREAS

	% Probably Dem.	% Probably Rep.	% Undecided but will vote	% Will not vote	% Other*	No. of cases
Urban metropolitan area	40	38	2	16	4	82
Suburban metropolitan area	21	55	5	17	2	62
Rural metropolitan area	31	51	..	16	2	43
City of 50,000 and over	40	47	2	8	3	110
City of 2,500–50,000	29	40	12	17	2	41
City under 2,500	34	39	11	12	4	92
Open country	27	49	14	5	5	22

* Probably for another party or don't know.

picture in 1952. The Democratic temper of the metropolitan centers and the Republicanism of the suburbs are highlighted in the table. It also shows that there is a significant difference in the probable voting behavior of residents of metropolitan centers and their suburbs, but the difference here can be ascribed to causes other than the contrast between rural and urban culture. It is principally a difference of income and of occupational groups. These suburbs contain the more prosperous and the more educated elements of the population. It can be seen too that the cities over 50,000 and the towns under 2,500 population had a considerable Democratic vote in the face of the general Republican sweep.

When the urban people are classified according to the main reason for their voting Democratic, it is found that they tended more than the rural people to be favorable to Stevenson as a personality (10% of 115 urban cases, and 3% of 37 rural cases, respectively); they cited prosperity and good times less than the rural people (14% to 30%); and they referred more often to the Democratic Party as being best for their particular group (26% to 11%). The urban and rural voters among the probable Republicans did not differ nearly so much. Both registered favoring Eisenhower as their primary reason for intending to vote Republican (23% of 155 urban cases, and 21% of 47 rural cases, respectively). Some others cited corruption, the "mess" in Washington, etc., as their primary reasons for intending to vote Republican (16% and 19%).

Another approach to the differences between rural and urban political behavior in the West is an analysis of the voting records of rural and urban counties over a period of time prior to and including the election of 1952. A sample of the several hundred counties of the Western states was taken for study. Only the most rural and the most urban in each state were chosen.[3] The states were divided into three classes according to population. California was made a class of its own and provided twenty sample counties. In the second class were included Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, which provided ten counties each. The other states supplied six counties each. Half the counties chosen in each state were the "most rural," and half, the "most urban." In each case the Republican percentage

[3] The rural counties were selected on the basis of their classification as "100 % rural" by the 1950 census, and in order of their percent of total farm acreage of their particular state. The urban counties were selected in order of the percent of their urban classification in the 1950 census within their particular state. The census classified as urban the population dwelling in towns of 2,500 people or more.

of the major-party vote for President in 1952, the mean Republican percentage in the presidential elections from 1916–48, and the difference between these two figures were computed.[4] Table XLIV summarizes the results.

TABLE XLIV

NORMAL AND 1952 REPUBLICAN VOTING IN THE VERY RURAL AND THE VERY URBAN COUNTIES OF THE WESTERN STATES*

State	No. of counties	Average % Rep. 1916–48		Average % Rep. 1952		Differences in Rep. % between (1916–48) and 1952		Difference in deviation
		Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	
Arizona	3 R, 3 U	39	40	58	53	19	13	R 6
California	10 R, 10 U	43	50	60	60	17	10	R 7
Colorado	5 R, 5 U	56	49	71	62	15	14	R 1
Idaho	3 R, 3 U	44	43	60	58	16	15	R 1
Montana	3 R, 3 U	47	41	65	52	18	12	R 6
Nevada	3 R, 3 U	41	41	61	62	20	21	U 1
New Mexico	3 R, 3 U	52	43	63	58	11	15	U 4
Oregon	5 R, 5 U	48	46	62	60	14	14	...
Utah	3 R, 3 U	51	41	69	56	17	15	R 2
Washington	5 R, 5 U	48	45	60	56	12	11	R 1
Wyoming	3 R, 3 U	58	49	74	60	17	11	R 6
All 11 states..	46 R, 46 U	48	46	63	58	16	13	R 3

* Based on data provided by Mr. James Arnold.

These "very urban" and "very rural" counties show surprisingly few differences in their voting habits, even over a long period of time. The "very rural" counties are slightly more Republican than the "very urban" and they shifted slightly more than the "very urban" counties to Eisenhower in 1952.

Table XLV presents the voting record of the Western sample in 1948 by the type of their residential area. It would appear that in 1948 the rural population preferred the Democrats, as did the urban population, but by a far more decisive margin.

The conclusion must be reached from this evidence that whatever rural-

[4] All the percentages deal with the Republican percentage of the combined Republican and Democratic vote, except in years where third-party voting was considered especially significant. These were the years 1916, 1920, 1924, and 1948. In these years the figure for every county sampled is the Republican percentage of the total three-party vote.

TABLE XLV

HOW URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS VOTED IN 1948

	% Urban*	% Rural†
Voted for Truman	36	44
Voted for Dewey	30	27
Did not vote, can't recall, and other	34	39
Total	100	100

* Number of cases = 338.
† Number of cases = 114.

urban differences in the rest of the country or in the world at large may be, the party distribution in the American West is fairly even as between country and city. The significant differences that show up in a comparison of the city and its suburbs are produced by economic, occupational, and social differences that are not germane to the inquiry at this point.

If it is true that the party affiliation pattern and the voting itself in many elections show little distinction as between the rural and urban populations, are there other qualities and issues that divide the country and the city folk? An answer to this general question is needed if a judgment is to be made whether the parties are successfully concealing the rural-urban conflict of interests or whether the conflict is not very important. It might be wondered whether the country was more excited and interested in the election than the cities. It might be conjectured that the country people pay greater attention to the state and local elections than the urban citizen. It might be felt that the country dweller knows the farm vote better than does the city dweller, but that he makes poorer predictions of the labor vote than do the city people. Are these surmises correct?

In the matter of the relative interest of urban and rural citizens in the election it was found that fewer rural Westerners thought that it mattered a good deal which party won the election, but that the rural Westerners were more concerned than the urban Westerners about state and local elections. Table XLVI gives the figures.

It seems, therefore, that the attention of the urban Westerners was focused more upon national concerns and less upon state and local, than was the case of the rural Westerners. An additional note should be taken regarding the position of suburbia on these questions. Suburbia resembles the metropolitan centers more than it does the rural areas. This fact is brought out to re-emphasize certain psychological resemblances between

TABLE XLVI

COMPARISON OF INTEREST OF URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS IN THE 1952 ELECTIONS

Do you care a good deal or not very much—	Urban*		Rural†	
	% Yes	% No	% Yes	% No
Which party wins the election?	70	27	55	37
Who wins state elections?	54	37	58	25
Who wins local elections?	54	38	59	25

* Number of cases = 338.
† Number of cases = 114.

suburbia and the metropolis, and the political differences between the two, suburbia being heavily Republican. This phenomenon will be encountered again later when international affairs are discussed.

More of the urban than rural voters made up their minds for whom to vote early in the campaign. Most of them had decided by the time the campaign began. Only 29% of the 119 urban Westerners said they made their choice during the campaign, whereas 40% of the 38 rural Westerners decided during the campaign. If this represents an enduring and general fact about urban and rural politics, perhaps campaign managers would do well to campaign early in the cities and late in the country. One wonders, too, whether this finding has any relation to the old belief about the countryman making up his mind in a leisurely fashion.

Another popular notion has it that the countryman has a stronger sense of civic-mindedness than his city brother. What light does the data in the 1952 campaign shed upon these beliefs? The survey reveals scarcely any difference between city and country on several items denoting a sense of citizen obligation and a high political morale.[5] The items, as they were answered by urban and rural residents, are shown in Table XLVII.

What were the urban and rural views on freedom of opportunity in America?[6] This too is a point on which popular lore has it that the city and country people differ. The country is supposed to be made up of Horatio Alger characters who dream of limitless opportunities, whereas the city is allegedly composed of scoffers and cynics and of people who have given up the idea of competition for advancement in life. The facts are disillusioning. A smaller proportion of rural than urban adults definitely

[5] See Appendix A-I, Question 47.
[6] See Appendix A-I, Question 49.

TABLE XLVII

COMPARISON OF THE CIVIC-MINDEDNESS OF URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS

The statement	% Agreeing with statement	
	Among urban*	Among rural†
On civic duty		
It isn't so important to vote when you know your party hasn't a chance to win	5	5
So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not	4	7
A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother about	21	15
On civic morale (or impotence feelings)		
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on	62	75
People like me don't have any say about what the government does	24	20
I don't think public officials care what people like me think	25	28

* Number of cases = 338.
† Number of cases = 114.

believed there is opportunity in America today (66% of 388 urban cases as against 46% of 114 rural cases); a qualified affirmative was given, however, by 17% of the urban group and 31% of the rural group; and considerable doubts or negative replies were registered by 10% of the urban and 17% of the rural sample.

Additional comparisons of interest can be made regarding the degree of political activity of the urban and rural population of the West. According to Table XLVII, about equal proportions of rural and urban electors turned out for the November elections. (See also Table LXXVII, p. 165.) Voting participation in the nation as a whole has been higher in the city than in the country in the past several presidential elections. A Survey Research Center study in 1948 showed a striking difference of 29%; the urban turnout was 70%; and the rural, 41%. The national survey showed that the voting proportion among the rural population doubled to 68%, whereas the urban increased to 75%. The Western differences seem persistently less than the Middle Western and Northwestern.

Western city and country dwellers showed some differences on a test of the extent of their participation in politics, as presented in Table XLVIII.

TABLE XLVIII

COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS

	% Urban*	% Rural†
Tried to influence anybody to vote for candidates	37	25
Attended any political meetings, rallies, political dinners, etc.	13	10
Gave money, bought tickets or gave other financial support to campaign	11	2
Did any other work for a party or candidate	6	4
Belonged to a political club or organization	2	4

* Number of cases = 158.
† Number of cases = 52.

This table suggests that urban people are more active politically than rural people. The greater physical difficulties involved in rural political action probably account for this. In getting out to vote and in most other political activities country people face obstacles such as distance and less frequent communication with others that city people scarcely encounter. The figures seem to indicate that the impulse to participate in politics is by no means universal but that it is of roughly the same strength among both elements of the population.

How well do rural people perceive the attitudes of city dwellers, and vice versa?[7] It would, of course, take a volume in itself to examine what they think the other fellow is like. But perhaps a single index, important in its own right, may be used here to test the contrast. What did the city voters say about how the farmers would vote? What did the rural voters say? Who was more correct? What did the farmers say about how the workers would vote? What did the city voters say? Again, who was more correct? Table XLIX answers these questions.

It is notable that fewer country people predicted that the farmers would vote Democratic than city people. Yet more city people seemed to believe the farmers were Republican. Both the urban and the rural perceptions of the politics of farmers were unclear and not good predictions, since the farm vote nationally went Republican rather markedly in 1952. It should also be noted that there was considerable uncertainty among both groups about the farmers' vote. More than half of the city and half

[7] See Appendix A-I, Question 44.

TABLE XLIX

URBAN AND RURAL WESTERNERS' PERCEPTIONS OF HOW THE FARMERS AND WORKERS WOULD VOTE IN 1952

	How will farmers vote?					Why will farmers vote Dem. or Rep.?*	
	% Dem.	% Rep.	% Split	% Don't know		% Special interest	% General interest
Urban†	36	16	25	23	Urban‡	62	38
Rural§	26	9	39	26	Rural‖	45	55
	How will workers vote?					Why will workers vote Dem. or Rep.?*	
	% Dem.	% Rep.	% Split	% Don't know		% Special interest	% General interest
Urban†	54	8	30	8	Urban¶	45	55
Rural§	51	8	24	17	Rural**	36	64

* Some responses implied selfish reasons, others implied altruistic ones, and many more (not considered here) gave technical or sociological or tautological explanations.
† Number of cases = 338.
‡ Number of cases = 136.
§ Number of cases = 114.
‖ Number of cases = 29.
¶ Number of cases = 154.
** Number of cases = 47.

of the country people either believed that the farmers would split their votes evenly between the parties or had no reply to give to the question.

An interesting discussion of city and country opinion arises from the question of what motivates the farmers' votes. More city than country people asserted that the farmer was casting his vote because of special or "selfish" group interests. The country respondent was more likely to suggest that the farmer was disinterested personally in the way he cast his vote. When the shoe was placed on the other foot, the surprising fact is found that urban people were more likely than rural people to ascribe special or "selfish" motives of group interest to the motivation of the worker in casting his ballot. The country people seemed to give the voter the benefit of the doubt and declared that the worker voted according to some notion of the general welfare of the country. Unless some better theory to explain this behavior is found, one must conclude that the urban population is more prone to suspect ulterior motives in the vote than country people. This difference is sufficiently marked as to minimize the tendency, on the part of country folk at least, to believe that the other fellow is selfish and that "we" have the country's interest at heart.

There was much greater "certainty" among both the urban and rural

samples as to the prediction of the workers' vote. There was general agreement that the worker would vote Democratic and there were many fewer uncertain answers. The proportions who said that the workers' vote would be pretty evenly split remain about what they were in the case of the farmer, although the workers were not as inclined to perceive themselves as a solid group. In leaving the question of these perceptions it is perhaps in order to say that some of those who answered the question would probably have been happier had they been told precisely what "evenly split" meant and who the "working-class people" were. They can only be consoled with the fact that considerations of time, money, and the purposes for which this question and the others like it were asked arbitrated against lengthy clarification and more reliable responses.

It has been shown that although very little difference can be perceived between city people and country people in party affiliation, pronounced differences are found in some of their general attitudes. Similar differences can also be shown to exist on certain specific issues. In Chapter IV there was a discussion of the positions taken by the general public regarding seven major issues. They will be taken up again here to see whether rural and urban folk differed in their attitudes on them.

In the realm of labor relations the respondents were asked whether they had heard anything about the Taft-Hartley law and what they thought should be done to the law. A slightly greater proportion of rural than urban residents had not heard anything about the law. This should not be surprising since its effects were more directly of concern to urban dwellers and it is known from past studies of other subjects that people select and know something about those items that more closely concern them. In the present case, indeed, the difference is quite slight and the awareness of the Taft-Hartley law is, therefore, in absolute terms, quite high. Seventy-five percent of the rural people and 80% of the urban had heard something of the law.

The rural population seems to have been a little more strongly in favor of the Taft-Hartley Act than the urban population. Twenty percent of the rural and 13% of the urban sample declared that nothing needed to be done with the law. About 14% of the rural sample and 15% of the urban sample desired considerable changes in favor of labor or even the repeal of the Act, and an additional 2% of the urban sample wanted small modifications in favor of labor. A considerable number of both the rural and

urban voters asked for changes in the law but did not specify whether they should be in favor of labor or management. This, then, was an issue on which there was a moderate tendency for the country and the city to take sides, but not anything approaching the kind of division that exists between the political parties.

On the more general question of whether the government had done about right, too much, or not enough in social welfare legislation there was somewhat more favor toward increased government action from the rural element than from the urban. Only 21% of the urban sample declared that the government should expand social welfare programs, whereas 29% of the rural sample asked for more social welfare programs. The difference between the rural and the urban positions is not very large, but it should temper the frequent assertion that the stronghold of rugged individualism lies in the rural areas. This may be true of some areas, but it is not true of the rural West. Rural Westerners regard positive government with sanguinity. It is unlikely that general appeals against government intervention, creeping socialism, and the like would have any different effect in rural than in urban areas.

On the matter of government intervention into problems of racial discrimination in employment, the rural population was somewhat more favorable to some form of fair employment practices legislation than was the urban population. Urban opinion seemed to be more inclined to keep the national government out of the picture entirely and to let the state governments take action.

On the questions concerning foreign affairs some impressive differences emerged. More isolationists proportionately were found in the rural population than in the urban. In reply to the question whether this country had gone too far in interesting itself in foreign problems since the war, 56% of the rural population, as compared to 42% of the urban population, agreed that America had gone too far. Eleven percent of the rural and 6% of the urban agreed with some qualifications, and, significantly, more city dwellers rejected the idea that it had intervened too much than did rural voters. Again, in examining the replies of people to this question, the deviation of the suburban from the rural pattern of thought as well as from the metropolitan pattern was noted. Suburbia approved American intervention by 36 to 20; the metropolis disapproved 40 to 30; cities 50,000 and over disapproved 56 to 39; and the rural areas disapproved 77 to 41. Isola-

tionism in the American West appears to be centered in the rural areas. The center of agreement with the State Department and with the Truman-Eisenhower positions of maintaining American interests abroad appears to be the suburban areas, with the smaller cities and the metropolis taking a middle position. Undoubtedly the higher social and educational status and the wider spheres of interest of the inhabitants of suburbs incline them to admit the need for and even to encourage American activity throughout the world.

In keeping with this position the reactions of the rural population to the specific questions of whether America was wise in entering the Korean War and what should be done in Korea in the existing state of suspended fighting were critical of the record of the Democratic Administration. Slightly over half of the rural population was opposed to the idea of getting into the war in the first place, whereas only 31 % of the urban dwellers held this position. Second, the rural population was more extreme and impatient in its proposals for doing something about the Korean War. Only 33 % advocated trying to get a peaceful settlement and a significantly larger number held that the United States should take a more dramatic step, either pulling out of Korea entirely or bombing the Chinese military bases in Manchuria.

About equal proportions of urban and rural people declared that there was nothing the United States could have done to prevent China's having become communistic. About twice as many people took this position as blamed the United States for this episode.

It is concluded that the city and country people of the West contrast in a number of regards, such as party affiliations, voting, civic-mindedness, and controversial issues. The rural West is, if anything, more Democratic than the urban West. It is more pessimistic about politics. It is more liberal on domestic questions and more isolationist on international issues. At the same time, general trends of sentiment strongly affecting one group are noticeable in the other. On the whole there is no sign of a deep schism of opinion or behavior between the country and the city. Many political appeals are well received among large sections of both groups. No visible issues of vital concern to the one public arouse enmity in the other. Neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party in the West is solely urban or rural in its orientation. Nor is there a likelihood that either party would tolerate a domineering rural or urban leadership.

Chapter XI

MEN AND WOMEN

When the French Parliament a generation ago debated heatedly whether to grant the vote to women, a deputy ended his passionate harangue for the measure by listing one after another the ways in which the sexes were similar. "Gentlemen," he concluded, "when you come down to it there is very little difference between men and women." Whereupon an old dignitary from the opposition raised himself and shouted, "That's true. But hurrah for the little difference!"

In politics, small differences often add up to a great deal. What is true "on the whole" and "in general" is often not true enough for the tactics of political campaigning. Victory often turns on small margins. If it can be ascertained that, whatever their similarities, the two sexes do indeed have differences of a political kind, it may help to explain the victories and defeats.

Western men and women behave very much alike politically—more alike than most people think. At the same time there are interesting and important contrasts that should be known in order to present a finished portrait of the Western public. The first comparisons that will be taken up in this chapter will have to do with how they voted in 1952 and what party they supported. They will then be contrasted with regard to their attraction to the candidates and their attitudes about campaign issues. Finally, the degrees of their interest in politics and the extent of their political activities will be compared.

Many have said of the 1952 elections that the women decided the election for Eisenhower. Such a statement is, however, unclear. If it means that many of them voted for him, that is true, of course. If it means that more women voted for Eisenhower than voted for Stevenson, that is correct; but so did more men. If it means that a greater proportion of all who voted for Eisenhower were women than of all who voted for Stevenson, then it is a doubtful proposition; it is more likely that the reverse was true. If it means that women were more concerned with certain issues that favored the Republicans, that too is true, as will be shown. If it means that

Eisenhower had a stronger personal attraction for women than Stevenson had, that is doubtful, and again the reverse might well be the case.

Table L records how those who intended to vote divided their ballots between the candidates.

TABLE L

HOW WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN INTENDED TO VOTE IN 1952

	% Probable Democrats	% Probable Republicans	Total %	No. of cases
Men	41	59	100	157
Women	43	57	100	188

Table LI records how those men and women who had voted in the election were divided on the candidates. The obvious revelation from these tables is that the women voted very much like the men. They both supported Eisenhower strongly. There is also a suggestion in both tables that women might have formed a bigger proportion of the Stevenson voters than men, for they outnumbered the male proportions for Stevenson in both samples.

The generally similar behavior of the sexes might have been expected from a knowledge of the party affiliations of the two sexes. Among the seven different categories of party attachment are to be found roughly equal numbers of men and women. Table LII gives the distribution of the sexes in these categories.

There is a slight tendency for more women to hold strong party convictions than men. Perhaps this is typical of the behavior of what has been called the "faithful sex." Another interesting fact emerges when the party affiliations of men and women are compared with their actual voting: whereas more women than men indicated their affiliation with the Republican Party (38% to 34%) and fewer with the Democratic Party (53%

TABLE LI

HOW WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN ACTUALLY VOTED IN 1952

	% for Stevenson	% for Eisenhower	Total %	No. of cases
Men	37	63	100	70
Women	39	61	100	87

TABLE LII

PARTY AFFILIATION OF WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN IN 1952

	% SD	% WD	% ID	% I	% IR	% WR	% SR	% Other	Total %	No. of cases
Men	20	23	12	7	8	11	15	4	100	213
Women .	23	23	7	6	6	15	17	3	100	239

to 55%), they shifted in the actual voting, with the men voting more Republican (63% to 61%) and less Democratic (37% to 39%).

Women also seem to have more difficulty in dividing their loyalties at any given election. When asked what they would do if they didn't like their party's candidate, women retreated from this mental conflict in greater proportions than men. Table LIII reveals what happened when both imagined such a conflict. Among Strong Democrats, Weak Democrats, and Weak Republicans, a greater proportion of women than men declared they would not vote when faced with such a conflict. The Strong Republican women were an exception. A greater proportion of them than of their male counterparts would have abandoned the party, rather than not voting, and would have voted for the candidate they liked. This kind of a question, however, is likely to get idealistic responses. Notice that

TABLE LIII

HOW MEN AND WOMEN WOULD RESOLVE A CONFLICT BETWEEN THEIR PARTY LOYALTY AND A DISLIKED CANDIDATE OF THEIR PARTY

	% Would vote for the party's candidate	% Would vote for the other candidate	% Wouldn't vote	% Don't know or no answer	Total %	No. of cases
Strong Democrats						
Men	35	44	16	5	100	43
Women	36	41	21	2	100	56
Strong Republicans						
Men	23	48	29	..	100	31
Women	17	65	15	3	100	40
Weak Democrats						
Men	12	76	10	2	100	50
Women	9	69	20	2	100	55
Weak Republicans						
Men	..	100	..	..	100	24
Women	14	74	9	3	100	35
All men	19	65	14	2	100	148
All women	20	61	17	2	100	186

there seems to be only a slight tendency for more women to be faithful to their party than men. This does not bolster the earlier finding that more women than men have strong party affiliations. On the other hand, women may very well be more partisan but also more vulnerable to an attractive candidate.

The information in Table LIV supports this surmise. Each person who

TABLE LIV

WHY WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN VOTED AS THEY DID

Main reason given for voting a certain way	% Men*	% Women†
Like the Democratic Party	12	8
Dislike the Democratic Party	6	5
Like the Republican Party	18	17
Dislike the Republican Party	3	2
Like Stevenson	18	28
Dislike Stevenson	1	1
Like Eisenhower	32	33
Dislike Eisenhower	1	1
No answer; don't know	9	5
Total	100	100

*** Number of cases = 162.**
† Number of cases = 188.

intended to vote was asked his main reason for voting the way he planned. His first response was classified according to one of eight categories having to do with liking or disliking a candidate or party, with this result: A notably higher proportion of women than men explained their vote on the ground that they liked Stevenson. It should be noticed too that 1% more women than men cited Eisenhower personally as their most important reason for voting Republican.

Unfortunately, waters will have to be muddied again for a moment in presenting another set of figures. In the first interview the pollsters made a judgment as to how a person would vote and the main reason why he would vote that way. Table LV presents the results.

There seems to be little difference between men and women in the extent to which they were affected by a candidate's personality. Furthermore, Eisenhower's personality was much more effective in this respect than Stevenson's. What reasons can there be for the seeming contradiction between Tables LIV and LV?

TABLE LV

WHY WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN WOULD PROBABLY VOTE A CERTAIN WAY

Main reason	Probable Democrat		Probable Republican	
	% Men*	% Women†	% Men‡	% Women§
Party identification	33	44	22	27
The candidate	7	8	29	27
Against a candidate	1	3	3	3
Issues, foreign and domestic	5	2	5	3
Foreign policy	1	1	2	7
Domestic issues	5	1	6	2
Corruption	..	..	25	19
Prosperity, economic considerations	16	22	4	4
Party is best for the respondent's group	30	19	2	2
Other	1	..	..	1
Personal influence	1	..	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 83.
† Number of cases = 96.
‡ Number of cases = 117.
§ Number of cases = 130.

Part of the answer lies in the way the question was asked. In Table LIV, people were asked why they would vote a given way. If the first response had to do with liking the Republican Party, it was so scored; if it had to do with liking the Democratic Party, it was so scored; and so on. In Table LV, a judgment was passed on the written report of the interview and it took into consideration more than one simple reaction of the person. People with strong party ties and a record of regular party voting in the past were put down as voting because of their party identifications regardless of whether the most exciting thing about the 1952 campaign to this person was the personality of the candidate. Consequently a woman might be "madly for Adlai" without that passion being reflected in Table LV.

This apparent contradiction can be looked at from another angle. One of the most useful concepts in the science of human behavior is called the principle of "multiple causation." It is a simple idea and is taken for granted in studying natural objects. But men find it difficult to apply to themselves. When two trains are headed toward each other along a track and an intelligent person is asked to say at what point they will crash, he wants to know the speed of not one but both trains. Similarly, when he is trying to decide how far such a human action as a vote is determined by the attraction of the personality represented in the vote, the intelligent

student considers whether some other forces are operating against voting for that personality. If the Democratic Party were in serious disrepute among Democrats, a Democrat's mind would carry—to continue the analogy—at least two trains moving toward the same point (the vote) from opposite directions, at different speeds, and the resulting collision might cause the defection of a Weak Democrat and tempered enthusiasm in a Strong Democrat. The assumed disrepute of the Democratic Party in the given case would cause a psychological distortion of the two-train encounter. Even if the "party train" were maintaining its speed in the Democrat's mind, he would not admit it; he might conceal the fact or avoid it, or not even realize that his "party train" was still running at about the usual speed. With his "party train" in a mental tunnel, he asserts and believes that he is voting a certain way because of the speed of the "personality-attraction train."

Both brakes, the actual and the psychological, are probably at work in the figures of Tables LIV and LV. But Table LIV gives more weight to the actual and the psychological acceleration provided by the campaign, while Table LV is weighted more by the cumulative forces that gave the "trains" their direction and acceleration in the past and explain their present momentum.

It should be noted too that in both tables Eisenhower's personality is a very strong accelerating force for both men and women. In absolute terms it is stronger for both men and women than Stevenson's personality. But the fact remains that Stevenson had greater proportionate appeal to women than to men, whereas Eisenhower had greater proportionate appeal to men than to women.

As was indicated in Chapter III, Eisenhower's personal appeal was very strong. In Table LV it is demonstrated that "party identification" is not as important a motive to probable Republican voters as to probable Democratic voters. Despite the considerable disrepute in 1952 of the Democratic Party, party identification remained the chief motive for Democratic voters. Without Eisenhower the likelihood seems strong that party identification would have been more important on the Republican side.

Table LV provides also an introduction to the next general question to be considered. It shows that the "cost of living" and "prosperity considerations" moved more probable Democratic women than men. It also shows that the benefits of the party to their own special-interest group gave a

primary motive for voting among more probable Democratic men than women. Foreign policies activated more probable Republican women than men. The corruption issue was ineffective among probable Democrats but was widely proclaimed by probable Republicans, especially the men.

Specific questions on the "welfare state," the Taft-Hartley Act, racial discrimination in employment, internationalism, and the Korean War resulted in Table LVI, which compares the attitudes of Western men and

TABLE LVI

REACTIONS OF WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN TO SIX MAJOR ISSUES OF 1952

	The "welfare state"				
	% Govt. should do more	% Govt. just about right	% Govt. should do less	% Govt. should do mixture of both	% Don't know or other
Men*	23	40	18	13	6
Women† ...	23	39	14	15	9

There were few significant differences between men and women on the "welfare state."

	Government action against racial discrimination in employment		
	% Govt. (state or natl.) should pass laws and/or do other things	% Govt. should stay out or be restrictive of Negro rights	% Don't know or no answer
Men*	63	28	9
Women†	67	22	11

Women tended to be somewhat more "liberal" than men in asking for protection for Negroes in employment opportunities.

	Preferred action on the Taft-Hartley Act					
	% Hadn't heard of it	% For its repeal	% For change: pro-labor	% For change: pro-manager	% Let it stand	% Don't know or no answer
Men*	10	16	29	3	20	22
Women† ..	28	10	21	1	10	30

Many women were out of their element on this question. Fewer had heard of it; more did not know what to do about it.

	Internationalism			
	% U.S. has gone too far in international sphere	% Yes and no	% U.S. has not gone too far	% Don't know or no answer
Men*	55	3	32	10
Women†	52	2	32	14

No important differences are noticeable here. Women may have been slightly more "internationalist."

*** Number of cases = 213.**
† Number of cases = 239.

TABLE LVI (*Continued*)

REACTIONS OF WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN TO SIX MAJOR ISSUES OF 1952

	Should we have gone into Korea?			
	% Did right in going in	% Yes and no	% Should have stayed out	% Don't know or no answer
Men*	44	8	30	18
Women†	31	8	42	19

The difference here is remarkable. Though basically not isolationist, women were definitely more pacifistic.

	What should be done now in Korea?			
	% Pull out entirely	% Try for a peaceful settlement	% Take stronger stand and bomb China	% Don't know or no answer
Men*	11	29	49	11
Women†	12	35	40	13

Women were pacifistic and also more of them wanted to continue tries for a peaceful settlement.

*** Number of cases = 213.**
† Number of cases = 239.

women. A study of their opinions on specific issues, given in Table LVI, shows that Western women had much in common with their menfolk. But fewer of the women were interested in labor legislation than were the men, more of them were for action against racial discrimination, and more of them disliked warfare even under severe provocation.

The greater lack of knowledge of many women on the specific economic and structural bases of politics is shown within responses to such a question as that on the Taft-Hartley Act. More women seem to have strong interest and opinions on issues with high moral rather than technical content. For example, when they were asked whether they agreed with the statement that "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party hasn't a chance to win," men and women responded in almost equal numbers, only 4% of the former and 5% of the latter agreeing with it.

Table LVII shows that there is more indifference to political campaigns among women than among men.

Besides having this greater degree of indifference to political campaigns (and probably connected with it psychologically), more Western women than men feel politically impotent. The figures in Table LVIII show this quite clearly.

On these, as on other matters considered in this study, the differences

TABLE LVII

COMPARATIVE INTEREST OF WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS

	% Interested in the political campaigns, 1952	% General interest in state elections	% General interest in local elections
Men*	77	59	60
Women†	70	51	50

	% Agreeing that "A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother about"	% Agreeing that "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not"
Men*	9	3
Women†	15	7

* Number of cases = 213. † Number of cases = 239.

shown are perhaps not so impressive as the fact that they are so small. When one considers how most girls are trained and how restricted is the behavior of women, their confidence, their sense of political obligation, and their interest in the political process are surprising. If it were possible to interview the women of other, more restricted societies, one might find far

TABLE LVIII

COMPARATIVE FEELINGS OF POLITICAL IMPOTENCE AMONG WESTERN MEN AND WOMEN

	Agreeing	
	% Men*	% Women†
"I don't think public officials care much what people like me think"	24	28
"People like me don't have any say about what the government does"	21	25
"Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't understand what's going on"	56	74

* Number of cases = 213. † Number of cases = 239.

greater differences between the political behavior of men and women. Moreover, if one were to interview women in the same manner regarding their family world, their work world, and their social world, it might be found that in America politics is truly a woman's favorite world in that it gives her a greater sense of belonging to society, greater scope of decision, and more power than in the other spheres of her life.

The comparisons of the political activities of men and women in Table LIX tend to bear out this interpretation of women's role in politics. In Chapter VII it was reported that men and women voted in almost equal proportion in the 1952 elections. If anything, fewer women were nonvoters than men. There were few other differences between the participation of men and women in politics in 1952.

TABLE LIX

COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF MEN AND WOMEN IN 1952

	% Followed campaign quite a bit in newspapers	% Followed campaign quite a bit on radio	% Tried to influence others how to vote	% Contributed money in any way
Men*	47	33	42	10
Women†	41	45	28	8
	% Attended rallies, meetings, etc.	% Did other party campaign work		% Belonged to a political club or organization
Men*	10	5		1
Women†	15	6		4

* Number of cases = 101.
† Number of cases = 107.

Women are kept from most elective and high appointive offices for a variety of reasons, but there is proof here that they are not kept from office because they do not have the energy for politics. It has been seen on one hand that more Western women than men were indifferent to campaigns, that more of them felt politically impotent, and that they had less technical political knowledge. But, on high priority items, Western women were as politically active as men, if not more so. Although more men followed the campaign in the newspapers, more women followed it on the radio. Women made less effort than men to influence others. A few more men than women contributed money to the campaign, but more women than men attended rallies and as many women as men were active political workers. Finally, more women belonged to political organizations than men. Politics is truly "community property" in the American West. A generation of women's suffrage has brought women to almost equal political status with men, in fact as well as in law.

Chapter XII

NATIVE SONS AND AUTO PIONEERS

SINCE THE UNITED STATES is a relatively new country and the West is the most recently settled region in the country, only a few generations can possibly separate the oldest groups in the population from the newcomers. Yet such is the nature of social distinctions and so sensitive is politics to the conflicts between vested and aspiring interests, that the West has had its share of political difficulties between the new and old settlers. Descent in the West is not measured in centuries as it would be in the old cultures of Italy, France, Spain, or England, but in short periods of generations.

Two general types of "short-term oldness" exist in the West. The first considers family time in the United States, that is, the first or immigrant generation, the second generation, the third, and so on. The second or chronological scale is measured in years: it serves to distinguish "native sons" who were born in the West, those who have spent most of their lives in the West, and the recent arrivals dating from the early 1930's. The latter two groups of "auto pioneers" are very numerous in the West as a whole and three times as numerous in California as the native sons. Taking up in turn each of the two general chronological measures, this chapter will determine whether any political differences exist among the several groupings of the two types, and whether some widespread assumptions about such differences are fact or myth.

How long the Western population has been in America therefore becomes the first question. The "melting pot" has been at work in the United States from the very beginning and it is impossible to classify exactly a large part of the population as to its length of residence in the country. Many people do not know their precise origins, even their ancestral homeland. Ordinarily people will know where their grandparents came from and whether they were born in the United States, but beyond that their memories are likely to be faulty. None of the measures used to ascertain the national origins of the American people for the purpose of establishing immigration quotas have proved satisfactory. Strong scientific objections can be made to all of them.

The survey of 1952 took a bold step forward in the analysis of population origins by asking people to recall their birthplaces and those of their parents and grandparents. The response was excellent. A person born outside of the United States was classified as first generation; a person at least one of whose parents was born outside of the United States was called second generation; a person one or more of whose grandparents were born outside of the United States was called third generation, and a person whose four grandparents were all born in the United States was called fourth generation. Table LX shows the distribution of the generations in the West as compared with the United States as a whole, in terms of these definitions.

TABLE LX

LENGTH OF FAMILY RESIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE WEST AND THE NATION

	The West		The United States as a whole	
	Number	%	Number	%
First generation in United States	33	8	126	9
Second generation in United States ...	99	23	375	26
Third generation in United States	112	26	346	24
Fourth generation in United States ...	183	43	594	41
Total	427	100	1,441	100

The Western population is seen to resemble remarkably the population of the United States as a whole in its length of residence in America. More than half of the Westerners and of all Americans belong to the three most recent generations in America. The number of foreign born is less than 10% and is a steadily diminishing percentage, decreasing in proportion to the balance as the native population grows and restrictions on immigration are maintained. The second and third generation groupings are roughly equal both in the West and in the nation. An assertion therefore that the West represents a people much older to America than the rest of the country is incorrect.

Table LXI presents a social summary of the four generations of Westerners in America. It compares the several generations on a number of key indices, in order to supply the background for analyzing their political attitudes and to give a general knowledge of what has happened to the generations in America.

The second generation in the West seems to have the highest proportion

of Catholics, and the third and fourth have a lesser proportion than the first. The first generation has fewest children in school, and the other three generations are about equal in that respect. It should be noted that a comparison of the percentage of families having children in school with the percentage of Catholics indicates a more even distribution of children in the population than might have been expected, since it is commonly believed that the Catholic birth rate is much higher than the non-Catholic.

TABLE LXI

SOCIAL SUMMARY OF FOUR GENERATIONS OF WESTERNERS IN THE UNITED STATES

	Generation				No. of cases
	First	Second	Third	Fourth	
Number	33	99	112	183	427
% of total number of cases	8	23	26	43	..
% of Catholic	36	41	16	14	96
% having children in school	18	32	31	32	131
% of families with income of:					
$0–2999	30	29	19	32	118
$3000–4999	33	37	36	43	166
$5000 or more	27	29	45	24	132
% with education of:					
Some high school or less	52	54	31	50	195
High school and/or special training	36	27	35	31	134
Some college or more	9	19	34	19	95
% of households with union members	42	35	34	31	143

One rather surprising finding is that the third generation is the most successful of all economically. About 45% of the families of the third generation respondents earned incomes of $5,000 or more. The lowest number of high-income earners is found among the fourth generation, that is, among those who have resided longest in America. Similarly, the third generation has the highest proportion of college-trained and the lowest proportion of those with a maximum of only some high-school education. The immigrant or first generation has the highest percentage of union

affiliation in the family and the proportion decreases slightly from one generation to the next.

One would be tempted to say that the third generation in the West is the privileged generation, if it were not so misleading to speak of it as a group; for these are merely statistical categories and are composed of people who, perhaps with the exception of the first generation, have little knowledge of one another's family histories. It is more appropriate to say that the third generation represents people who came into the West at the most propitious time for the setting up of businesses, the farming of land, and the building of the culture. Undoubtedly the fourth generation contains a large number of former Southerners from Oklahoma, Arkansas, and other states, who, coming to the West more recently, started from the bottom like the foreign immigrants.

The figures on the distribution of the various occupations among the several generations have not been presented. The most noticeable features of the distribution, however, are that the second and third generations have at least twice as many professional and semiprofessional people in proportion to their numbers as the first- and fourth-generation groups. Fewer of the foreign-born than any of the other generations are in clerical and sales work and a greater proportion of them are skilled and semiskilled workers. The highest proportion of unskilled and service workers are found among the fourth generation (10%). One would scarcely say that any one of the generations is noticeably specialized in a particular occupation and hence there is little chance for any distinctive status to develop from the occupational disproportions in any generation. Together with the figures arrived at from the social summary, the occupational distribution points to a rapid decline of distinctions by generations as a possible source of political differences.

With reference to possible political differences the basic measure is the party identification scale. Table LXII gives the party breakdown of Westerners by their generation in America. The Western foreign-born have a surprisingly high concentration of Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans. The second generation has the largest proportion of Independents—also an unexpected finding. Weak Democrats preponderate among the second generation. The third generation shows a fairly even balance of all kinds of Democrats and Republicans. The fourth generation has more Democrats than any other but the foreign-born. This is another manifesta-

TABLE LXII

PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF WESTERNERS BY THEIR GENERATION IN THE UNITED STATES

	% of generation			
	First*	Second†	Third‡	Fourth§
SD	34	16	20	25
WD	24	28	19	22
ID	9	9	9	10
I	6	13	4	4
IR	..	7	11	6
WR	3	11	17	14
SR	21	14	18	16
Other	3	2	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 33.
† Number of cases = 99.
‡ Number of cases = 112.
§ Number of cases = 183.

tion of the Southern heritage of the fourth generation population of Westerners.

In 1948 the proportion of Democrats was highest in the foreign-born generation, as is shown in Table LXIII. The next highest percentage was

TABLE LXIII

THE REPORTED 1948 VOTE AND THE PROBABLE 1952 VOTE, BY THEIR GENERATION IN THE UNITED STATES

	% of generation			
	First*	Second†	Third‡	Fourth§
1948 vote				
Truman	52	38	34	38
Dewey	21	28	41	27
Nonvoting and other	24	27	22	31
Don't know or no answer	3	7	3	4
Total	100	100	100	100
1952 probable vote				
Democrat	30	29	30	34
Republican	37	43	54	45
Undecided	6	7	2	1
Nonvoting	24	17	10	16
Other	3	4	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 33.
† Number of cases = 99.
‡ Number of cases = 112.
§ Number of cases = 183.

from the second generation, although the fourth generation was very close. It might be expected that the fourth generation would have been close to the foreign-born in its 1948 vote. But it will be recalled that that was the year of the Dixiecrat movement and it is quite probable that Southern Democrats of recent arrival in the West carried their political inclinations with them and defected from Truman. The fourth generation had the largest number of nonvoters and the third generation the smallest.

In 1952 the proportion of probable Democrats among the foreign-born dropped sharply and the number of prospective nonvoters was as high as in 1948. Of course, a certain nonvoting element was present among the foreign-born, owing to the fact that some of them were not yet citizens. On the other hand, since the number of nonvoters declined from 1948 to 1952 in all other generations, and a noticeable shift from the Democrats to the Republicans had occurred among the foreign-born, it can be surmised that more of the foreign-born were disturbed about their voting affiliations in 1952. They liked Eisenhower, admired his ability in foreign affairs, but had a strong previous attachment to the Democratic Party.

Table LXIV gives some indication of the general attitudes of the several generations toward civic responsibility and compares their faith in the political process and in American society. The highest morale was shown by the third generation. A smaller proportion of third generation Westerners disputed the usefulness of local elections, felt politically impotent, and gave a qualified or definite negative to the question as to whether there is much opportunity in America today. The higher average income of the third generation group, together with its higher educational level, helps to explain these differences. The first and fourth generations have the lowest civic morale, the fourth generation having twice as high a proportion as the third generation of people who say that local elections aren't important enough to bother with and who believe that public officials do not care what they think. Almost a quarter of them feel that there is not much opportunity in America.

As has been pointed out in regard to other tabulations, the similarities between the generation groups are greater than their differences. For instance, there is a range of only a few percentage points difference between the fourth generation and the third, which are the extremes, in their agreement with the statement that people don't have much to say about what the government does. This means that three-quarters of the fourth genera-

TABLE LXIV

THE ATTITUDE OF WESTERNERS TO THE ROLE OF A CITIZEN BY THEIR GENERATION IN THE UNITED STATES

	% of generation in agreement			
	First*	Second†	Third‡	Fourth§
A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother about	12	11	7	15
People like me don't have any say about what the government does	21	24	18	25
I don't think public officials care much what people like me think	36	24	14	32
Do you think there is much opportunity in America today?	82	85	88	78

* Number of cases = 33.
† Number of cases = 99.
‡ Number of cases = 112.
§ Number of cases = 183.

tion are in accord with three-quarters or more of every other generation in feeling that they do have something to say about what the government does.

It can be concluded that there is little reason for agitation deriving from the differences in the length of residence of Westerners' families in America. Can the same be said about differences owing to length of personal residence in the West, especially in California where this factor is most evident and for which the sample is best adapted? As can be seen in Table LXV one out of every four Californians today was born in California; another one out of four was born elsewhere but was living in California in 1932. A heavy immigration from other parts of the country continued after 1932 and supplied two out of four of the present population of the state.

The same table gives a social summary of Californians. The proportion of Catholics among the native sons of California is higher than the proportion in the two other groups. The income and the educational level of native Californians exceed that of the other two groups. In their educational level the post-1932 Californians reveal the principal elements in the California immigration of recent years. The percentages of relatively uneducated and of relatively highly educated post-1932 Californians are larger than the percentages of high-school graduates and they stand high in relation to the comparable distributions of native Californians and pre-1932 Californians. Recent immigration to California has attracted both poorly educated and highly educated Americans. The percentage of households

TABLE LXV

SOCIAL SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIANS BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE

	Born and living in California	Born elsewhere, living in California in 1932	Born elsewhere, moved to California after 1932	No. of cases
Number	64	69	135	268
% of total	24	26	50	..
% Catholic	36	22	14	57
% with children in school	31	25	35	84
% of families with income of:				
$0–2999	16	25	33	71
$3000–4999	45	30	39	103
$5000 or more	38	32	26	86
% with education of:				
Some high school or less	36	48	49	122
High school and/or special training	34	33	23	76
Some college or more	30	19	28	70
% of households with union members	34	28	35	88

with union members among native Californians is as large as either of the other groups.

The distribution of occupations among the three types of Californians, given in Table LXVI, shows a fair degree of balance within each group. As might be expected from a scrutiny of the educational levels, the proportion of unskilled workers is highest among the more recently arrived Californians, but the proportions of the professional and self-employed among them are high as well. The most notable distinctions of occupations among the native Californians rest in the high proportion of farm operators and of clerical and sales people. Why there should be more farm operators among the natives is clear: earlier Californians tended to take up the land. The high proportion of clerical and sales people is perhaps explained by the fact that the native born are better able to engage in the contact occupations where knowledge of other people and familiarity with the social environment are desirable attributes.

Table LXVII gives the party identification of Californians by their

TABLE LXVI

OCCUPATION AND LENGTH OF CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE

Occupation of head of household	Length of California residence		
	% Born and living in California*	% Born elsewhere, living in California in 1932†	% Born elsewhere, moved to California after 1932‡
Professional and semiprofessional	9	13	11
Self-employed businessmen	14	22	14
Clerical and sales	17	6	7
Skilled and semiskilled	27	26	27
Unskilled and service workers	6	6	15
Protective service	3	1	15
Unemployed	..	..	2
Farm operators	11	3	2
Retired	8	12	2
Housewife	3	10	3
Student	..	1	..
No answer	2	..	2
Total	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 64.
† Number of cases = 69.
‡ Number of cases = 135.

TABLE LXVII

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND LENGTH OF CALIFORNIA RESIDENCE

	Length of California residence		
	% Born and living in California*	% Born elsewhere, living in California in 1932†	% Born elsewhere, moved to California after 1932‡
SD	24	23	27
WD	23	16	24
ID	9	4	7
I	3	6	5
IR	5	4	4
WR	20	16	10
SR	14	29	18
Other	2	2	5
Total	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 64.
† Number of cases = 69.
‡ Number of cases = 135.

length of residence, so that it is possible to determine whether the old Californians are more conservative, more Republican, more interested in politics, and so on. An examination of the table discloses that the largest proportion of Strong Republicans is found among nonnative Californians who were living in the state in 1932. The largest concentration of Strong Democrats occurs among those who have moved to California since 1932, but Democrats considerably outnumber Republicans among the native Californians. Democratic politics are not a recent import to California. The proportion of Independent or nearly Independent citizens does not vary significantly from group to group.

In Table LXVIII, which describes the voting behavior of the three residence groups in 1948 and 1952, the Republicanism of the nonnative, pre-1932 Californians is reflected to a marked degree. So is the general Democratic sentiment of native Californians and the anti-Trumanism of the more recent Californians in the 1948 election. The shift to the Republicans in

TABLE LXVIII

RESIDENCE TIME IN CALIFORNIA RELATED TO THE 1948 VOTE AND THE PROBABLE 1952 VOTE OF WESTERNERS

	Length of California residence		
	% Born and living in California*	% Born elsewhere, living in California in 1932†	% Born elsewhere, moved to California after 1932‡
1948 vote			
Democrat	36	41	28
Republican	25	48	27
Didn't vote	31	9	42
Other	2	1	..
Don't know or no answer	6	1	3
Total	100	100	100
Probable 1952 vote			
Democrat	30	23	30
Republican	52	64	39
Undecided	6	3	3
Won't vote	9	9	25
Other	3	1	3
Total	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 64.
† Number of cases = 69.
‡ Number of cases = 135.

1952 was less marked among the more recent residents of California than among the native Californians or the old-time residents. A very large proportion of the nonvoters in California comes from those who have moved into the state since 1932. Within the last generation the California population which started out Democratic was diluted by the pre-1932 immigration toward Republicanism and then was transformed by the later immigration back to a Democratic outlook.

Table LXIX shows how the sample reacted to the question of the "wel-

TABLE LXIX

CALIFORNIANS' ATTITUDE ON THE "WELFARE STATE," BY THEIR RESIDENCE TIME

	Length of California residence		
	% Born and living in California*	% Born elsewhere, living in California in 1932†	% Born elsewhere, moved to California after 1932‡
Government definitely should do more	9	16	26
Activity about right	56	39	37
Government should do less	13	25	16
Government should do more on some matters, don't know or same on others	19	17	18
No answer	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 64.
† Number of cases = 69.
‡ Number of cases = 135.

fare state." A larger proportion of the nonnative older residents than the native sons or the more recent arrivals felt that the government should do less about unemployment, education, housing, and the like. The recent Californians, in greater proportion than either the native sons or the older migrants to California, felt that the government definitely should do more.

It is the nonnative older residents of California, too, who are most concerned that the state government should enact any necessary legislation to guarantee Negroes against racial discrimination in employment. As Table LXX indicates, 41 % of them favored state government action. Yet a considerable proportion of them asked for the passage of national legislation

TABLE LXX

CALIFORNIANS' ATTITUDE ON ACTION AGAINST JOB DISCRIMINATION, BY THEIR RESIDENCE TIME

	Length of California residence		
	% Born and living in California*	% Born elsewhere, living in California in 1932†	% Born elsewhere, moved to California after 1932‡
National government should pass laws and do other things too	20	17	24
State government should pass laws and do other things too	28	41	27
Government should do other things only	24	9	10
All governments should stay out entirely	17	17	22
Don't know	11	6	11
Favors restrictive legislation (anti-Negro statements)	..	10	6
Total	100	100	100

* Number of cases = 64.
† Number of cases = 69.
‡ Number of cases = 135.

and, despite hostility to Negroes on the part of some of them, no more of them than either of the other groups wanted the government to ignore the question entirely.

When the several types of Californians were asked whether they felt that the government had become too concerned with foreign problems since World War II, the native Californian emerged as the most internationalist of the residence-time groups. Only a third of the native Californians agreed that the United States had become too involved abroad, whereas over half of all nonnative Californians, both long-time and recently arrived residents, took that view. If this is any indication of what happens elsewhere in the West, it would appear that isolationism is not born in the West but is imported by migrants seeking "a nest way out in the West," wanting "to let the rest of the world go by." The native Californian may feel it necessary to establish his connection with the universe, whereas the newer Californian is more inclined to want to break the connection.

As a result fewer native Californians than either of the other groups

thought the United States should have stayed out of the fighting in Korea although the differences here are not so marked as on the question of foreign involvements. Native Californians were also more favorably disposed to continue trying for a peaceful settlement in Korea rather than taking a more defiant stand or bombing Manchuria and China. Proportionately more native Californians than either of the other groups recommended pulling out of Korea entirely (14% against 9% and 9%). Forty-two percent of the native Californians wanted to strive for a compromise settlement as against 22% and 24% respectively of the other groups. The pre-1932 group seemed a little more bellicose than the others on this item.

Those who moved to California before 1932 also seemed generally to be more active politically than the other two groups. About 54% of them said they were very much interested in the political campaigns of 1952 as against 52% of the native Californians and 42% of the recent Californians. When they were asked whether or not they cared a great deal which party won the presidential election, the pre-1932 Californians were again the most excited. Fully 87% of them were interested in which party won, as against 77% of the native Californians and 64% of the more recent Californians. This interest in politics was carried over to state and local elections as well. Among the pre-1932, nonnative Californians, 65% claimed pretty much or very much concern about who won state elections. The corresponding figures for the other two groups are 56% among the native-born Californians and 44% among the recent Californians. Similarly, on the question as to whether the respondent cared a good deal or not who generally won local elections, the pre-1932 Californians were again more concerned. Sixty-four percent of them cared pretty much or very much, in contrast with 55% of the native Californians and 45% of the recent Californians.

Summarizing briefly, the most volatile and Republican of the three groups of Californians were the nonnative residents who moved to the state before 1932. The native Californian is likely to be more Democratic, more internationalist, and more moderately but consistently liberal than either of the other groups. The recent Californian tends to be more apathetic politically, strongly Democratic in party affiliations but deviant from the Democratic party line in international affairs and in race relations.

In general, this chapter has suggested that differences of a political sort among the people of the West that arise from length of residence in the United States are not very significant, that they are, in fact, probably less

significant politically than the differences between native sons and migrant residents from other parts of America. The comparisons dispel some widespread myths about the inhabitants of the West and of California. Among the most striking discoveries appear to be the equable, balanced Democratic temper of the native Californian and the high level of success of the third generation American in the West. The way in which the many possible differences among people shade off and are merged and mingled among the several groups suggests the rapid working of the melting pot in the West.

Chapter XIII

THE WEST: IS IT PECULIAR?

THE ESKIMOS, who live amidst snow most of the year, distinguish different kinds of snow and have special names for them. Americans, who must seem very much alike to the rest of the world, can talk at length about the differences between Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Both the outsiders who see the sameness and the Americans who see the differences may be correct, of course, from their separate points of view. It would be useless to argue the issue on any absolute level. It is useful, however, to inquire whether some common assertions about the American West are indeed true, and also to determine whether there are some characteristic Western political slants.

In the preceding chapters the Western public has been treated as a group by itself without considering how similar are its attitudes and behavior to those of other Americans. But in the process it must have become obvious that the same factors that help to explain the voting behavior and political attitudes of the Westerner also help to explain the political behavior of the rest of America, of the Chinese, or of the English. That is, people derive their attitudes in large measure from their backgrounds, their associates, and their occupations. Income, occupation, place of residence, religion, sex, and character determine a good part of their politics. Westerners act in these ways very much like everyone else in the world. Even Angelenos, although they are targets of extravagant comment from all sides, react to political events with remarkable normality. If Westerners are different, it will be no easy matter to say how different they are and why.

That there is a great area of sameness between the West and the rest of the country can be affirmed straightaway. It will also be shown that many popular beliefs about the West are greatly exaggerated and sometimes completely unfounded. There are, too, some interesting differences about the West that can be demonstrated. The several lines of inquiry pertaining to those conclusions will take up five major subjects: a comparison of the voting results and the reasons for voting in a given way among the four great sections of the country; a comparison of party affiliations among the

regions; a comparison of the behavior of city and country, occupations, and income groups in the four divisions; a comparison of several temperamental factors in politics among the regions; and a comparison of the West and other regions on some important issues of the campaign.

The results of the election showed that the West voted more strongly for Eisenhower than did the nation as a whole. (Table LXXI presents the actual election returns.) However, this figure is somewhat deceptive be-

TABLE LXXI

PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN 1952, BY REGION

	% Voted for Eisenhower	% Voted for Stevenson	% Voted for others	Total
Northeast	55.1	44.2	.7	18,975,619
Midwest	58.3	41.3	.4	19,261,595
South	49.4	50.4	.2	14,163,545
West	57.3	41.9	.8	9,151,182
Total	55.1	44.4	.5	61,587,861

cause the almost solidly Democratic South reduced the national average. The Midwest was more strongly for the Republicans than was the West. The percentage increase in the Republican vote in 1952 over the 1948 Republican vote was 116% for the South, 37% for the Northeast, 31% for the Midwest, and 57% for the West. When the Mountain States and the Pacific Coast area are compared, it is found that the former shifted much more sharply to the Republicans than the latter states. The difference in the percentages of the two-party vote obtained by Eisenhower in the least and in the most Republican Western states in 1952 was 10%. The corresponding figure for the Northeast was also 10%; for the Midwest, 16%; and for the South, 26%. Thus, although the Western states showed less variation than the rest of the country outside of the Northeast, they were not particularly homogeneous in their voting behavior. There was a wide variation in the degree of their support of the candidates.

Table LXXII, based on the sample survey, presents the over-all regional vote in a different form. One should note how the nonvoting in the West and South hurt Stevenson, whereas it made little difference to the outcome in the Northeast and Midwest.

Eisenhower's popularity in the West, in absolute terms, was great. It

TABLE LXXII

VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE 1952 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BY REGION*

	% Voted for				% No vote, but preferred			% Total not voting	No. of cases
	Eisenhower	Stevenson	Other†	% Total Voting	Eisenhower	Stevenson	Other‡		
Northeast	49	34	1	84	8	6	2	16	390
Midwest	51	33	1	85	8	6	1	15	580
South	25	25	..	49	20	25	6	51	440
West	47	29	1	77	7	15	1	23	204

* From Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

† Includes respondents whose vote was not ascertained as well as those who voted for minor-party candidates.

‡ Includes nonvoters who expressed no preference as well as those who preferred minor-party candidates.

should be pointed out, however, that the personal popularity of Eisenhower in the West was not noticeably greater than it was in the rest of the country, with the exception perhaps of the South. In the West, as in the rest of the country, the major reason for people voting as they did was their party affiliation. Then came their personal attachments to the candidates and afterward a number of special and miscellaneous considerations. The several factors that seemed to determine their votes are described and weighed in Table LXXIII.

TABLE LXXIII

MAIN REASON FOR THE INTENDED VOTE, BY REGION

	Northeast		Midwest		South		West	
	% Dem.	% Rep.	% Dem.	% Rep.	% Dem.	% Rep.	% Dem.	% Rep.
Party identification	37	19	32	27	61	11	38	27
Candidate preference	6	24	6	21	1	38	9	25
Hostility to other candidate	1	..	1	1	..	2	2	3
Issues, general	4	4	3	6	1	2	3	4
Foreign policy	1	4	3	6	1	3	2	5
Domestic issues, general	1	2	3	2	1	3	2	4
Corruption	..	22	..	21	1	16	..	17
Prosperity	12	11	22	6	10	11	18	3
Party best for respondent's group	30	..	22	..	13	3	21	2
Other	6	12	8	9	8	7	3	7
Personal influence	2	2	..	1	3	4	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	137	206	216	286	146	117	144	201

A slight difference between the West and the rest of the country is noticeable when people's reactions to the Republican vice-presidential candidate are considered. When asked for remarks for or against the Republican candidate for vice-president, Richard Nixon, the Westerners mentioned more positive things. About 13% more people reacted positively to Nixon in the West than in the Northeast or Midwest. On the other hand, there was also a slight tendency for more Westerners to be anti-Nixon. Of course, the factor at work here was Nixon's Western origin. The West was hence more attentive to him; he received more favorable comment for being a native son, and a slightly larger number of negative comments because his opponents in the West had grown accustomed to contesting him. It should be noted that throughout the country, however, not very much attention was paid to the vice-presidential candidates, even in the middle of the political campaign. From 47% (West) to 68% (South) of the people of the several regions had no opinion one way or the other about Nixon. Votes were made and lost by Nixon and by many other factors, but they were not decisive.

If it were discovered that in the actual voting Westerners were scarcely more concerned about the presidential candidate's personality than were other Americans, it might be anticipated what would happen if Westerners were asked about their party affiliations. Table LXXIV shows that the West was not a strongly independent part of the country, politically speaking. The West had a greater proportion of Strong Democrats than any other region except the South; it had a greater proportion of Strong Re-

TABLE LXXIV

COMPARISON OF PARTY IDENTIFICATIONS AMONG THE REGIONS

	% Northeast	% Midwest	% South	% West	% Total sample
SD	18	17	31	22	22
WD	18	25	32	24	25
ID	13	9	8	10	10
I	8	7	2	7	5
IR	9	8	5	6	7
WR	18	15	8	13	14
SR	14	18	6	16	13
Other	2	1	8	2	4
Total ...	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases .	390	580	440	446	1,614

publicans than the Northeast section of the country; and it had fewer Independents than the Northeast section of the country. The popular impression that the Westerners do not attach themselves to the party label is erroneous. There may be some truth in the idea that Westerners are independent, but they are independent of organization, not of identification or of feeling of involvement with a party.

In Chapter II it was shown that the parents of the average Westerner tended to have had the same political conviction as their offspring. A man "inherits" his political affiliation in a large number of cases. The tendency is not only Western, but is general throughout the country. The child learns to vote as the parents vote. In the accompanying chart of the political affiliations of parents of the people in the sample (Fig. 7), there is a remarkably uniform progression of identical characteristics between parents and children. Where both parents were Democratic, very many Democrats and very few Republicans are to be found among the children. Put in another way, among Strong Democrats (depending upon the region) no more than from 5% to 14% had parents who were both Republicans, while from 56% to 76% of them had parents who were both Democrats. Moving down from Strong Democrats to Weak Democrats to Independent Democrats, through Independents to Republicans, there is a gradual decrease in the extent to which the parents of the Westerners were Democrats. In the Independent category the parents tended to come rather equally from Democratic and Republican ranks.

Other facts of equal interest could not be included in Figure 7. For example, there were a few cases found in the country of persons who were completely apolitical, who had no conception of politics or of elections at all. Most of these people had parents who were probably at least as ignorant of politics as they were themselves. Material on individuals whose parents were politically split was also excluded, but the number of these individuals increases from Strong Democrat and Republican toward the Independent Westerner, showing that the Independents also tend to inherit their lack of party identity.

Beyond asking about their party affiliations, the interviewers asked whether the person thought there were any important differences between the parties. Table LXXV shows that the West did not stand out remarkably in its response to this question. Westerners corresponded rather closely to people from the Northeastern region in holding, somewhat more than



FIGURE 7
THE INHERITANCE OF PARTY LOYALTY

TABLE LXXV

COMPARISON OF REGIONAL ATTITUDES ABOUT PARTY DIFFERENCES

	Are there any important differences between the parties?						
	% Many	% Some	% Minor	% None	% Don't know or no answer	Total %	No. of cases
Northeast ...	13	35	8	35	9	100	448
Midwest	10	24	12	46	8	100	617
South	8	26	10	39	17	100	509
West	14	30	8	37	11	100	446

those from the other two regions contended, that there were important differences between the two parties. (It is surprising to note that Southerners felt very much like the rest of the nation in this respect.)

Another indication of how well Westerners identified themselves with a party is the extent to which they voted a straight ticket at elections. The West stood out remarkably in this respect. Of all those who cast ballots in the West, 58% voted a straight ballot. In contrast, 66% of the Midwesterners voted straight tickets, 79% of the Southerners, and 83% of the Northeasterners. The difference stands out with especial sharpness when it is recalled that the people of the West distributed their party affiliations much like Midwesterners and Northeasterners. Apparently the Westerners regarded the parties as being of considerable importance and regarded themselves as being part of one or the other party in about the same proportions as other Americans; but they did not operate in an organized fashion on behalf of a given party. Rather, a large number of them tended to split their votes between candidates of the two parties.

A specific example may illustrate what happened in 1952 through ticket splitting. In the West, 18% of those who reported having voted for Stevenson added that they had voted for a Republican candidate for governor. Sixteen percent of those who had voted for Eisenhower voted for a Democratic candidate for governor. This was a much higher rate of ticket splitting than occurred in the Northeast or the Midwest, especially among those who voted for Stevenson. Fully 34% of the Westerners split their tickets on these two offices. (The number of cases here was only 59 in all, because, in a number of states, the governor was not up for election. But obviously a large number of split tickets in the West on these offices is of some significance.)

Given the fact that Westerners share with other Americans their ideas regarding political affiliation and the function of political parties, one can conclude that the resulting maverickism of Western elections must be due to legal, institutional, and organizational peculiarities. The West is independent in effect, not in motive.

A second distinction between the West and the rest of the nation springs from differences in the distribution of political affiliations among the several types of community. It was learned in Chapter XI that the rural areas of the West were about as Democratic as the urban areas, and it was remarked that this seemed to go directly counter to a great deal of scientific literature and popular lore. In examining Table LXXVI on the party affiliations of the urban and rural populations of the four regions of the country, it is found that the West is the only section of the country in which the proportion of all Republicans in the cities and large towns outnumbers those in the small towns and open country. Conversely, the West is the only section of the country outside of the South in which the proportion of Democrats in rural areas outnumbers the proportion of Democrats in urban areas.

This difference between the politics of rural and urban Westerners and other Americans manifested itself also in the election of Truman in 1948 and Eisenhower in 1952, as can be seen in Table LXXVII. The West gave Truman fewer votes in the urban and suburban metropolitan centers and in cities over 50,000 than did the same areas of the Northeast and Midwest. Westerners in cities under 2,500 gave Truman a larger proportion of their votes than did the other two regions outside of the South, and a far larger proportion in the open country. In cities of between 2,500 and 50,000 people, the West was slightly less avid for Truman than the Northeast, but more so than the Middle West.

When the question is re-examined for 1952, with the new candidates, a war, and many other changed circumstances, the Western urban-metropolitan areas, suburban-metropolitan areas, cities over 50,000 population, and cities of 2,500 to 50,000 population are shown to have given a considerably lesser percentage of their vote to Stevenson than was given by the corresponding areas in the Northeast and Middle West.

Why should these differences exist between the West and the other regions of the country? Why does neither the rural nor the urban population of the West behave like that of the Northeast and Middle West? The

TABLE LXXVI

COMPARISON OF THE PARTY AFFILIATIONS OF THE URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS OF THE FOUR REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

	% Strong Democrats				% Strong Republicans				% Independents			
	W	MW	NE	S	W	MW	NE	S	W	MW	NE	S
Urban ..	23	20	19	28	18	19	13	4	6	7	8	2
Rural ...	20	12	8	35	11	14	24	7	7	6	6	2
Whole region .	22	17	17	31	16	18	15	6	7	7	8	2

	% Weak Democrats				% Weak Republicans				% All other responses			
	W	MW	NE	S	W	MW	NE	S	W	MW	NE	S
Urban ..	22	23	20	33	14	13	17	8	2	1	3	10
Rural ...	27	28	13	31	11	19	24	9	2	2	3	8
Whole region .	23	25	18	32	13	15	18	8	2	1	3	9

	% Independent Democrats				% Independent Republicans			
	W	MW	NE	S	W	MW	NE	S
Urban ..	9	9	12	9	6	8	8	6
Rural ...	12	9	13	5	10	10	9	3
Whole region .	10	9	13	7	7	8	8	5

	% All Democrats				% All Republicans			
	W	MW	NE	S	W	MW	NE	S
Urban ..	54	52	51	70	38	40	38	18
Rural ...	59	49	34	71	32	43	57	19
Whole region .	55	51	48	70	36	41	41	19

	Number of cases			
	W	MW	NE	S
Urban ..	335	382	370	245
Rural ...	111	235	76	264
Whole region .	446	617	446	509

answers to these questions are several. One reason may be that there are more Catholics and Americans of relatively recent arrival living on the land in the West than in the other areas of the country. Another reason may be that the rural areas of the West are more "urban" than those of the Middle West and East. They are more recently settled. They became more dependent upon the automobile; people are little concerned about

TABLE LXXVII

1948 AND 1952 VOTE, IN CITIES, SUBURBS, AND RURAL AREAS, BY REGION

	% Voted for Truman	% Voted for Dewey	% Didn't vote in 1948	Total cases, 1948*	% Voted for Steven-son	% Voted for Eisen-hower	% Didn't vote in 1952	Total cases, 1952*
Urban-metropolitan								
NE	48	30	19	133	39	46	13	120
MW ...	56	19	23	99	40	34	24	97
S	9	5	82	22	12	12	76	17
W	42	26	28	81	36	44	19	36
Suburban-metropolitan								
NE	33	38	25	81	34	45	18	77
MW ...	21	61	14	28	24	72	3	29
S	..	..	100	1	..	..	100	1
W	19	40	37	62	23	40	37	30
Rural-metropolitan								
NE	..	83	17	6	..	100	..	6
MW ...	63	13	25	16	27	47	27	15
S	50	..	50	6	33	17	50	6
W	37	26	37	43	10	45	40	20
Cities over 50,000								
NE	42	36	16	50	48	45	7	44
MW ...	49	23	25	108	48	35	15	97
S	15	5	72	75	22	20	58	79
W	38	32	22	108	30	51	18	61
Cities of 2,500–50,000								
NE	42	25	26	100	35	43	21	99
MW ...	27	42	28	131	23	61	15	131
S	35	11	47	141	28	31	42	134
W	41	22	32	41	18	64	18	11
Cities under 2,500								
NE	26	41	31	39	22	50	28	32
MW ...	35	38	22	130	31	57	10	128
S	34	12	49	143	26	26	47	133
W	43	27	23	90	37	41	22	41
Open country								
NE	21	49	26	39	16	68	16	38
MW ...	37	33	26	105	27	53	19	104
S	31	4	59	121	24	17	55	116
W	52	33	14	21	27	45	27	11

* Miscellaneous replies were omitted from the table but were included in the calculation of percentages.

having to drive long distances to cities and towns. Rationalized farming practices are followed to a greater extent; farm life is subjected to more business considerations than elsewhere. Yet another and perhaps the most important reason may be the greater dependence of the Western farmer upon government action, resulting in a preference for the Democratic Party as the party of active government. One thinks here of the vast grazing areas and public parks of the West that have immediate economic relations with the farmers around them. There comes to mind too the great importance of irrigation and public and private power projects to the Western ranchers. All of these factors, singly and taken together, may explain in good part the distinction between the Western rural voter and his Eastern counterpart. It is possible that the differences shown in the figures might be even greater if the numerous recent immigrants from the Southern states, who are traditionally Democratic, were excluded from the calculation of the Western urban vote.

Apparently the party differences between the rural and urban West and the rural and urban East are among the few outstanding ones. Examination of the part the three major income groupings played in making up the party vote in Table LXXVIII shows a good deal of similarity in the regions of the country outside of the South. Both in 1948 and in 1952, the principal sources of the Democratic voting strength came from the middle income families having from $3,000 to $4,999 annual income in 1952. Those having incomes under $3,000 appear to have supplied only slightly greater proportions of the Democratic vote than of the Republican vote in both elections, presumably because many old and retired persons of low income have Republican sympathies. The Republicans received a considerably larger share of their votes from those with annual family incomes of $5,000 or more.

Table LXXVIII shows where a candidate's vote comes from but not whether his vote is large enough to win; it shows where his volume of strength lies. It would be interesting to learn how many politicians can estimate correctly the proportion of their vote that they receive from each income grouping. Perhaps, also, few experts would, for instance, guess that Truman in 1948 received about as large a proportion of his vote from the upper income as from the lower income groups. Or that Stevenson's quantity of support from upper income families nearly matched the quantity from lower income families, except in the South.

TABLE LXXVIII

THE SOURCE OF THE PARTY VOTE IN INCOME GROUPS, 1948 AND 1952, BY REGION

	Annual family income				
	% Lower: $0–2999	% Middle: $3000–4999	% Upper: $5000 or more	Total %	No. of cases
Respondent's reported 1948 vote					
Truman (Democratic)					
NE	30	42	28	100	169
MW	26	46	28	100	240
S	43	34	23	100	151
W	30	41	29	100	166
Dewey (Republican)					
NE	24	38	38	100	164
MW	27	33	40	100	244
S	43	24	33	100	42
W	25	33	42	100	131
1952 voting intentions					
Will probably vote Democratic					
NE	28	45	27	100	135
MW	27	47	26	100	214
S	46	37	17	100	144
W	32	38	30	100	138
Will probably vote Republican					
NE	28	34	38	100	178
MW	25	38	37	100	268
S	41	29	30	100	115
W	24	36	40	100	197

Table LXXIX compares the sources of party strength in each occupational category among the regions. It reveals that the Democratic vote in the Northeast was dependent to a large degree upon the support of the skilled and semiskilled workers. In the West it depended relatively more than in any other region upon the self-employed business class. It can be seen, furthermore, that the party vote was more evenly spread among the various occupational groups in the West than in the Northeast or the Middle West.

Table LXXX gives the preferences of the three general income groups for the 1952 candidates. Again there are few structural differences outside of the South. Among the income groups, the most notable fact is that the percent of the lower-income group that supported Stevenson in the West is greater than in either of the other regions outside of the South. Perhaps here is a place for a remark that might have been made almost as well earlier in the book: the accuracy of income as a predictor of voting be-

TABLE LXXIX

THE SOURCE OF THE 1952 VOTE IN OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, BY REGION*

	Will vote Democratic (Stevenson) Same, with qualifications				Will vote Republican (Eisenhower) Same, with qualifications			
	% NE	% MW	% S	% W	% NE	% MW	% S	% W
Professional and semi-professional	9	5	6	6	18	12	18	17
Self-employed businessmen	9	12	12	17	19	24	16	22
Clerical and sales	16	15	14	15	22	19	21	16
Skilled and semi-skilled	46	39	31	34	24	20	19	23
Unskilled service, farm laborers	17	17	19	21	9	6	8	6
Protective service, unemployed, students	3	3	3	5	2	4	3	8
Farm operators	..	9	15	2	6	15	15	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	99	138	98	85	124	176	74	115

* Retired persons and housewives are omitted.

TABLE LXXX

THE PREFERENCES OF INCOME GROUPS IN 1952, BY REGION

Income by region	Probable vote in 1952		Total %	No. of cases
	Stevenson	Eisenhower		
Under $2999				
NE	43	57	100	88
MW	46	54	100	125
S	58	42	100	113
W	49	51	100	92
$3000–4999				
NE	42	58	100	146
MW	48	52	100	210
S	62	38	100	86
W	42	58	100	124
$5000 or more				
NE	35	65	100	103
MW	36	64	100	155
S	42	58	100	60
W	34	66	100	119

havior increases disproportionately with the size of the income. That is, the chances in 1952 of forecasting a person's vote from his income would be rather poor if his family earned less than $5,000, but much improved if over $5,000. And at $10,000 or more, predictability becomes much easier; many fewer Democrats move at that level.

Table LXXXI brings out at least two differences among the occupational groups around the country. The preference for Eisenhower was stronger among the professional and semiprofessional groups and among the retired in the West than in either the Northeast or the Middle West. On the other hand, among skilled workers Stevenson received less support in the West than in the other two regions.

The people of the several regions of the country, as can be seen in Table LXXXII, seemed to progress uniformly in making up their minds for whom to vote. In the West and in the other regions of the country, from one-fifth to two-fifths of the voters "knew all along" how they would vote; another quarter or more had made up their minds by the time of the conventions; a somewhat smaller percentage decided after the conventions; a proportion (ranging from 5% of the Stevenson vote in the South to 10% of the Stevenson and Eisenhower vote in the Middle West) made up their minds within two weeks of the election; and finally, a small group decided on election day (from 1% of the Eisenhower supporters in the Midwest and Northeast to 5% of the Stevenson supporters in the Northeast). The West shows no significant deviation from the other regions in the chronology of vote decision. There was not a great boom for Stevenson in the West in the late stages of the campaign any more than there was in the other regions of the country. Nor was there any vast undecided group that made up its mind at the last moment. This contrasts remarkably with the case in 1948 where a study by the Survey Research Center showed that the undecided vote in the last couple of weeks of the Truman-Dewey election amounted to 40% or more of the total vote.

Certainly the West's psychology was not peculiar on the matter of the time of decision. But there are other psychological questions also worth considering. Perhaps Westerners are more interested in the different kinds of elections, have a different attitude toward government and civic obligations, or possess unusual notions of what American society is like.

Comparison of the West with the rest of the country in respect to political interest and activity begins with the ominous discovery in Table LXXII

TABLE LXXXI

THE PREFERENCES OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS IN THE 1952 ELECTION, BY REGION

	Probable vote in 1952			
	% Stevenson	% Eisenhower	Total %	No. of cases
Professional and semiprofessional				
NE	29	71	100	31
MW	27	73	100	26
S	32	68	100	19
W	20	80	100	25
Self-employed and businessmen				
NE	27	73	100	33
MW	30	70	100	54
S	50	50	100	24
W	36	64	100	39
Clerical and sales				
NE	37	63	100	43
MW	42	58	100	50
S	47	53	100	30
W	42	58	100	31
Skilled and semiskilled				
NE	60	40	100	75
MW	64	36	100	85
S	68	32	100	44
W	52	48	100	56
Unskilled and service				
NE	61	39	100	28
MW	77	23	100	33
S	75	25	100	24
W	72	28	100	25
Farm operators				
NE	..	100	100	7
MW	33	67	100	36
S	58	42	100	26
W	18	82	100	11
Retired				
NE	36	64	100	11
MW	37	63	100	30
S	69	31	100	13
W	22	78	100	18

that the proportion of Western voters was significantly lower than the proportion of Midwestern and Northeastern voters (see p. 158). About 23% of the Western sample failed to cast ballots in the 1952 elections, whereas only 16% of the Northeasterners and 15% of the Midwesterners failed to do so. The damage was done chiefly to the Democratic cause,

TABLE LXXXII

TIME OF VOTE DECISION, BY REGION*

Time of decision	For Stevenson					For Eisenhower				
	% NE	% MW	% S	% W	% Nation	% NE	% MW	% S	% W	% Nation
Knew all along ..	43	28	40	35	36	23	30	21	31	27
Preconvention decision	1	..	1	..	..	4	5	10	7	6
Decided at time of convention	21	28	26	27	26	37	34	36	32	35
Decided after convention	18	26	24	27	23	21	17	17	17	18
Decided within two weeks of election	6	10	5	6	7	9	10	9	9	9
Decided on election day	5	3	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	1
Not ascertained ..	6	5	..	2	4	4	2	5	2	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. of cases..	138	193	121	60	512	204	306	115	96	721

*** See Appendix A-II, Question 10.**

since the nonvoters who preferred Stevenson outnumbered those who preferred Eisenhower by fully two to one.

A study of the voting returns and of the potential and registered voters throws some doubt upon the comparison, however. Perhaps more Western Democrats than Republicans were disqualified by lack of residence, for it was noted in Table XXIV (p. 90) that a considerably higher percentage of registered electors than potential electors actually cast their ballots. Furthermore, California, which stood twenty-third in rank among the states in proportion of its *potential* vote cast, rose to fourteenth in proportion of *registered* vote cast. Oregon similarly rose from position number twenty-nine to position number nineteen. Colorado rose from seventeenth to first place. Washington dropped from nineteenth to twenty-fifth place. A high rate of transfer of residence or difficult registration requirements may explain some of these changes. The lack of party organization both to register people and to get out the vote might help to account for a lower poll in the West.

How do Westerners compare with others in their general attitudes toward voting? Questions were asked regarding the degree of voter

interest in the presidential election, in state elections, and in local elections.[1] The responses are depicted in summary form in Figure 8. The West's responses to the three questions in each instance fell into an intermediate category among the regions. The Midwest was most interested in elections at all levels. The Northeast was the region least interested in state and local elections. The South was the region least interested in presidential elections, reflecting its time-honored states'-rights outlook.



FIGURE 8

REGIONAL INTERESTS IN NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

Probably more interesting than the differences among the regions is the fact that almost a third of all voters possess little or no interest in who wins. Moreover, only about ten percent fewer people claim an interest in state and local elections than in national elections, contrary to the general belief that interest in state and local elections is much less than in national elections. How this finding can be reconciled with the great difference between participation in presidential and state level elections is hard to say. Perhaps the public is more open to persuasion in a national campaign and more vulnerable to the great publicity attendant upon it. This puzzle must be left without any satisfactory theory to explain it.

On other questions that probed the people's beliefs in the usefulness of voting, the Westerners' responses by and large stand in high correlation with the rest of the country. Fewer Westerners, however, than the inhabi-

[1] See Appendix A-I, Questions 18, 19.

tants of any other region agreed with the propositions that "So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not," "A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with," "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think," or, finally, "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win." The national average of agreement with these four statements, respectively, was 12%, 18%, 34%, and 11%. The Westerners also showed a stronger assurance and more ego in disagreeing with another statement: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." Seventy-five percent of them disagreed with the statement, in contrast with 68% in the Northeast, 69% in the Middle West, and 59% in the South.

Offsetting this appearance of confidence among Westerners were their responses to a question about the extent of freedom of opportunity in America. The question was: "Some people say there's not much opportunity in America today . . . that the average man doesn't have much chance to really get ahead. Others say there's plenty of opportunity and anyone who works hard can go as far as he wants. How do you feel about this?" Eighty-five percent of the national sample replied in a qualified or unqualified negative. The West, with an 82% affirmative and 9% negative response, was less impressed about the extent of opportunity than either of the two other regions outside the South. They both scored 88% affirmative, and the Northeast 6% and the Midwest 8% negative. Table LXXXIII shows that the skilled and unskilled workers, the farmers, and the housewives of the West seem to be definitely less optimistic about opportunities than the corresponding groups elsewhere in the North.

Horace Greeley's century-old advice to the young man to go West to find opportunity is no longer seconded unconditionally by Westerners; they are not as convinced of their opportunities as are the people of other regions. Of course, the belief may have very little to do with the actual state of opportunity in the West, relative to the other regions of the country. People who have many opportunities may simply have their appetites whetted and feel that they are not getting ahead fast enough.[2]

[2] For example, during World War II a comparative study of the satisfaction with promotional opportunities among Military Police units, where advancement was slow, and among Air Corps units, where promotion was rapid, found that the M.P.'s were more satisfied with the promotion system than the Air Corps men. See S. Stouffer *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, Princeton University Press, 1949, Vol. I, 252.

TABLE LXXXIII

REGIONAL BELIEFS IN OPPORTUNITY AND SOCIAL CLASS

	% of people in the occupation that said there is much or pretty much opportunity to get ahead in America				% of people in the occupation that said they belong to the middle class			
	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W
Professional and semi-professional	85	96	91	93	73	81	65	61
Self-employed and managers	97	90	87	93	49	54	42	49
Clerical and sales	92	88	95	95	42	49	35	50
Skilled and semiskilled	90	88	82	84	14	18	20	18
Unskilled and farm labor	90	93	70	74	18	..	6	11
Protective services	100	100	75	78	50	50	50	11
Unemployed	67	83	67	60	..	50	..	40
Farm operators	89	89	84	73	11	36	18	47
Retired	100	94	54	89	47	51	38	48
Housewives	86	87	76	76	42	46	30	42
Students	100	75	50	75	..	50	..	100

That this may be the case is supported by the indirect evidence presented in the second part of Table LXXXIII. People were asked to place themselves into one of four social classes—upper, middle, working, or lower. A negligible number called themselves upper class or lower class. About as many Westerners as residents of other northern regions regarded themselves as middle class and working class. So the somewhat lesser optimism of Westerners about the extent of opportunity in America is not reflected at all in a greater feeling among Westerners of belonging to the working class. Western workers, farmers, and housewives place themselves as commonly in the middle class as do their counterparts elsewhere in the North.[3]

If people have a low opinion of their ability to influence the government and of the usefulness of voting, they are less likely to participate in such political activities as voting. A separate series of computations was made

[3] Briefly, in respect to the matters here treated, the South was more apathetic and pessimistic and these tendencies hold even when the Southern white and colored population are examined separately. Although the South is shown in this and many other tables, it is not treated fully in the discussion, since an explanation of its differences from the West and North would go far afield.

by the Survey Research Center to check this point against the materials cited above. The facts conformed with the theory. Those who participated in politics, even to a modest extent, had stronger beliefs in the efficiency of voting and in the responsiveness of government.[4] The relationships held even among members of the same occupational groups, the same income groups, the same religious groups, the same age groups, and so on.

On several specific items of political activity on which information was gathered, the West differed somewhat from the Middle West and the Northeast. Table LXXXIV presents the comparisons. It is noted that

TABLE LXXXIV

POLITICAL ACTIVITY WITHIN THE AMERICAN REGIONS

The form of political activity	% of each regional group that participated in the activity			
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Tried to persuade others	30	25	24	34
Attended meetings, rallies, etc.	7	7	5	12
Gave money or other financial aid	5	5	2	9
Did other campaign work	4	3	2	5
Belonged to political club or organization	5	2	1	2
Number of cases	416	602	486	210

Westerners, more commonly than most, were active in persuading others how to vote, in giving financial support to the campaigns, in attending meetings and rallies, and in doing other kinds of political work. But only about one Westerner in fifty belonged to any political organization, half the proportion of Easterners, and the same as that of the Middle Westerners. These facts correspond well with the popular conception of Westerners as gregarious, generous, sociable, and active, but unorganized. It was noted earlier[5] that Westerners were slightly less interested in elections themselves, but slightly more reluctant to believe that elections and civic responsibility are futile. Perhaps diffuseness of energy and argumentativeness might be added to the foregoing list of traits that are a little more widespread in the West than in the Midwest or Northeast. If popular lore is right, it is either unbelievably subtle or only slightly right. It is not possible, of course, to

[4] See Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op cit.*, Appendix A.

[5] See pp. 172–73.

be certain in these matters. What it all adds up to, and this with assuredness, is that no temperamental differences of great consequence separate the Western population from the rest of the United States population.

Political issues are another matter. Positions that people take on issues are determined only partly by temperament, but more by attention, material interest, and party affiliation. One could hardly expect from temperamental differences alone to discover important differences in taking sides on issues. With the other factors added, however, important differences might emerge.

To see how the regions sided on issues in 1952, six of the issues previously discussed may be used as examples: the desire for a more active government, the Taft-Hartley Act, legislation against discrimination in employment, isolationism versus internationalism, what to do about the Korean War, and the responsibility for the advent of communism in China.

The West differed very little from the rest of the country in its beliefs about whether the government should do more or less in social and economic welfare legislation, as can be seen in Table LXXXV. It was, on the

TABLE LXXXV

REGIONAL URBAN-RURAL ATTITUDES ABOUT GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

	% Urban				% Rural				% Total			
	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W
Should do more	24	21	13	21	21	9	13	30	23	16	13	23
All right as is	44	41	51	41	48	52	53	37	44	45	52	40
Should do less	12	18	14	16	19	22	14	16	13	19	14	16
Varying changes needed	11	14	10	16	6	10	10	8	10	13	10	14
Don't know or no answer	9	6	12	6	6	7	10	9	10	7	11	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. of cases	370	382	245	335	78	235	264	111	448	617	509	446

whole, no more "socialistic" or "individualistic" than the other parts of the country. On the other hand, the rural West was more favorable to increased governmental activity than the rural areas of the rest of the country; the urban West was about the same as the urban areas of the rest of the country outside of the South.

Table LXXXVI shows that more of the Westerners had heard about the Taft-Hartley Act than had people elsewhere, and more of them favored changes in the Act that would benefit labor. About one-fifth of the West

TABLE LXXXVI

REGIONAL URBAN-RURAL ATTITUDES ABOUT THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

	% Urban				% Rural				% Total			
	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W
Should be repealed ..	15	19	15	16	8	11	8	16	14	16	11	16
Should be changed in labor's favor	29	31	26	31	31	23	23	33	29	28	25	31
Should be changed in management's favor	2	2	1	3	2	4	4	1	2	3	2	3
Should not be changed	17	17	14	16	26	21	13	27	18	18	13	19
Don't know or no answer	37	31	44	34	33	41	52	23	37	35	49	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. of cases	276	301	145	272	49	167	146	86	325	468	291	358

and of the North had not heard of the Act, and of those who had, about a third had no idea whether it ought to be changed or what changes should be made. Most of the people who had some opinion about what should be done, however, wanted the Act changed in favor of labor. On this issue, as with most others, nothing beyond a general expression by the electorate of favorableness or unfavorableness was possible. The public does not "solve" specific problems.

Table LXXXVII compares the stands taken by the people of the regions on the question of whether the government should act against racial discrimination in employment. Interest in legislation and governmental action against racial discrimination in employment was a little lower in the West than in the Middle West and Northeast. This finding is contrary to the expectations of many who look upon the West as strikingly free of prejudice against Negroes. Although the whole nation, not excepting the West, was liberal on this issue, there was widespread disagreement about the method of accomplishing the goal. The most striking fact derived from the table does not concern the West at all, but rather the South, where the stance of

public opinion on this question was only slightly different than in the other three regions of the United States.

TABLE LXXXVII

REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARD DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

	% Northeast	% Midwest	% South	% West
Nat'l government should pass laws	30	22	17	24
State government should pass laws	30	31	30	26
Government interest but no laws .	13	14	15	16
Government should stay out	17	20	22	20
Restrictive legislation	5	6	6	5
Don't know or no answer	5	7	10	9
Total	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	448	618	509	446

The questions on international affairs likewise resulted in few regional differences. Isolationism struck the Democrats a blow throughout the country in 1952, as indeed it did in the West. Table LXXXVIII shows that

TABLE LXXXVIII

REGIONAL URBAN-RURAL ATTITUDES TO FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS

The government has gone too far in international affairs	% Urban				% Rural				% Total			
	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W	NE	MW	S	W
Agree	54	55	49	49	59	67	55	69	55	60	52	54
Both agree and disagree	2	3	4	3	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	2
Disagree	35	37	31	37	31	25	24	19	34	33	27	33
Don't know, no answer	9	5	16	11	8	6	20	10	9	5	18	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. of cases	370	382	245	335	78	235	264	111	448	617	509	446

an easy majority of the total electorate of the country agreed that the United States had gone too far in interesting itself in world affairs. Only about a third of the population disagreed with the statement. Here the rural West, departing from its Democratic and "welfare state" leanings in domestic affairs, was more isolationist than the rest of rural America. The urban

West, on the other hand, was somewhat more internationalist than the rest of urban America.

In confirmation of its isolationist leanings, or perhaps in partial explanation of it, the West was more extreme in its proposals for settling the Korean War. Table LXXXIX shows that fewer Westerners than other

TABLE LXXXIX

PREFERRED POLICY IN KOREA, BY REGION

What is best to do now in Korea?	% Northeast	% Midwest	% South	% West
Pull out entirely	8	10	8	11
Try for peace settlement	48	44	47	32
Stronger stand; bomb China	36	40	34	45
Either pull out or try for peace settlement	..	2	1	2
Don't know or no answer	8	4	10	10
Total	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	448	618	509	446

Americans wanted to keep up the discussions at Panmunjom for a peaceful settlement, and that more wanted to pull out entirely or to take a stronger position. Furthermore, Table XC shows that more Westerners felt that it

TABLE XC

REGIONAL ATTITUDES TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHINA'S GOING COMMUNIST

Was it our government's fault that China went Communist, or not?	% Northeast	% Midwest	% South	% West
Yes	27	26	17	33
No	48	51	47	44
Don't know or no answer	25	23	36	23
Total	100	100	100	100
Number of cases	448	618	509	446

was the fault of the American government that China went Communist. The beliefs of most experts that the West was more attentive to the Orient and more resentful of American policies there is borne out by the survey.

Whether this viewpoint is "natural" because the West faces the Orient or whether it is stimulated by the opinion leadership of the Western press and of the Western political leaders like Senator Knowland of California cannot be determined from this evidence. Certainly, much of this attention is "natural" and has always existed; the actual direction of the opinion is probably only slightly induced by the press and politicians, since the same leadership affects other regions of the country as well.

If, in conclusion, someone asked whether the Western public, on these issues, in its temperament, and in its voting behavior, was like the rest of America, one could only repeat what was said at the beginning of this chapter: the West is in a great many ways very close to the rest of the nation; there are a few notable differences, but whether or not these differences are important in absolute terms is impossible to say.

Certainly a party may make some appeals in an election campaign that are more effective elsewhere than in the West, and vice versa. Some of the differences shown in the chapter would call for special slants in a campaign. Certainly, too, there are some differences in the way of life that would call for different modes of address when speaking to the West; an "orchard" is a "ranch," a New England "pond" is a "lake," and so on. The proportions of Westerners in the various occupations, such as professional workers, unskilled labor, etc., vary from those of the rest of America, and, although the members of these groups in the West react very much the same as their counterparts elsewhere, these differences in proportions require differences in emphasis during campaigning and in the appeals that are aimed at a whole region. Most of the presumed differences between the West and the Midwest and the Northeast are in this sense quantitative rather than qualitative.

Another group of supposed differences, such as the freedom from party ties of the Western public, the high level of interest of Westerners in politics, the existence of very special issues in the West, or the localistic feelings of the West, are deceitful exaggerations of fact. None of the American regional publics, not even the Southern public, is politically unique; they are much alike. If one region were to be singled out as "typically American," the Western public would be as promising a contender for the title as any other. The Western public, all things considered, is as close to the central model of the United States as can be found.

Chapter XIV

TRENDS OF WESTERN OPINION

As THE PICTURE of the Western public has attained fullness and clarity, its peculiarities and its sharing of the attributes of other publics have become evident. Appreciation of the picture brings a realization that Western opinion is both unique and universal. Much of what has been learned about the Western public confirms what has been generally known about public opinion everywhere.

The public, on the whole, is relatively passive. Most people pay little attention to politics, even in the heat of a political campaign. The press, radio, and active politicians and citizens create a great impression of public excitement, but this is found to be exaggerated when one goes among all classes of people and inquires of their thoughts and behavior. Public discourse tends to be stereotyped. There is little originality springing from individuals regarding political questions or political personalities. The sources of information and thinking are few. From talking with people and hearing them talk one learns less of what is novel and clever, than of how it is possible to sway their opinions. The level of popular information on what are usually termed "issues" is, by almost any standards, low.

When there is a fairly inert public and a rather feeble flow of information to the public, tradition is strong. A large number of people follow their political habits without deciding anew the value of their affiliations and without seriously considering an alternative. The path of least resistance is to vote for the same party as in the preceding election; the result is a pattern of voting behavior that frequently goes back without deviation for at least a generation. A voter is most likely to adopt a different political party when he first votes and at that time considers whether he should be different from his parents. But he usually decides to continue his parents' affiliation.

Personalities or candidates may be important when they are very striking, but that is almost saying that personality ordinarily plays a minor role in the determination of the vote. Most striking characters tend to be sidetracked from politics. Those that survive, like Eisenhower, do make a

strong impression on a large number of voters. It is common to hear people talk about politicians being publicity-mad or eccentric or otherwise abnormal, but in politics, as in other professions, a man can be eccentric in a conventional way. Probably such a person does not engage the attention of those voters who are otherwise bored. Having a candidate with an unusual and favorable personality is to a political party like a gold strike to a nation—highly profitable, but quite rare.

Issues are similar to personalities in their histories and effects. A good issue is also a gold strike to a party. It is rather rare and quite effective. Its origins are somewhat mysterious; but apparently a combination of general sentiments in the environment (for example, antiforeignism or isolationism) with striking events of a negative or positive sort (for example, the Korean War) produces an influential issue. Such an issue brings votes to one group of candidates and hurts another group badly.

In election years the media of communication are saturated with material about the campaign and a considerable part of the public pays some attention to the press, radio, television, and movies. But the public does not read campaign material avidly and regularly; a very small part of the public does that. In fact, only a very small part of the public engages in political activity, no matter how it may be defined. Most people do not try to persuade others to their views even in the middle of an exciting campaign. Very few people perform such necessary political tasks as contributing money, attending rallies or meetings, working as canvassers, or belonging to a political club.

These traits of the public are universal to free election systems, as well as characteristic of the American Western public. Hence, whatever diagnosis is made of the public ills of free democracy would apply to the Western public; and whatever correctives may be proposed for the problems of the Western public may simultaneously be correctives for the free world. The public process is largely the same the world over. There are the apathetic, the few active citizens, the ragged character of public information, the persistence of tradition, and the sometimes meteoric but more often negligible effect of personalities and issues.

As the basic conditions of the public are common to the West and other free publics, the tactics of politics will be similar. The lessons learned elsewhere are to be found in the study of the Western public in 1952. The big lesson of political tactics, one which can never be well enough explained to

political amateurs, and, indeed, to a great many professionals, is that the contest for power is perhaps three-quarters settled before the encounter of an election comes about. The traditional affiliations, economic conditions, general issues, the average of personalities on both sides—such assured general features account for most of the strength of both sides. Sometimes these basic conditions may differ from one election to another, but they tend toward constancy.

But beyond the durable resources of the parties and the short term conditions of economic life and ponderous international events comes the multitude of minor, often trivial, events that create the margin of victory. The difference between defeat and victory, whenever there is the possibility of one or the other (and no one dares to estimate what proportion of all free elections admit the possibility of defeat or victory), depends upon the algebraic total of many negative and positive happenings and actions on each side. Politics, in so far as it can be a rational process in a free election, is the playing to maximum efficiency of these many marginal causes. Public opinion surveys, analyses of election returns, or the general commentaries of authorities and statesmen on what wins elections cannot by their nature observe, count, or watch closely the changing of the many little things that make for the margin of victory.

If it is discovered in a poll, as it was discovered in 1952, that the issue of Nixon's sources of financial support caused a bare flicker of the needle of popular emotion, then this was a big issue of the campaign. So weighty and immobile are the general conditions under which the campaign is fought that a few hundred changed votes constitute a major change in the determination of the campaign's results. This is the same lesson that intelligent army commanders drill into their troops. Every skirmish is a critical one because there are so few things that a man may do to change the general circumstances of war. If the number of active canvassers increases over the nation by a fraction of one percent, the result, in so far as any party or group can bring about victory, is tremendous. If it can be shown that, of the millions of words that are cast out in favor of the candidates by the newspapers, some few thousands have effectively induced a few hundred people to change their minds or to act otherwise than they would have acted without the words, then this should be registered as a triumph of propaganda. To take another example, although it may be truly said that only one out of a hundred people was concerned about conservation

policies in the West in 1952, the figure remains a most important one for the political campaign managers. Add the presence of these few thousand minds to the mosaic of public opinion which is composed of numerous pieces that are no larger, and the total victory is seen to depend upon the careful management of small publics.

It is not contradictory to say on the one hand that the great mass of people is quite uninterested in all but the most diffuse, general, and unassailable positions on issues, and on the other hand to say that issues should be played for all they are worth in a campaign. To abandon a political campaign because of a superficial knowledge of the first condition means giving up the notion of controlling the course of history forever; it would be like abandoning the tiller of a ship to the elements. That is why there is so much truth and persistence to the analogy of political statesmanship as charting and piloting the ship of state over stormy waters. That is why, too, all famous political organizations have treated every individual vote as pure gold, often to the surprise of the voter, who considers it as certainly a base or cheap metal, or to the outsider who cannot understand the obsessive preoccupation of the political machine with a single vote.

The Western public, therefore, is far more like all free publics, especially the Northern and Eastern American regions, than it is different from them. Some special accents that distinguish the Western public have been assessed in this study. The West is a strongly urban society in a highly rural setting, which results in a number of political consequences. The rural areas are more liberal than elsewhere. The West as a whole seems to be friendly toward the ideas of the positive or "welfare" state. The disorganized condition of politics in the West, using the traditional Eastern forms of political organization as the criteria of what constitutes organization, causes a good deal of independent voting for particular candidates.

In fact, the chief distinctions between the West and the rest of the country are distinctions in the condition of the parties rather than differences in the publics and their attitudes, outlook, and behavior. The West tends basically to be Democratic not only in its ideological affiliations but in its party affiliations. The Republican Party can win, and often easily, but it does not win with the same prerogatives, mandates, or privileges with which it wins in the East or Midwest. It wins as a recess from the Democratic Party or as a change of horses of the same gait or speed.

Republicans have greater chances for victory in the West than the basic constituency of the public admits because the Western public is politically

unorganized. Since the parties do not have generally effective party organizations, Republicans gain a strong initial advantage from their "natural" organization. By natural organization, it is meant that the Republicans number among their supporters by far the greater proportion of the business and professional groups who, without changing their way of life, engage in politics as a matter of course. There is no gentry in America, much less in the West, but the Republicans have a great many individual supporters who belong to real estate organizations, publishers' associations, insurance groups, Rotary, Kiwanis, and other fraternal organizations that function continually, and that, without breaking step with their routine operation, can convert themselves into political organizations. The transformation is often not a conscious one. Indeed it may not even be a transformation at all. But society is like a giant spider web of communication and contacts, and Republicans tend to be stationed at the centers of contacts and communications with the society at large. As spare-time politicians, such contact-controllers and opinion leaders can easily bring to bear upon the political process their strong influences and political leadership. In brief, the normal social structure provides an informal Republican Party organization.

The Democrats in America and in the West have discovered and employed only two means for combating the Republicans' natural organization. One has been the bureaucracy of the local, state, and federal governments. But this has been foreclosed to politics by many laws against patronage and on behalf of merit systems and permanent tenure of nonelected officeholders. The second opportunity for natural organization has been afforded the Democrats through labor unions. But labor unions can only encompass a limited part of the public and they cause considerable antagonism among the balance of the public.

The third possibility is an organization founded upon disinterested spare-time politicians. It has always been a favorite doctrine among democratic theorists and even among the public, but it has never been shown to have succeeded elsewhere. The conclusions about political activity in the West would not lead one to feel confident about the possibilities of the public there being organized by disinterested individuals. Again, the great possibilities of power inherent in maximum individual participation within a party should be emphasized, but such participation should not be looked upon as providing a political organization capable of disciplined work over a period of time.

Two possible subcategories of nonprofessional organization, neither one to be found now in the West, should also be considered. One kind develops as a personal organization out of the lifetime political career of a single man. Such was the Bull Moose and Independent movement of Hiram Johnson of California. The organization of Johnson's party was furnished its reason for existence by the personality of the leader. Another possibility is an organization founded upon a strong ideological base. Extreme nationalism, socialism or some other "ism," or some overwhelming long-term issue (such as free silver, abolition, or prohibition) that could collect together and commit to hard labor a sizable fraction of the electorate, would bring about this possibility. At present neither ideas nor personalities can be taken seriously as a way of shaping a political organization in the West.

If either type of movement were to arise it is most likely that it would be national rather than regional, and that the West would find itself, as it does regularly, at one with the nation. In normal situations, as was 1952, the West is strongly national and pays attention to and reflects national currents. There were exceptions to be found in studying public opinion in the West in 1952. There was a fairly high degree of immunity to appeals to return to rugged individualism and to reject the "welfare state." The rural areas of the West were found to be unusually characterized by these resistances. The West showed itself rather strongly isolationist, owing apparently to a dislike, more intense than Midwesterners or Easterners felt, of government policy on the Far East. But these are trends that characterized the nation as a whole and were found to exist only in a "more so" manner in the West, rather than as a qualitative difference.

The West participates in all respects in the national divisions. It has in all previous national movements. In 1849, when forty-eight men wrote California's first constitution, they adopted sixty-six sections of the Iowa Constitution, nineteen sections of the New York Constitution, and a number of other clauses from the constitutions of other states and the federal government, adding, however, some of their own devising. These earliest events that symbolized the West's extroversion find their parallels in everyday political action and thought a century later. The national politics of the future involve the West as a leading element and the Western public in a crucial role. New political formations, though they may not originate in the West alone, will find in the West an environment congenial to their political development and organization.

Chapter XV

EXPECTATIONS: 1954 AND 1956

JUST BEFORE THANKSGIVING, 1952, the California Poll asked people what they were thankful for. Quite a few people replied, "the Republican victory." This book has been trying to explain why those people felt thankful and why quite a few others would rather think of other things for which to be thankful. The last chapter may now say something about who will feel thankful after the general elections of 1954 and 1956, or, more broadly, in the several years to come.

Even a thorough knowledge of the public and the laws by which its opinions operate does not permit automatic prediction. An engineer might know all the laws about the capacity of wood and brick to withstand stresses, but he would not make a prediction about the ability of a certain house to stand an earthquake unless he had the chance of examining the house directly and painstakingly. Nor would a physician, fully possessed of the principles of physiology and of the methods of diagnosis and treatment, describe and prescribe for a case unless he might adequately examine the patient.

The best way to predict a particular election is to poll people before they enter the voting booths; the next best method is to poll a random sample of the same people. Every successive departure from that procedure in time, space, and sampling begets a greater risk of error. The materials and evidence of this study obviously supply only a fraction of the facts necessary to make pin-pointed election predictions. They are better suited to the painting of general trends of Western opinion. General trends of opinion—the foundations of public thought—can persist and, even though contradicted by a collection of opposing forces on a given day, determine what, in the main, will be done over a period of time by whomever may be elected.

Since the analysis to come is not built upon a specific diagnosis, structured so as to maximize the predictive possibilities of the data, it should not be regarded as an absolute prognosis. Rather, it is an analysis of those factors that must be seriously regarded in conjecturing how the public will

behave and what the two political parties will accomplish in the forthcoming elections.

One of the first considerations to be taken up in estimating the chances of the parties in 1954 and beyond is what the Republicans have done to cement their fairly unstable and temporary hold on the Western public. The answer seems to be that relatively little has been done. Perhaps it should be said that relatively little could be done. For the Republicans, like the Democrats, cannot turn people out of office wholesale when they take power.

Reports from various quarters indicate that a modest increase of Republican activity in the grass roots organization of volunteers has been occurring and that this will enhance Republican chances. However, outweighing Republican efforts at organizing the grass roots, the Democratic Council movement in California has invested several thousands of persons with the character of an organization. Nothing like this kind of a movement has been seen in California, or over most of the West, for a generation and many thousands of additional Democratic votes may be expected from it.

Second, one should consider what the effects of business conditions may be upon the congressional races. Generally, a decline in business prosperity helps the party out of power to gain strength. There is every reason to believe that the same rule would apply in the West in 1954. But will there be a recession in November 1954, or is there one actually in September 1954? As this is being written, astute economists and experienced managers and politicians are heatedly debating the question of whether a recession, an inventory clearance, or even a depression is occurring. In June 1954, national industrial production had fallen off ten percent from the year before. The fact of a rise in unemployment was also indisputable. Indications are that unemployment will remain at a somewhat higher level than in the last half dozen years.

An increase in unemployment of one or two percent in the West means poorer living conditions for about twice that proportion of the Western electorate. There will be at least as many who are working part time or are threatened by the fear of unemployment. Most of the newly unemployed will be people who have voted Democratic in 1952 and before. But a fair number of them will have been previous nonvoters now more agitated to cast a vote, or special Eisenhower voters, or voters opposed to the Truman

foreign policies. All of these can be counted upon to reconsider their temporary deviation from the ranks of the Democratic Party.

Without an expensive survey, the precise extent to which the Democrats would benefit by the increase in unemployment under a Republican administration is difficult to estimate. We can guess roughly that for every one percent of unemployment increase over the level of 1952 there would be subtracted from the Republican vote 1% of its vote in 1952 (allowing .25% for the unemployed shift, .25% for the family shift, and .50% similarly for those made anxious by part-time work or threatened layoffs). This 1%, plus a fraction of 1% for the agitated nonvoters who would vote, may be added to the Democratic vote. The concentration of such votes, of course, will follow the areas of concentration of unemployment and will not hit all congressional or legislative districts equally. Many congressional districts that were won by slender margins in 1952 are, however, urban in character. National unemployment figures, too, are not very useful because the unemployment situation is regarded as critical already in certain eastern states but not in most of the West.

Many Republicans believe that unemployment may be reduced quickly whenever the moment for the application of government measures arrives. The danger to the Republicans, however, lurks in the time lag between the application of the measures and their effects. It takes time for the suggested palliatives or remedial measures to take effect and, since the Republicans did not act in the state legislatures or in Washington before the summer recess, any measures taken in the fall will be rather late to be reflected in public opinion by the November elections. The "recession issue" may therefore hurt the Republicans in November. The Western public gives every indication of being particularly sensitive to inactivity by the government and may react strongly.

Many Republican politicians hope that the effects of recession "talk" may be counterbalanced by the issue of communism. The insistence of Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin that communism would be an issue in 1954, the dogged assertions of President Eisenhower that it would not be an issue, and the rather divided and wavering opinions of the Republican politicians on the question deserve a careful evaluation. It was shown earlier in this book that the demagogic potentialities of the Communist issue form one of the Republicans' chief entrees to popular support. But it was also pointed out that communism was effective as an issue in 1952

in considerable part because of the existence of the Korean War. In 1954 the Korean War is at least temporarily terminated. (If it were to resume, of course, it would hurt the Republicans.) It is unlikely that communism as an issue would agitate enough people to make it decisive in the congressional or state elections of 1954. Almost without doubt, it is a far weaker issue and brings in far fewer votes than the "recession talk."

Furthermore, foreign developments must cause the Republicans grave concern as party politicians, as well as anxiety as Americans. In mid-1954 the United States was on the brink of intervention in the Indochinese War. This would, however, have been as unpopular with the Western public as was the Korean War, and this time the issue of domestic communism could not have been linked, without a great stretching of an ordinary man's imagination, with intervention in the war. The Eisenhower Administration would have had to move by subtle degrees into such intervention in order not to ignite a sudden display of popular fireworks. In fact it began such an intervention, and not at all subtly, but then suddenly withdrew the plan. By thus conceding victory in Indochina to the Communists, it began, however, to accumulate the same kind of "appeasement" record that previously had bedeviled the Democrats on Far Eastern policy. Probably a kind of short-term dividend to the Republican Party was being paid by Senator Joseph McCarthy, who kept public attention focused upon allegations of domestic communism at a time when the administration might have been viewed with great hostility by some part of the public for its difficult and devious maneuvers in Indochina.

This dividend from Senator McCarthy, on the other hand, was earned at considerable cost to the happy relations of the Republican Party with the people. No one has yet declared that the Republican vote in November will be enlarged by the struggles between the executive branch of government, especially the Army leaders, and the McCarthy supporters. President Eisenhower's tactics of resisting provocation have been superb, confirming the opinion of those who have known him and watched him in action over many years that his outstanding ability is the avoiding of destructive conflict. But here, as often in political struggle, superb tactics might fail ultimately to be effective. The battle was forced by the circumstances and the party could not have been impregnably protected, any more than could England, from 1937 to 1939, successfully employ the policy of resistance

to provocation with respect to the Nazis, knowing that war would cause her extreme distress whether she emerged victorious or not.

The absence of foreign events that would benefit the Republicans at the polls is duplicated on the domestic scene. Besides the business "recession," questions of conservation, power development, and farm price supports will cause some distress to the Republicans. The grain areas of the Northwest are likely to be unhappy about the effects of two years of Republicanism. Certain Western export crops, principally of the orchard type, have suffered from a dropping off in foreign demand, partly as a result of the prohibitive import practices of the United States with which the Republican Party especially has been identified. The dairy farmers will not view calmly the decline of butter supports. Nor have the conservation and power policies of the Republican Administration been of a type to engender enthusiasm among the largest number of affected voters. After its initial pronouncements aroused the ire of co-operatives and public power devotees, the Department of the Interior has moved slowly but it has not earned itself many new friends.

Much of the Department of the Interior's change of policy has been quietly introduced through administrative channels. Unfortunately, this tactic, although it may be effective in other spheres, is not so effective in an area where interest groups abound. For the interest groups have special staffs carefully watching administrative as well as legislative activity. Since the issues are not ordinarily those that excite any large fraction of the public, the awareness of the changes in policy spreads via the interest group channels of communication about as effectively as it would if it were announced publicly through the full media of mass communication.

Besides these several elements that would work against the Republicans in 1954, there is the very considerable factor of the absence of Eisenhower's name from the ballots. The presidential "coattail effect" of 1952 will be absent in 1954. If everything else remained the same except this one factor, the Republicans would have an even chance of holding a majority of the seats in both houses, for they would lose by its disappearance the margin of their national plurality in the House vote and in several senatorial elections. A corresponding decline in the Republican vote for state officers in the Western states would also be witnessed.

Finally, a constitutional change in the election system in California de-

serves attention, especially since California's representation of thirty seats in the House of Representatives is second largest in the nation. A proposition providing that the system of cross-filing in California primary elections be eliminated was defeated in a referendum in 1952. However, the voters passed a "weaker" proposition which requires that the party designation of every candidate in the primary election be inserted opposite his name on whatever party ballots it may appear. The Republicans generally have benefited more than the Democrats from the system of cross-filing in California. Republican candidates have often amassed not only a plurality in their own party column, but also a plurality over the Democratic candidates on the Democratic ballot. They have accomplished this feat more frequently than the Democrats have accomplished the opposite.

In June 1954 the Republican candidates filing on the Democratic ballot had to carry their Republican designation onto the ballot with them and they encountered a fair number of Democratic voters who rejected them offhand in favor of the labeled Democratic candidates. Some Republicans who might have won both nominations had to be content with winning only one, and had the novel experience of facing Democratic opposition in November. Only two candidates, both Democratic, won the nomination of both parties; the corresponding number in 1952 was fourteen. Add to the factor of the party label the factor of the system of informal nominations of Democratic candidates engaged in by the newly organized California Democratic Council, and the day of Republican candidates triumphing in the Democratic primary seems almost ended. There is some possibility indeed that cross-filing will not be an issue for very long in California; the party label may be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

There have not been enough "off year" elections in the West between 1952 and 1954 to determine whether the political and social conditions as described above have indeed been affecting the vote. The most significant election of 1953 in the West occurred in the 24th Congressional District in the Los Angeles area. There a special election was held on November 10 to fill the unexpired term of Norris Poulson (R), who had resigned from the House to become mayor of Los Angeles. Most of the elections conducted in cities and states at the same time as that of the 24th District went against Republicans and showed a modest general decline in Republican strength. The 24th District election was regarded widely as an exception to the trend and a demonstration that Republican strength had not declined.

A closer look at the 24th District election shows that it represented a loss of popular support for the Republicans, though not a great one. The district is in territory ordinarily comfortably Republican. Mr. Poulson had won both party nominations in the primary in 1952. Glenard Lipscomb, official Republican candidate for Congress, had an impressive record as state assemblyman and possessed a large number of personal friends in the area. The official return of the district showed that Lipscomb and a second Republican candidate together achieved 56% of the vote, and George Arnold and Irving Markheim, the two Democratic candidates, 44% of the vote. The contrasting figures in 1952 were Eisenhower, 59% of the vote, and Stevenson, 39% of the vote. Thus the Republican vote declined by three percentage points, even with a strong candidate. These events happened immediately after the blazoning of the Harry Dexter White case allegations against the Truman Administration by Attorney General Brownell, and before there was any talk of recession.

A student at Stanford University, Richard H. Pauley, made a rough but tolerably random sample of the district the weekend before the election, choosing one hundred cases. He predicted the official voting results within two percentage points, with a Democratic bias on the two points. He also asked people, "Do you feel more or less friendly to the Republicans since they won the election in 1952? Or the same?" Ten persons said they were more friendly to the Republicans, 50 liked them as well as before, and 35 felt less friendly to the Republicans. Of those who had voted for Eisenhower, 10 were more friendly, 50 less friendly, and 36 as friendly as before. No Democrat of 1952 said he was more friendly, 20 said they were less friendly, and 14 were unchanged. Those among the registered Democrats who had voted for Eisenhower in 1952, who now said they were less friendly, and who intended to vote for the Democratic candidate in the 1953 district election, came principally from the skilled workers and the clerical group. They displayed an even division between Protestants and Catholics, which in a predominantly non-Catholic district meant that there had been a disproportionate Catholic switch. Their average education consisted of completion of high school or more. One out of three of them was a union member. The group appeared very much like one of the major traditional sources of support for the Democratic Party. Apparently the Democratic switchers were moving back to the Democratic Party. Yet the 24th District is a relatively well-to-do district and has been

usually Republican. If the 24th District election had been held in a marginal district, there is little doubt that the Democrats would have won.

This brings up the direct question of the possibility of Democratic victory in November 1954. For it is in the marginal districts that the progress of the two parties has to be watched. Without Eisenhower at the head of its ticket, with some internal disturbances, with issues going generally against it, the Republican Party stands to lose at least five percentage points of its congressional and state office vote in the West. The loss of this 5% will cost the Republican Party its first line of defense in House seats and will bring the Democratic Party to the point where most of the Republican seats are safely concentrated. In 1952, 39 Republicans won House elections by pluralities of 5% or less. Ten of these seats are in the West, half of them in urban districts. Since the Republicans at this moment hold the very slender majority of 4 seats,[1] the Democrats need only win 3 Republican seats to take control of the House of Representatives. The Senate wavers along a similarly slender margin, and the eight governorships at stake in November are all held by Republicans, three of them—New Mexico, Nevada, and Colorado—unenviably vulnerable to the Democrats. Given the considerations advanced above regarding the "coattail effect," economic conditions, and other difficulties faced by the Republicans, their future control of Congress after the autumn elections appears bleak.

To win, the Republicans must receive certain "breaks" and achieve several tactical objectives. The "recession" must diminish by an actual stabilization of productivity and employment and by late executive attention to economic crisis areas. The "recession talk" must decline, which is to say that the Republicans would have to win the propaganda battle over so-called "depression psychology."

Foreign events must also "break their way," at least in the short run. That is, if the abatement of the Indochinese conflict should continue, it would, even if only temporarily, produce an atmosphere of successful peace-making. Confidence in the strength of the Western alliance should be bolstered; this would be achieved most readily by the bringing into being of the European Defense Community, which in turn would also partially redress the dissatisfaction with the settlement in Indochina. But time has run out on this problem so far as the 1954 elections are con-

[1] The House has 219 Republicans, 215 Democrats, and 1 Independent.

cerned. Third, a united "Eisenhower front" should be established, strengthening the impression that all Republican candidates are necessary elements of "the Eisenhower team." Creating the "front" would require subduing the conflict over Senator McCarthy within the Republican ranks, and, at best, enlisting the Senator from Wisconsin in the united front for the duration of the campaign. Although the Senator would probably hurt the Republican cause by campaigning on his own terms, he would possibly help it in many places by beating the drum on the Eisenhower bandwagon. Finally, the Republicans would have to spend in 1954, at a time when they are harder to obtain, sums approaching the totals spent in 1952, when campaign money was not as badly needed. All of these occurrences and measures would benefit the Republicans with the Western public as well as with the American public as a whole.

Whether the Republicans or the Democrats win in 1954, peace will not descend upon the political arena. A Democratic Congress with slight majorities in both houses would probably behave in an undisciplined manner, very much like the present Republican Congress. It would contribute little to the probability of a Democratic victory in the presidential election in 1956. A substantial Democratic victory, however, would probably introduce two years of strong congressional leadership in the national government—with important legislation on labor, income taxes, public power, tariffs, and public spending that might be the prelude to a Democratic victory in 1956.

In either event, the Eisenhower Administration will be in difficult straits. A closely divided Congress, whether in Democratic or Republican hands, prevents an administration from presenting a clear and consistent image of itself to the nation. A strongly Democratic Congress would tend to make the President appear either weak or obstructionist, unless he should desire to appear as a bipartisan or a Democrat. Furthermore, in his own Republican Party, the President would face some blame for defeat on grounds that his leadership was ineffective. The opposition within his party would become restless and obstreperous.

If the Republicans should retain control of Congress from 1954 to 1956, the basic grounds of disagreement within the party over foreign policy and domestic problems would remain. Foreign problems would probably be more dangerous to party unity. Soviet victories in the world cannot continue unabated without setting up strong reactions in the United States.

The iso-imperialists of the Republican Party (by whom is meant those who at one moment wish to pull away from the world and, at the next, to intervene forcibly in world affairs) have potential leaders in Senators McCarthy and Knowland and in General MacArthur and others. A number of Democratic liberals who fear Communist imperialism are likely also to be antagonized by a "soft" or "vacillating" foreign policy. Senators Hubert Humphrey and Paul Douglas are examples of such leaders. What may appear now, even at this late moment, to be a strange alliance may result logically from the fact that America is moving into the strangest era of foreign relations in her history.

A Republican victory would also confirm the leadership of Governor Thomas Dewey, Sherman Adams, Herbert Brownell, John Foster Dulles, and other middle-of-the-road Republicans to whom President Eisenhower is normally sympathetic. The increased hold of this element on the party leadership will, in turn, augment the dissatisfaction of the iso-imperialists in foreign and domestic affairs. One cannot discount, however, in the foreseeable future, the personal popularity of President Eisenhower. His opponents in Washington assert begrudgingly of him that "everyone is disappointed with Eisenhower, except the people." He is easily the most formidable presidential candidate in the 1956 picture. It is difficult to see how, without climactic events on the national and international scene, any coalition of forces within or between the two party leaderships or followings can manage the drive to succeed him in office against his will.

APPENDIX A-I

Pre-Election Study Questionnaire*

I'm mainly interested in talking to you about the election this fall and how you feel about it.

1. Who do you think will be elected President in November?

   a) (If R† makes choice) Do you think it will be a close race or will (answer to 1) win by quite a bit?

2. How about here in (your state)? Will the vote for President be pretty evenly split or not?

   a) (If necessary) Who do you think will win for President here in (your state)?

3. Do you think there are any important differences between what the Democratic and Republican parties stand for, or do you think they are about the same?

4. I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two parties. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic Party? (What is that?)

5. Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic Party? (What is that?)

6. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Republican Party? (What is that?)

7. Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Republican Party? (What is that?)

8. Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country whether the Democrats or the Republicans win the elections this November, or that it won't make much difference which side wins?

   a) (If yes) Why is that?
   b) (If no) Why do you feel it won't make much difference?

9. Do you think it will make any difference in how you and your family get along financially whether the Democrats or Republicans win?

   a) (It makes a difference, and not answered in 9) Well, do you think you'll be better off or worse off financially if the Republicans win the election?

* Administered in October 1952.
† Respondent.

10. Now I'd like to ask you about the good and bad points of the two candidates for President. Is there anything in particular about Stevenson that might make you want to vote for him? (What is it?)

11. Is there anything in particular about Stevenson that might make you want to vote against him? (What is it?)

12. Is there anything in particular about Eisenhower that might make you want to vote for him? (What is it?)

13. Is there anything in particular about Eisenhower that might make you want to vote against him? (What is it?)

14. Now, adding up the good points and the bad points about the two candidates, and forgetting for a minute the parties they belong to, which one do you think would make the best President?

15. Some people say that Eisenhower is not a real Republican. What do you think about this? Is he the kind of man that *you* think of as being a real Republican? (Why do you say that?)

16. (If not answered in 15) What about Eisenhower's ideas and the things he stands for? Do you think that he is pretty much the same as most other Republicans or is he different from them? (Why do you say that?)

17. How about the candidates for vice-president? Aside from their parties, do you have any strong opinions about either of them? (How is that?)

18. Generally speaking, would you say that you, personally, care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall or that you don't care very much which party wins?

19. How about state and local elections? When you have state and local elections around here would you say that you care a good deal who wins those elections?

20. Some people don't pay much attention to the political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns so far this year?

Now I want to ask you how you feel about some of the issues that people are talking about these days. For example—

21. Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has done has been about right, too much, or not enough?

a) Now, how do you think the two parties feel about this question? Do

you think there are any differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on this issue, or would you say they feel the same? (How is that?)

22. There is a lot of talk these days about discrimination, that is, people having trouble getting jobs because of their race. Do you think the government ought to take an interest in whether Negroes have trouble getting jobs or should it stay out of this problem?

a) (If government should take an interest) Do you think we need laws to deal with this problem or are there other ways that will handle it better?
b) (If "other ways") What do you have in mind?
c) (If "laws") Do you think the national government should handle this or do you think it should be left for each state to handle in its own way?
d) (If government should stay out) Do you think the state governments should do something about this problem or should they stay out of it also?

23. Have you heard anything about the Taft-Hartley Law?

a) (If R has heard) How do you feel about it? Do you think the law should be changed in any way, or don't you have any feelings about it?
b) (If should be changed) Do you think the law should be changed just a little, changed quite a bit, or do you think it should be *completely* repealed? (How is that?)

24. Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?

a) Now, how do you think the two parties feel about this question? Do you think there are any differences between the Democratic and Republican parties on this issue, or would you say they feel the same? (How is that?)

25. Some people feel that it was our government's fault that China went Communist—others say there was nothing that we could do to stop it. How do you feel about this?

26. Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea two years ago or should we have stayed out?

27. Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do *now* in Korea? Should we:

a) Pull out of Korea entirely?
b) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement?
c) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China? (Qualifying comments)

Now, I would like to ask you a little more about the political parties.

28. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?

If Republican or Democrat:

a) Would you call yourself a strong (Rep.) (Dem.) or not very strong (Rep.) (Dem.)?

b) Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a (Rep.) (Dem.) rather than a (Dem.) (Rep.)?

(1) (If yes) When did you change?

c) Suppose there was an election where your party was running a candidate that you didn't like or you didn't agree with. Which of the following things comes closest to what you think you would do?

(1) I would probably vote for him anyway because a person should be loyal to his party.

(2) I would probably not vote for either candidate in that election.

(3) I would probably vote for the other party's candidate. (How would you feel about voting for the other party—would it bother you in any way?)

If Independent or Other:

d) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?

e) Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a Democrat or a Republican?

(1) (If yes) Which party was that?

(2) (If yes) When did you change?

Ask of everyone:

29. Do you remember when you were growing up whether your parents thought of themselves mostly as Democrats or Republicans or did they shift around from one party to another?

30. In the elections for President since you have been old enough to vote, would you say that you have voted in all of them, most of them, some of them, or none of them?

If R has ever voted for President to Question 30, ask Questions 31–33; If R has never voted for President, skip to Question 34:

31. Have you always voted for the same party or have you voted for different parties for President?

a) (If same) Which party was that?

32. Do you remember whom you voted for the first time you voted for President?

a) (If yes) Who was it? What party was it?

b) (If yes) Do you remember what year that was? (If yes) When?

33. In 1948, you remember that Truman ran against Dewey. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

a) (If yes, does remember voting) Which one did you vote for?

Ask of everyone:

34. Now how about the election this November? Do you know if you are (registered) (eligible to vote) so that you could vote in the November election if you wanted to?

a) (If necessary) Are you (registered) (eligible to vote)?

35. So far as you know now, do you expect to vote in November or not?

If Yes *to Question 35, ask Questions 36–39; if* No *to Question 35, skip to Question 40*:

36. How do you think you will vote for President in this election?

a) (If mentions candidate or party) What would you say is the *most important reason* why you are going to vote for (answer to 36).

37. Whom do you plan to vote for as United States senator?

38. How about congressman? Whom do you plan to vote for there?

39. Whom do you think you will vote for as governor here in (your state)?

If No *to Question 35*:

40. If you *were* going to vote—how do you think you would vote for President in this election?

a) (If mentions candidate or party) What would you say is the most important reason why you would vote for (answer to 40)?

41. Some people think that if a voter votes for one party for President, he should vote for the same party for senator and congressman. Do you agree or disagree with that idea?

a) Why do you feel that way?

42. Was there some other candidate whom you would rather have seen nominated at Chicago last July? (If necessary) Who?

a) (If yes to 42) Why would you like to have seen him nominated?

43. Do you think the party conventions like they had in Chicago are a good way to nominate candidates for President or do you think there is a better way?

a) (If a better way) What would you suggest?

44. Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think *other* people will vote in this election.

For instance, take *farmers*—do you think farmers around the country will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?

Now, how about *working-class people*—do you think they will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?

Now, how about Negroes, middle-class people, big-businessmen, labor union members?

Now, how about people in different religious groups, like Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. For instance, how about Protestants—do you think Protestants around the country will vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or do you think they will be about evenly split?

How about Catholics?

How about Jews?

a) (Ask only for groups seen as mostly supporting one or the other party to Question 44.) Now let me check back and ask you why you feel that ——— are more likely to vote (Rep.) (Dem.), etc.

Ask of everyone:

45. Are you married?

a) (If yes) How do you think your (husband) (wife) will vote?

46. Now, how about your five best friends—how do you think they're most likely to vote?

47. Now, I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell me when I interview them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them. I'll read them one at a time and you just tell me whether you agree or disagree.

a) It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance to win.

b) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.

c) The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.

d) Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.

e) A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.

f) So many other people vote in the national elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.

g) People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

h) If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it.

i) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

48. There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. If you were asked to use one of these four names for *your* social class, which would you say you belonged in—the middle class, lower class, working class, or upper class.

49. Some people say there's not much opportunity in America today—that the average man doesn't have much chance to really get ahead. Others say there's plenty of opportunity, and anyone who works hard can go as far as he wants. How do you feel about this?

PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex: Male? Female?
2. Race: White? Negro? Other?
3. What year were you born?
4. How many grades of school did you finish? 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12?
   a) (If high school) Have you had any schooling other than high school?
      (1) (If yes) What other schooling have you had?
   b) (If attended college) Do you have a college degree?
5. What is your occupation? I mean, what kind of work do you do?
   a) (If R is employed) Do you work for yourself or for someone else?
   b) (If R is unemployed) What kind of work do you usually do?
   c) (If R is retired) What kind of work did you do before you retired?
6. (Ask only if R is not head of the household) What kind of work does the head of your household do?
   a) (If head is employed) Does he work for himself or for someone else?
   b) (If head is unemployed) What kind of work does he usually do?
   c) (If head is retired) What kind of work did he do before he retired?
   d) Age of head: 21–24? 25–34? 35–44? 45–54? 55–64? 65 and over?
7. Do either you or the head of your household belong to a labor union?
   a) (If necessary) Who is it that belongs?
8. What kind of work did your father do for a living while you were growing up?
9. Where were you born? (If United States, which state?)
10. What part of the United States did you grow up in? Which state or states?
11. Were you brought up mostly on a farm, in a small town, or in a large city?
12. Were both your parents born in this country?
   a) (If yes) Which country did your father's parents come from?
   b) (If yes) Which country did your mother's parents come from?
   c) (If no) Which country was your father born in?
   d) (If no) Which country was your mother born in?
13. How long have you lived in this county? (Note: *county*, not country)
14. How long have you lived in (state)?

15. Do you feel that you have settled down to stay here in ———(?) or do you feel that you may not stay here very long?

16. Do you folks own your home here, or rent, or what?

17. Do you have any children in school here in ———?

18. Is your church preference Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other, or none?

19. Would you say you go to church regularly, often, seldom, or never?

20. About what do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family? Under $1000? $1000–1999? $2000–2999? $3000–3999? $4000–4999? $5000–7499? $7500–9999? $10,000 and over?

APPENDIX A-II

Post-Election Study Questionnaire*

We are calling on all the people we interviewed before the election and asking them how they feel about the way the election came out.

1. Do you think it will make a good deal of difference to the country that Eisenhower won instead of Stevenson—or don't you think it will make much difference?

a) (If yes) Why is that?

2. We're mainly interested in this interview in finding out whether people paid much attention to the election campaign this year. Take newspapers for instance, did you read about the campaign in any newspaper?

a) (If yes) Would you say you read quite a lot, or not very much?

3. How about radio—did you listen to any speeches or discussions about the campaign on the radio?

a) (If yes) Would you say you listened quite a lot, or not very much?

4. How about television—did you watch any programs about the campaign on television?

a) (If yes) Would you say you watched quite a lot, or not very much?

5. How about magazines—did you read about the campaign in any magazines?

a) (If yes) Would you say you read quite a lot, or not very much?

6. (If yes to two or more) Of all these ways of following the campaign which one would you say you got the most information from—newspapers, radio, television, or magazines?

7. In talking to people about the election, we find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered or they were sick or they just didn't have time. How about you, did you vote this time?

If R voted (If R did not *vote, skip to Question 23):*

8. For whom did you vote for President?

9. What would you say is the most important reason you voted for him?

10. How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did?

* Administered in November 1952.

11. Did you ever think during the campaign that you might vote for (opposite candidate)?

a) What made you decide not to vote for him?

12. How about the election for United States senator? Did you vote for a candidate for senator?

a) (If yes) Whom did you vote for?

13. How about the vote for congressman? Did you vote for a candidate for Congress?

a) (If yes) Whom did you vote for?

14. How about the vote for governor here in (your state). Did you vote for one of the candidates for governor?

a) (If yes) Whom did you vote for?

15. How about the elections for other state and local offices—did you vote a straight ticket or did you vote for candidates from different parties?

a) (If voted a straight ticket) Which party did you vote for?

16. You know that the parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anybody from either one of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you during the campaign?

(If yes)

a) Which party were they from?

b) Do you remember what they talked to you about?
If Democratic ———.
If Republican ———.

c) Do you think that anything they said had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?

Now, I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think some people you know voted in the election.

17. Could you tell me how your friends voted in the election? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?

a) Do you think any of their opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?

18. How about the people where you work? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?

a) Do you think any of their opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?

19. (If married) How about your (husband) (wife)? Did (he) (she) vote Democratic or Republican?

a) Do you think any of (his) (her) opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?

20. (If not married) How about your family? Did they vote Democratic or Republican?

a) Do you think any of their opinions about the election had anything to do with the way you decided to vote?

21. Is there anything in particular that happened during the campaign, something you saw, read, or heard about, that helped you decide how you were going to vote?

22. I have a list of some of the things that people do that help a party or a candidate win an election. I wonder if you could tell me whether you did any of these things during the last election campaign?

a) Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?

b) Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?

c) Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?

d) Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates?

e) Do you belong to any political club or organizations?

If R did not vote:

23. For whom would you have voted if you had voted?

24. What was the main reason you did not vote?

25. Were you registered to vote?

26. You know the parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anybody from either one of the parties call you up or come around and talk to you during the campaign?

a) (If yes) Which party were they from?

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about how you think some people you know voted in the election.

27. Could you tell me how your friends voted in the election? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?

28. How about the people where you work? Did they vote mostly Republican, mostly Democratic, or were they pretty evenly split?

29. (If married) How about your (husband) (wife)? Did (he) (she) vote Democratic or Republican?

30. (If not married) How about your family? Did they vote Democratic or Republican?

31. I have a list of some of the things that people do that help a party or a candidate win an election. I wonder if you could tell me whether you did any of these things during the last election campaign?

a) Did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?

b) Did you give any money or buy tickets or anything to help the campaign for one of the parties or candidates?

c) Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, dinners, or things like that?

d) Did you do any other work for one of the parties or candidates?

e) Do you belong to any political club or organizations?

APPENDIX B

Supplementary Tables of Election Results

TABLE I

THE VOTE FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR, 1952

	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total	Two-party Republican or Democratic plurality		Republican % of major-party senatorial vote	
							1952 election	Preceding election
Arizona* ...	132,063	125,338	...	257,401	R	6,725	51.3	37.4†
California ..	3,982,448	...	559,992	4,542,440		—	—	—
Montana‡ ..	127,360	133,109	1,828	262,297	D	5,749	48.9	43.0§
Nevada	41,906	39,184	...	81,090	R	2,722	51.7	42.0†
New Mexico	117,168	122,543	...	239,711	D	5,375	48.9	42.6§
Utah	177,435	149,598	...	327,033	R	27,837	54.3	54.0†
Washington‡	460,884	595,288	2,563	1,058,735	D	134,404	43.6	46.3†
Wyoming* .	67,176	62,921	...	130,097	R	4,255	51.6	42.9§
Total ...	5,106,440	1,227,981	564,383	6,898,804	D	103,989	—	—

* Republican replaced Democrat.

† 1950.

‡ Democrat replaced Republican.

§ 1948.

Source: Republican National Committee.

TABLE II

STATES RANKED ACCORDING TO REPUBLICAN % OF THE MAJOR-PARTY VOTE FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS IN 1950 AND 1952

	Rank in nation, 1952	% in 1952	Rank in nation, 1950	% in 1950	Republican gain or loss
Oregon	9	61.3	8	58.9	+ 2.4
Wyoming	10	60.1	13	54.5	+ 5.6
Idaho	12	59.4	14	54.4	+ 5.0
Washington	15	56.5	21	52.3	+ 4.2
Montana	16	56.5	28	47.5	+ 9.0
Utah	17	55.6	30	47.0	+ 8.6
Colorado	19	55.3	23	51.3	+ 4.0
California	20	54.0	15	54.2	− 0.2
Nevada	30	50.5	29	47.2	+ 3.3
Arizona	31	48.5	37	35.0	+13.5
New Mexico	32	48.1	32	43.8	+ 4.3

Summary

House seats gained by Republicans

% Gain or loss in vote	State	Net increase in number of seats
13 to 14	Arizona	1
9 to 9.9	Montana	1
8 to 8.9	Utah	1
5 to 5.9	Wyoming	1
	Idaho	1
4 to 4.9	New Mexico	1
	Washington	1
	Colorado	1
3 to 3.9	Nevada	1
2 to 2.9	Oregon	1
	Total	10

House seats lost by Republicans

0 to −1	California	−1

TABLE III

THE STATE-WIDE VOTE FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS, 1952

	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total	Two-party Republican or Democratic plurality	Republican % of major-party House vote		
						1952	1950	1948
Arizona	120,533	127,867	...	248,400	D 7,334	48.5	35.0	38.3
California	2,382,921	2,030,549	150,190	4,563,660	R 352,372	54.0	54.2	59.4
Colorado	335,394	269,865	1,307	606,566	R 65,529	55.3	51.3	45.2
Idaho	157,181	107,417	...	264,598	R 49,764	59.4	54.4	59.3
Montana	144,296	110,882	888	256,066	R 33,414	56.5	47.5	42.4
Nevada	40,683	39,912	...	80,595	R 771	50.5	47.2	49.4
New Mexico	112,297	121,477	...	233,774	D 9,180	48.1	43.8	41.4
Oregon	408,349	257,743	...	666,092	R 150,606	61.3	58.9	62.7
Utah	181,841	144,982	...	326,823	R 36,859	55.6	47.0	41.9
Washington	574,194	440,938	1,347	1,016,479	R 133,256	56.5	52.3	49.9
Wyoming	76,161	50,559	...	126,720	R 25,602	60.1	54.5	51.5
Total	4,533,850	3,702,191	153,732	8,389,773	R 831,659	55.0	—	—

TABLE IV

THE VOTE FOR GOVERNOR, 1952

	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total	Two-party Republican or Democratic plurality	Republican % of major-party gubernatorial vote	
						1952 election	Preceding election
Arizona	156,592	103,693	...	260,285	R 52,899	60.2	50.8*
Colorado	349,920	260,039	3,066	613,025	R 89,881	57.4	52.6*
Montana†	134,423	129,369	...	263,792	R 5,054	51.0	44.0‡
New Mexico	129,116	111,034	...	240,150	R 18,032	53.8	53.7*
Utah	180,516	147,188	...	327,704	R 33,328	55.1	55.0‡
Washington	567,822	510,675	...	1,078,479	R 57,147	52.6	51.7‡
Total	1,518,449	1,261,998	3,066	2,783,453	R 256,391	54.5	—

* 1950.
† Republican replaced Democrat.
‡ 1948.

TABLE V

THE COMPOSITION OF STATE LEGISLATURES

	Elected in 1952				Elected in 1950			
	Senators		Representatives*		Senators		Representatives	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Arizona†	4	15	30	50	..	19	10	62
California	29	11	56	24	27	13	47	33
Colorado	23	12	45	20	20	15	47	18
Idaho	33	11	45	14	29	15	36	23
Montana‡	36	20	62	32	28	26	49	41
Nevada§	12	5	18	29	11	6	20	23
New Mexico‖	9	22	28	27	6	18	9	46
Oregon	26	4	49	11	21	9	51	9
Utah	15	8	39	21	8	15	30	30
Washington	26	20	58	41	21	25	32	67
Wyoming	21	6	45	11	17	10	39	17
Total	234	134	475	280	188	171	370	369

* States have different names for the larger branch of their legislatures, e.g., Gene Assembly, House of Representatives, etc.

† The number of seats in the House of Representatives was increased by 8 between t 1950 and 1952 elections.

‡ The number of seats in the House of Representatives was increased by 4 between t 1950 and 1952 elections. In 1950, two Senators were Independents.

§ The number of seats in the Assembly was increased by 4 between 1950 and 1951.

‖ The number of seats in the Senate was increased by 7 between the 1950 and 1952 ele tions.

TABLE VI

THE REPUBLICAN % OF THE MAJOR-PARTY VOTE FOR PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES SENATO REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS (ON THE BASIS OF THE STATE-WIDE VOTE), AND GOVERNOR, IN 1952

	President	United States Senator	Representative	Governor
Arizona	58.3	51.3	48.5	60.2
California	56.9	—*	54.0	—†
Colorado	60.7	—†	55.3	57.4
Idaho	65.5	—†	59.4	—†
Montana	59.7	48.9	56.5	51.0
Nevada	61.4	51.7	50.5	—†
New Mexico	55.6	48.9	48.1	53.8
Oregon	60.9	—†	61.3	—†
Utah	58.9	54.3	55.6	55.1
Washington	54.9	43.6	56.5	52.6
Wyoming	62.8	51.6	60.1	—†

* No contest.
† No election.

APPENDIX C

The Public's Response to Seven Issues

I. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY (Appendix A-I, Question 21)

	Attitude*								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
SD	1	28	48	4	..	8	..	1	9
WD	4	21	51	11	..	10	..	3	5
ID	1	11	21	3	..	3	1	1	2
I	1	3	8	5	1	5	3	1	2
IR	1	6	12	6	..	2	1	3	..
WR	1	12	18	12	4	5	1	2	4
SR	2	9	18	21	4	6	1	5	5
Apolitical	..	..	1	2	..	..	..	..	..
Not ascertained	..	2	1	..	..	..	..	..	1
Other	..	..	1	..	..	1	..	..	..
Total (450)	11	92	179	64	9	40	7	16	28
Probable vote									
Democrat	3	38	73	5	..	13	..	2	10
Republican	..	29	66	47	8	14	7	12	13
Undecided	5	3	7	1	..	4	..	..	1
Other	..	1	..	..	..	1	..	..	..
Not voting	3	19	30	8	1	6	..	1	3
Don't know or no answer	..	2	3	3	..	2	..	1	1

Key to column headings:

A. Definitely should do more
B. Should do more
C. About right, OK
D. Should do less
E. Definitely should do less
F. Should do more on some, same on others
G. Should do more on some, less on others
H. Should do less on some, same on others
I. Don't know or no answer

*** Items A and B are classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Items C, D, and E are classed "Disagree." Items F to I are classed as ambiguous, etc.**

II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (Appendix A-I, Question 22)

	Attitude*									
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
SD	..	27	1	12	6	6	13	17	9	9
WD	1	26	..	11	9	6	12	24	3	13
ID	1	13	..	2	5	3	5	9	3	2
I	2	6	..	4	3	3	3	6	1	3
IR	..	4	2	7	5	1	6	5	1	3
WR	1	11	..	3	10	5	10	12	2	2
SR	1	11	2	..	5	5	20	16	3	5
Apolitical	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Not ascertained	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Other	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..
Total (446)	6	102	5	39	43	29	70	89	23	40
Probable vote										
Democrat	1	45	1	10	10	9	14	35	6	13
Republican	4	31	4	21	22	13	40	42	7	17
Undecided	1	5	..	2	1	1	2	3	1	..
Other	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Not voting	..	18	..	6	9	4	12	7	9	6
Don't know or no answer	..	1	..	..	1	2	2	2	..	4

Key to column headings:

A. National government should pass laws and do other things too
B. National government should pass laws
C. State government should pass laws and do other things too
D. State government should pass laws
E. Government should do other things only
F. Government should take an interest, answer how
G. National government should stay o but state government should take act
H. Government should stay out entirely
I. Favors restrictive legislation
J. Don't know or no answer

*** Items A to G are classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Items H and I are classed "D agree." Item J is classed as ambiguous, etc.**

III. TAFT-HARTLEY LAW (Appendix A-I, Question 23)*

	Attitude†								
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
SD	23	2	..	5	..	..	8	10	7
WD	11	4	1	6	1	1	6	5	14
ID	10	2	..	3	2	..	4	..	3
I	3	1	2	..	2	1	3	3	2
IR	2	1	..	2	..	..	5	2	6
WR	5	..	..	..	..	3	8	5	10
SR	4	..	..	2	2	1	11	5	23
Apolitical	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..
Not ascertained	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Other	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Total (357)	58	10	3	19	7	7	45	30	67
Probable vote									
Democrat	31	6	1	7	2	..	11	7	8
Republican	4	..	..	..	..	..	2	1	2
Undecided	12	2	1	11	5	6	28	15	47
Other	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Not voting	8	2	1	1	..	1	4	4	10
Don't know or no answer	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	..

Key to column headings:

A. Completely repealed
B. Changed quite a bit, in favor of labor
C. Changed quite a bit, in favor of management
D. Changed quite a bit, no answer in whose favor
E. Changed a little, in favor of labor
F. Changed a little, in favor of manage
G. Changed a little, no answer in w favor
H. Changed, no answer how much
I. All right as it is
J. Don't know or no answer

* Analysis of those who had heard of the law.

† Items A, B, D, E, G, and H are classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Items C, F, are classed "Disagree." Item J is classed as ambiguous, etc.

IV. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENTS (Appendix A-I, Question 24)

	Attitude*					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
SD	42	10	1	8	26	12
WD	44	4	2	5	27	18
ID	22	1	2	3	12	3
I	16	..	..	2	11	..
IR	15	2	2	4	5	3
WR	27	7	3	8	11	3
SR	35	6	1	9	14	6
Apolitical	2	..	..	..	1	2
Not ascertained	1	..	..	..	..	1
Other	2	..	..	..	..	..
Total (446)	206	35	11	39	107	48
Probable vote						
Democrat	61	10	4	9	40	20
Republican	91	16	5	24	49	16
Undecided	8	1	..	2	5	..
Other	1	..	..	1	..	..
Not voting	36	8	2	2	13	10
Don't know or no answer	9	..	..	1	..	2

Key to column headings:

A. Gone too far
B. Gone too far (qualified)
C. Both for and against
D. Hasn't gone too far (qualified)
E. Hasn't gone too far
F. Don't know or no answer

*** Items A and B are classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Items D and E are classed "Disagree." Items C and F are classed as ambiguous, etc.**

V. CULPABILITY FOR CHINA'S ACCESSION TO COMMUNISM
(Appendix A-I, Question 25)

	Attitude*			
	A	B	C	D
SD	16	9	47	27
WD	16	9	49	31
ID	6	8	21	8
I	4	4	15	6
IR	8	6	14	3
WR	15	5	29	10
SR	34	5	19	13
Apolitical	..	..	3	2
Not ascertained	1	..	..	1
Other	1	..	1	..
Total (446)	101	46	198	101
Probable vote				
Democrat	21	11	71	41
Republican	68	23	78	32
Undecided	1	1	9	5
Other	..	1	1	..
Not voting	11	9	32	19
Don't know or no answer	..	1	7	4

Key to column headings:

A. It was our fault
B. It was our fault (qualified)
C. Not our fault
D. Don't know or no answer

*** Items A and B are classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Item C is classed as "Disagree." Item D is classed as ambiguous, etc.**

VI. KOREAN WAR ENTRY (Appendix A-I, Question 26)

	Attitude*			
	A	B	C	D
SD	49	1	36	13
WD	32	6	40	27
ID	17	3	16	7
I	11	3	11	4
IR	13	4	9	5
WR	21	9	20	9
SR	25	10	27	9
Apolitical	..	..	3	2
Not ascertained	..	..	..	2
Other	..	..	2	..
Total (446)	168	36	164	78
Probable vote				
Democrat	60	4	54	26
Republican	74	24	70	33
Undecided	5	3	4	4
Other	1	..	1	10
Not voting	24	5	28	1
Don't know or no answer	4	..	7	4

Key to column headings:

A. We did the right thing to fight in Korea
B. Both for and against
C. We should have stayed out
D. Don't know or no answer

*** Item A is classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Item C is classed "Disagree." Item B and D are classed as ambiguous, etc.**

VII. BEST POLICY IN KOREA (Appendix A-I, Question 27)

	Attitude*				
	A	B	C	D	E
SD	9	40	43	1	6
WD	9	36	44	3	13
ID	7	20	13	..	3
I	2	8	14	1	4
IR	4	11	12	1	3
WR	9	12	29	1	8
SR	9	13	41	..	8
Apolitical	1	2	2	..	..
Not ascertained	..	..	..	..	2
Other	1	..	1	..	..
Total (446)	51	142	199	7	47
Probable vote					
Democrat	14	65	53	2	10
Republican	24	43	106	3	25
Undecided	2	6	7	..	1
Other	2	..	..	..	..
Not voting	9	23	30	1	8
Don't know or no answer	..	5	3	1	3

Key to column headings:

A. Pull out of Korea entirely
B. Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement
C. Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China
D. Either A or C but refuses to or does make a choice
E. Don't know or no answer

*** Item B is classed on the "Agree" side of Fig. 5. Items A, C, and D are classed "agree." Item E is classed as ambiguous, etc.**

APPENDIX D

The Vote in Western Metropolises

TABLE I

THE 1948 AND 1952 VOTE IN 7 WESTERN CITIES OVER 300,000 POPULATION COMPARED WITH 35 CITIES OF THE SAME CLASS OVER THE NATION*

Year	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total		Two-party Republican or Democratic plurality	Republican%†
Denver (Pop. 415,786)							
1952	119,797	92,237	1,534	213,563	R	27,555	56.5 (56.
1948	76,364	89,489	3,063	168,916	D	13,125	46.0 (45.
Chg.	+43,428	+2,748	−1,529	+44,647	R	40,680	+10.5 (10.
Los Angeles (Pop. 1,970,358)							
1952	496,422	456,021	13,926	966,369	R	40,401	52.1 (51.
1948	364,870	413,670	79,240	857,780	D	48,800	46.9 (42.
Chg.	+131,552	+42,351	−65,314	+108,539	R	89,201	+ 5.2 (8.
Oakland (Pop. 384,575)							
1952	90,278	88,858	1,485	180,621	R	1,420	50.4 (49.
1948	76,566	88,573	8,875	174,014	D	12,007	46.4 (44.
Chg.	+13,712	+285	−7,930	+6,607	R	13,427	+ 4.0 (5.
Portland (Pop. 373,628)							
1952	109,148	87,252	1,042	197,442	R	21,896	55.6 (55.
1948	86,519	93,703	8,806	189,028	D	7,184	48.0 (45.
Chg.	+22,629	−6,451	−7,764	+8,414	R	29,080	+ 7.6 (9.
San Diego (Pop. 334,387)							
1952	175,281	101,880	1,590	278,751	R	73,401	63.2 (62.
1948	101,552	98,217	5,690	205,459	R	3,335	50.8 (49.
Chg.	+73,729	+3,663	−4,100	+73,292	R	70,066	+12.4 (13.
San Francisco (Pop. 775,357)							
1952	188,531	167,282	4,136	359,949	R	21,249	53.0 (52.
1948	160,135	167,726	22,490	350,351	D	7,591	48.8 (45.
Chg.	+28,396	−444	−18,354	+9,598	R	28,840	+ 4.2 (6.
Seattle (Pop. 467,591)							
1952	129,347	105,502	4,232	239,081	R	23,845	55.1 (54.
1948	94,120	102,163	8,007	204,290	D	8,043	48.0 (46.
Chg.	+35,227	+3,339	−3,775	+34,791	R	31,888	+ 7.1 (8.
35 cities (Pop. 33,478,671)							
1952	6,892,240	7,681,924	120,183	14,694,347	D	789,684	47.3 (46.
1948	5,096,441	6,899,048	857,588	12,853,077	D	1,802,607	42.5 (39.
Chg.	+7,795,799	+782,876	−737,405	+1,841,270	R	1,012,923	+ 4.8 (7.

* Source: Republican National Committee.

† First % in each line shows Republican % of the two-party total; the % in parenthes shows Republican % of the total for all parties.

TABLE II

THE 1948 AND 1952 VOTE IN 4 WESTERN INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS COMPARED WITH THE TO FOR 28 IN THE NATION*

	Republican	Democratic	Other	Total	Two-party Republican or Democratic plurality		Republi %†
Area of Los Angeles City and County (Pop. 4,151,687)							
1952	1,226,971	950,093	24,148	2,201,212	R	276,878	56.4 (
1948	804,232	812,690	112,160	1,729,082	D	8,458	49.7 (
Chg.	+422,739	+137,403	−88,012	+472,130	R	285,336	+6.7 (
Area of San Francisco-Oakland: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, and San Mateo Counties (Pop. 2,135,934)							
1952	566,279	475,233	8,976	1,050,488	R	91,046	54.4 (
1948	415,337	419,307	46,751	881,395	D	3,970	49.8 (
Chg.	150,942	+55,926	−37,775	−169,093	R	+95,016	+4.6 (
Area of Portland: Multnomah County (Pop. 471,537)							
1952	132,602	107,115	1,339	241,059	R	25,484	55.3 (
1948	86,519	93,703	8,806	189,028	D	7,184	48.0 (
Chg.	+46,083	+13,415	−7,467	+52,031	R	32,668	+7.3 (
Area of Seattle-Tacoma: King and Pierce Counties (Pop. 1,008,868)							
1952	257,022	221,715	6,845	485,582	R	35,307	53.7 (
1948	165,435	193,969	23,017	382,421	D	28,534	46.0 (
Chg.	+91,587	+27,746	−16,172	+103,161	R	63,841	+7.7 (
Total area of 28 industrial districts of the nation							
1952	12,032,209	11,534,902	146,340	23,713,451	R	497,307	51.1 (
1948	8,732,438	10,349,894	911,057	19,993,389	D	1,617,456	45.8 (
Chg.	+3,299,771	+1,185,008	−764,717	+3,720,062	R	2,114,763	+5.3 (

* Source: Republican National Committee.

† First % in each line shows Republican % of the two-party total; the % in parenth shows Republican % of the total for all parties.

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